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ABSTRACT
DEFINITIONS AND DEPICTIONS OF RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLISH FÜRSTENSPIEGEL
Joseph Sharp
April 15, 2022
This dissertation examines how medieval authors defined rhetoric and depicted
rhetorical practice in medieval English Fürstenspiegel. It begins by analyzing how the
field of medieval rhetorical historiography has overlooked the Fürstenspiegel as a
rhetorical genre due to its overt reliance on meta-rhetorical handbook genres as the
objects of its analysis. This dissertation challenges traditional narratives that positions
medieval rhetoric as a primarily academic discipline divorced from political practice by
engaging in horizontal reading practices that examine the broader culture of medieval
rhetorical practice alongside the definitions of rhetoric found in medieval English
Fürstenspiegel. In so doing, this dissertation argues that the rhetorical theory contained in
the Fürstenspiegel tradition represent novel adaptations to classical rhetorical theory that
are designed to accommodate the constraints of the shifting medieval political landscape
as the Aristotelian tradition was recovered.
After establishing the relevance of the Fürstenspiegel as a rhetorical genre in
Chapter One, the dissertation provides three cases studies on John of Salisbury, John
Gower, and John Lydgate that demonstrate how the rhetorical theories communicated in
their Fürstenspiegel were responsive to particular cultural moments and resonated with
vi

contemporary political practices. Chapter Two analyzes how John of Salisbury positions
rhetorical knowledge as necessary for the development of higher-order learning in the
individual and compares the interpretive and inventive practices that John advocates in
the Metalogicon and Policraticus with emerging methodologies for determining the truth
of testimony and contingent situations in contemporary English jurisprudence. Chapter
Three explores how John Gower’s elevation of rhetoric to an epistemological category
establishes a political paradigm in which a sovereign’s rhetorical efficacy is measured
against his habituation to virtue, a paradigm that is challenged by Richard II’s attempt to
canonize Edward II. Finally, Chapter Four traces the development of rhetoric as a
legitimated discipline within the king’s household and details how John Lydgate
leverages the professionalization of rhetoric to create a political system in which
rhetorical intervention is achieved through rhetorical stylistics. In Chapter Five, the
dissertation concludes by explaining how these case studies affect the field of medieval
rhetorical historiography.
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CHAPTER I
THE CASE FOR THE FÜRSTENSPIEGEL AS A RHETORICAL GENRE
Preterea quod interrogasti et scire desideras est archanum tale quod humana
pectora vix poterunt tollerare; quomodo ergo possunt in mortalibus pellibus
depingi? Ad illud itaque quod te decet inquirere et mihi licitum est tractare, me
oportet et teneor ex debito respondere, sicut tu teneris ex debito discrecionis non
exigere a me amplius ex hoc secreto quod tibi tradidi in hoc libro. Quia si attente
et studiose legeris et intellexeris et ad plenum sciveris que ipso continentur,
indubianter credo quod non erit inter te et illud quod scire desideras aliquod
obstaculum: qui tantam graciam Deus contulit tibi in intellectu et velocitate
ingenii et literature scienciarum. Insuper per meam doctrinam precedentem quam
tibi tradidi, per teipsum poteris apprehender et figurative intelligere totum illud
quod postulas edoceri. Quia desiderium ferventis voluntatis aperiet tibi viam ad
tuum propositum optinendum, et perducet te ad finem optatum, Domino
concedente. Causa quidem subest quare tibi figurative revelo secretum meum,
loquens tecum exemplis enigmaticis atque signis, quia timeo nimium ne liber
proscenium ad manus deveniat infidelum et ad potestatem arrogancium, et sic
perveniat ad illos ultimum bonum et archanum divinum, at quod summus Deus
illos judicavit immeritos et indignos.1
Roger Bacon’s Latin edition of the Secretum Secretorum, a text translated from the
Arabic Kitāb sir al-asrār, opens with an Aristotelian pseudepigrapha in which Aristotle

1

R. Bacon, Opera hacentus inedita Rogeri Baconi Fasc. V: Secretum Secretorum cum Glossis et Notulis, ed.
Robert Steele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920), 40-1. In addition, that which you have asked of me and
that which you most desire to know are the secrets that the human heat can scarcely sustain; how,
therefore, can [these secrets] be painted upon human skin? Though it is proper for me to treat what you
inquire as far as it is permissible, as I am bound by legal duty, you are likewise bound by the debt of
discretion to not demand more from me than the secrets I have given in this book. If you read it diligently
and understand it, you will know the whole of what this book contains. Undoubtedly, I believe that there
will not be an obstacle between you and what you want to know, for so much grace has God given to you
such understanding and quick disposition for the learning of sciences. Therefore, through my doctrine
which I have given you before, you may on comprehend on your own and understand that in which you
asked to be instructed. And so, the desire of your fervent will shall open the way for you to achieve your
goal and lead to your desired end, if God so wills. And the cause why I have revealed my secrets to you
figuratively, speaking to you in enigmatic examples and signs, because I fear greatly that this book should
come into hands of the unfaithful and in the power of the arrogant, who may come to know the ultimate
good and the divine secret, of which God has judged them underserving and unbecoming (my
translation).
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responds to Alexander’s request for knowledge on governance with an exhortation to
secrecy. Composed in Arabic around 941 AD, the Kitāb sir al-asrār enjoyed a wide
circulation in translation in the late medieval Latin West and is found in around five
hundred manuscript copies dating from the twelfth century.2 Broadly understood not as
an Aristotelian-influenced novel Arabic composition but rather as a preserved and
genuine Aristotelian text, the Secretum Secretorum inserted itself into the established
tradition of the mirror for princes, or Fürstenspiegel genre, handbooks of advice that
educated sovereigns on both moral virtue and proper governance.3 As the introduction to
the Secretum Secretorum indicates, the knowledge contained within these books was not
deemed to be accessible to a wide audience but rather was reserved, through its figurative
language, symbolic allegory, and obscure exempla, to those who possessed the
grammatical, rhetorical, hermeneutical, and ethical frameworks to parse the truth
concealed by the genre’s ambiguity. In this incipit to one of the most widely influential
Fürstenspiegel of the late medieval period, the terms of the genre’s construction are laid
bare. Fürstenspiegel may provide sovereigns with the regiminal and didactic frameworks
needed to ensure their efficacy as a sovereign, but the construction of these frameworks is
dependent upon the sovereign’s already existing rhetorical-grammatical training.
The Fürstenspiegel’s construction of a didactic, moral framework through which
a sovereign can discipline himself was necessitated by the liminal space that the body of
the sovereign occupied in medieval political theory. As Michael Wilks has persuasively

2

For the circulation and translation of the Arabic text during the medieval period, especially in an English
context, see Secretum Secretorum: Nine English Versions, vol. 1, ed. M. A. Manzalaoui (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977) ix-l, at ix.
3
Following the foundational text in the field, W. Kleineke, Englische Fürstenspiegel vom Policraticus
Johanns von Salisbury bis zum Basilikon Doron König Jakobs I (Halle/Salle: Niemeyer, 1937). I prefer the
term Fürstenspiegel to mirror for princes due to its grammatical flexibility.
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argued, late medieval political theory grappled with two traditions that theorized the
foundation of sovereignty in radically different ways. The hierocratic model of
government, drawn from developments in Roman law principles in the twelfth century,
viewed lay and temporal authority as a “derivative power” that descended from the
special spiritual authority vested within the Pope as the head of the Ecclesia of all
Christian believers in the form of the Petrine commission.4 In contrast, the recovery of
Aristotle and its supplementation by Ibn Rushd [Averroes] in the thirteenth century
introduced a “materialist stream” into medieval conceptions of sovereignty, which
challenged widely accepted views that conceptualized the Ecclesia as a universal body
rather than as a collection of real, existing individuals.5 Consequently, when the image of
the universal Ecclesia is shattered and replaced with a multiplicious populus comprised
of individuals who form a community around certain cultural norms, these norms
themselves become a basis for an ascending governance based upon civil laws.6 These
conceptions of ascending and descending government were supported by distinctions
made between civil law—the positive law agreed to by the consent of the governed—and
natural law—the divinely derived absolute and universal standards against which civil
law must be measured.7 As it concerned the person of the sovereign, these competing

4

M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963), 67.
5
Ibid., 85.
6
See, W. Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1961), p.
20.
7
While, here, the dissertation draws a stark contrast between hierocratic and popular forms of
government and natural and civil law, it is important to remember that these two traditions were in
constant dynamic interplay. Much of the work of Thomas Aquinas focused on reconciling these two
traditions through Thomistic realism to simultaneously understand the Ecclesia as a material construction
that precipitated a universal mental abstraction that, on its own, possessed some spiritual sense of
sovereignty. This naturally necessitated mixed forms of government in which questions concerning
sovereignty in a particular case were determined by the ultimate end of the actions. See, for example, Pol.
I.1.5; Sent. II d. 44 ex. ad. 4; and ST II-II q.12 a. 2 ad 1. Though it is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
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juristic conceptions of sovereignty positioned the sovereign’s body in a perpetual state of
composition. In the common metaphor of the political state as the body politic, the
sovereign occupied the position of the head, with the other components of the populus
representing the other parts of the body that supported, but ultimately followed the rule of
the head.8 According to Ernst H. Kantorowicz, medieval theorists drew upon Christian
traditions that framed Christ as having a heavenly and mortal body to argue that secular
king likewise possessed two bodies: a natural, mortal body subject to pleasures and pains
of living, and a sovereign body that functioned in the lex animate tradition as the
incorporation of civil law within the kingdom.9 The king himself, then, occupies a liminal
space in which he exists both under the natural law but above the civil law of the
community that he rules.10 To exist within this space requires a sovereign to allow
himself to be educated under the regiminal framework posited by the Fürstenspiegel so
that he may develop the disposition toward virtue that will curb any tyrannical
tendencies.
While the broad medieval concern over the nature of a moral education descended
from similar anxieties in antiquity, the elevation of the king as both the moral exemplum
and reflection of the entire kingdom and his liminal positioning in relation to law

with its focus upon rhetorical theory and practice, to extensively demarcate the lines between particular
manifestations of government and their relation to medieval theories of governance, these competing
conceptions that emerged with the recovery of Aristotle broadly informed political praxis in late medieval
England and were in turn influenced by conceptions of language and its use.
8
While the medieval metaphor of the body represented a unified whole, the individual parts of the body
were understood as having distinct functions based upon their role within the body. Rather than a holistic
understanding of the body, the medieval metaphor instead depicted the body politic as a union of
opposites that required the strong control of the head to be kept in order. See, M. Camille, “The image
and the self: unwriting late medieval bodies,” in Framing Medieval Bodies, eds. S. Kay & M. Rubin
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 62-99.
9
E. H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1999), 8-20.
10
Ibid., 149.
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necessitated a robust education in virtue. Through the influence of Cicero’s political
writings, Aristotelian virtue ethics were reconciled with traditions of Christian morality to
develop a moral framework under which an ideal Christian sovereign could function,
with an emphasis upon the four cardinal virtues of actio, or the practical action of
rulership: prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. However, as Aristotle elucidates in
the Nicomachean Ethics, as virtues of character rather than intellectual virtues, these
virtues could only be developed through experience, not through a didactic education.11
For young sovereigns assuming the throne, this distinction between experience and
education posed significant dilemma, as their youth precluded them from the prudential
knowledge based upon experience that the Aristotelian reception recognized as necessary
for practical rulership. While moral virtue, according to Aristotle and his followers like
Aquinas, may not be didactically taught, considerations of moral virtue did comprise a
significant component of late medieval grammatical-rhetorical training. Given the close
relationship in classical rhetorical theory between rhetorical practice and the development
of moral virtue, it is not surprising that the texts used to train grammatical interpretation
and rhetorical composition would touch on matters of morality. Specifically, in the late
medieval period, young nobility were educated in the realm of “lettrure,” which “had the
basic meaning of literacy” but also extended to a wider range of self-improvement that
included moral development.12 As the young English nobility learned to read and write,
first in Latin and then in the vernacular English and French, the objects of their
interpretations and translations were often moral axioms or moral exempla that

11

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 2.1.17.
R. F. Green, Poets and Princepleasers: Literature and the English Court in the Late Middle Ages (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 75.
12
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constituted a broad range of wisdom literature.13 The grammatical-rhetorical skills
developed in one’s youth formed a generalized orientation toward interpretation and
composition that informed the practical actions of rulership throughout one’s life. At the
same time, through the process of interpreting and translating axioms and exempla, their
moral teachings became internalized by those who encountered them. This is further
evidenced by the broad circulation of genres such as the Fürstenspiegel that “often
illustrated their advice with literary references, allusions to historical events and moral
stories, reminding their readers of the triumphs of virtuous rulers and the downfall of
foolish and wicked ones,” which necessitated the grammatical-rhetorical skills learned in
childhood and further developed through continuing education and the interpretation of
particular circumstances that arise during rulership.14 In short, while late medieval
pedagogical theorists may have disputed the possibility of didactically imparting an
education in moral virtue, questions of morality were central to literacy training during
the period.
With the recovery of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum Secretorum, the genre of
the Fürstenspiegel, which had always had a presence in the Latin West,15 exploded in
popularity, especially as it sought to address the gap between experience and education

13

C. Cannon, From Literacy to Literature: England, 1300-1400 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016),
199-201. See also, M. C. Woods, Classroom Commentaries: Teaching the Poetria nova across Medieval
and Renaissance Europe (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2010). In tracing the circulation of
the Poetria nova throughout Europe, Woods notes that rhetorical texts, such as the Poetria nova and its
commentaries, were often collected with moralizing texts, alongside other dictaminal works, pp. 166-9.
14
N. Orme, From Childhood to Chivalry: The Education of the English Kings and Aristocracy, 1066-1530
(London: Methuen, 1984), 89.
15
For an example of an early Latin Fürstenspiegel that predates the influence of the Secretum Secretorum,
see Alcuin, The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, trans. W. S. Howell (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1941). In contrast to the Fürstenspiegel influenced by the Letter to Alexander tradition, the Rhetoric
of Alcuin and Charlemagne adopts a dialogic approach in which Charlemagne questions and is directly
instructed by his advisor Alcuin.
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faced by young sovereigns. To generalize broadly, Fürstenspiegel thematized and
reconciled two distinct but related questions in the medieval Latin West that both
centered upon the person of the king and descended from similar issues: first, how does
the sovereign’s authority stand in relationship to the civil law of which he is the
guarantor; and, second, to what extent does an individual’s moral and virtuous character
depend upon a didactic education and, relatedly, what form should this virtuous education
take? In answering these questions, Fürstenspiegel authors turned toward classical and
Biblical sources, making specific adaptations to the narrative action found in these stories
within their translations to align them more closely with contemporary concerns and, in
some cases, to fit them within a Christian moral framework. Rita Copeland has
demonstrated that this act of displacing a source text through translation allowed
medieval authors to develop their own sense of auctoritas and to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the vernacular as a literary language.16 While the nature of vernacular
translation as a rhetorical act has been widely explored in modern scholarship,17 less
attention has been paid toward how the adaptations made by vernacular authors to
classical theory and classical narratives within texts like the Fürstenspiegel reveal a
robust depiction of deliberative rhetorical theory and contemporary rhetorical practices.
Despite claims that the undemocratic nature of the medieval period foreclosed the
possibility of deliberative rhetoric in practice,18 Fürstenspiegel as a genre provide
16

R. Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and
Vernacular Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 92-5.
17
See, for example, A. J. Minnis, Translations of Authority in Medieval English Literature: Valuing the
Vernacular (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). And, R. R. Edwards, Invention and Authorship
in Medieval England (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2017).
18
This claim remains one of the most widely repeated myths about the medieval period and descends
from two distinct traditions operating within rhetorical historiography. In the first, classical theories of
rhetoric that developed in the classical democracy of Athens are held up as “pure” forms of rhetoric that
are fragmented and refracted in the medieval period; see, for example, G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric
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extensive rhetorical frameworks for sovereigns as they engage in the act of practical
rulership. As I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, understanding
Fürstenspiegel only as moral or constitutional handbooks limits the range of social
actions that the genre aimed to achieve as it circulated throughout the Latin West.
Situated at the intersection of morality and governance, the education provided by the
Fürstenspiegel naturally had much to say about rhetorical theory and practice.
While the claim that Fürstenspiegel functioned as rhetorical handbooks alongside
their moral and political dimensions challenges accepted knowledge about the genre, the
close relationship between rhetoric, morality, and education has been well attested in both
the classical and medieval periods. Indeed, beginning with the work of Isocrates, the
development of moral virtue was closely associated with the rhetorical education required
by citizens to engage in civic affairs.19 This traditional association persisted in the Latin
rhetorical treatises most influential during the later medieval period, with Cicero noting:
Quare meo quidem animo nihilo minus eloquentiae studendum est, etsi ea quidam
et privatim et publice abutuntur; sed eo quidem vehementius, ne mali magno cum
detrimento bonorum et communi omnium pernicie plurimum possint, cum
praesertim hoc sit unum, quod ad omnes res et privatas et publicas maxime
pertineat, hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc inlustris, hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat. Nam
hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium rerum
praesto est sapientia.20

and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1980). In the second, contemporary historiography follows the example of Renaissance
theorists to paint the medieval period as a “dark age” of absolutism that hindered the development of
rhetorical theory and practice. In this version of historiography, the Renaissance rhetorical theorists
recover what has been “lost” during the medieval period; see for example, B. Vickers, In Defence of
Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
19
Isocrates, Against the Sophists, in Isocrates with an English Translation in Three Volumes, trans. G.
Norlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), especially at 291-97.
20
Cicero, De Inventione, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), at 1.5:
“Wherefore, in my opinion at least, men ought not the less to devote themselves to eloquence, although
some men both in private and public affairs misuse it in a perverse manner; but I think rather that they
should apply themselves to it with the more eagerness, in order to prevent wicked men from getting the
greatest power to the exceeding injury of the good, and the common calamity of all men; especially as
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As classical theories of language became inflected with Christian exegetical traditions by
theorists such as Jerome, Augustine, and Aquinas, they incorporated Christian views of
post-lapsarian language as a force ambiguity that produces discord and limits human
communication to the expression of external, material signs, whose sensory apprehension
makes possible misinterpretation.21 Due to the ambiguous nature of the linguistic and
textual signs used for communication, those who produce and interpret ambiguous signs
are compelled to use language morally aligned with language’s intended purpose of
revealing the truth of God’s creation. When these foundational ideas became modified
within late medieval theories of education, they produced a cultural disposition toward
symbolic interpretation that continually sought to represent and reflect the natural world,
moral truths, and intentions of the soul concealed by discordant language.22 Operating
within this broad culture of symbolic interpretation and production, the Fürstenspiegel’s
focus upon matters of governance and morality found their foundation in the concerns of
rhetoric, perception and language, especially in knowledge of particulars. Naturally, then,
in addition to providing a simulation of the experiences necessary for gaining prudential
knowledge, Fürstenspiegel also provided young sovereigns with definitions and
depictions of rhetoric that they would need to both interpret the symbolic hidden secrets
mentioned in the incipit to the Secretum Secretorum and to engage in the day-to-day
realities of rulership.

this is the only thing which is of the greatest influence on all affairs both public and private; and as it is by
this same quality that life is rendered safe, and honourable, and illustrious, and pleasant. For it is from this
source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom,
that governor of all human affairs.”
21
E. Jager, The Tempter’s Voice: Language and the Fall in Medieval Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990), 58.
22
M. Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in
the Latin West (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 32-6.
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The Fürstenspiegel as a Case Study in Medieval Rhetoric
Within the field of rhetorical historiography, although the rhetorical principles of
individual Fürstenspiegel authors have been examined, the genre’s definitions and
depictions of rhetorical practice have never received an extended scholarly treatment.
When the Fürstenspiegel has received scholarly attention, the primary focus has been on
the genre as a type of constitutional or ethical document, with the rhetorical aspects of the
genre being subsumed under these larger categories, even as Fürstenspiegel authors
placed ethics and politics under the governance of rhetoric.23 The traditional
subsummation of rhetoric as a field of knowledge in modern rhetorical historiography
produced an understanding of medieval rhetorical practices that positioned medieval
theories of rhetoric and, especially, the possibility of deliberative rhetoric, as fragmented
due to the loss of Greek-Latin bilingualism in the Latin West—resulting in the
disappearance of Greek rhetorical sources in the early medieval period—and the fall of
Republican Rome and the subsequent rise of tyrannical monarchy.24 Under these cultural
conditions, which early scholarship assumed made political intervention impossible, the
epideictic mode was seen as the only strand of classical rhetorical theory to operate
during the medieval period. However, as recent scholarship has shown, while the
medieval period did not emphasize public civic oratory in the manner of classical Greece
and Rome, the feudal relationships the constituted medieval political society offered
multiple avenues for engaging in deliberative rhetorical practice, particularly through the

23

For some of the most prominent examples, see J. Ferster, Fictions of Advice: The Literature and Politics
of Counsel in Late Medieval England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). M. Kempshall,
The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). C. F. Briggs, Giles
of Rome’s De Regimine Principum: Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c. 1275-1525
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
24
Vickers, Defence, xx.
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act of counsel, either in parliamentary spaces, through letters, or even direct speech.25
Though we now understand deliberative rhetoric to operate within the medieval period,
modern scholarship has been slow to examine its constituent rhetorical theories and
practices, primarily because there exist no primary textual sources that figure rhetoric as a
unified theory of knowledge. As Martin Camargo has argued, any attempt “to identify a
timeless essence of rhetoric” will always position medieval rhetoric “as something
between decadence and hiatus” because of the period’s lack of “comprehensive
theoretical treatises on rhetoric.”26
In an attempt to disrupt rhetorical historiography’s traditional claims on the
nonrhetorical nature of the medieval period, modern scholarship focused upon recovering
those texts that did articulate a theoretical perspective on rhetoric as a body of
knowledge. Most prominently, James. J. Murphy divided medieval rhetorical theory into
three fundamental genres, the ars dictaminis, the ars praedicandi, and the ars poetriae,
based upon meta-rhetorical handbooks that achieved wide circulation in the Latin West.27
Following Murphy, most modern rhetorical historiography has focused upon these three
rhetorical genres despite the fact that medieval rhetoric as a practice “permeated a
broader range of social practices than those enumerated in the treatises devoted

25

See, for example, M. Giancarlo, Parliament and Literature in Late Medieval England (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). S. Ramsey, “Consilium: A System to Address Deliberative Uncertainty
in the Rhetoric of the Middle Ages,” Advances in the History of Rhetoric, 15, no. 2 (2012): 204-21. Further,
claims that classical Greece and Rome represented a pinnacle of democratic access are undercut by the
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specifically to the discourse itself.”28 The field’s myopic focus upon these three
handbook genres has resulted in the defining of medieval rhetoric as an academic and
ecclesiastical discipline dissociated from political praxis. Consequently, the
methodologies adopted by such scholarship naturally focuses upon the sources and
reception of the theoretical rhetorical treatises composed by medieval authors and the
adaptations that they may or may not have made to their source texts.29 By engaging in
source and reception studies, this scholarship treats medieval rhetoric as an art of
relationality rather than invention; medieval rhetoricians are only granted rhetorical
agency and skill to the extent that they employ or adapt techniques that would have been
known to them through their grammatical-rhetorical training. In contrast to this trend, a
second group of scholarship takes a broader definition of rhetoric and centers its objects
of analysis, primarily vernacular poetry, as “the central element in a whole rhetorical
situation” constructed by the medieval author.30 This subtle shift in positioning—from
understanding a text as a point upon a rhetorical continuum to recognizing a text as a
rhetorical intervention in its own right—situates the rhetorical theory and practices
expressed within their more immediate cultural contexts and demonstrates how authors
“did indeed make pragmatic adaptations of ancient materials to shape special genres for
their own purposes” by mixing “grammatical and rhetorical materials to accomplish their
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ends.”31 However, even as this scholarship recognizes that medieval rhetorical invention
could extend beyond the precepts laid down in classical rhetorical theory, it still
privileges the text itself, and its associated discursive communities, namely, the grammar
school, university, and church, as the sole site of rhetorical praxis.
By locating the work of medieval rhetoric narrowly within these spaces, even as
contemporary scholarship has reclaimed and expanded the productive potential of
medieval rhetoric as an analytic category, it has broadly ignored that rhetoric itself was
figured, both by medieval rhetoricians and the classical sources that they drew upon, as
always-already a social practice, not merely a textual practice. As Paul Strohm has
argued, medieval texts did not exist within an isolated textual discursive community bur
rather articulated “social relations in a larger field of such depictions” that drew upon the
wider material culture of the medieval period in their portrayal and discussion of
particular aspects of life.32 Through the study of the Fürstenspiegel as a rhetorical
treatise, we can extend medieval rhetorical practice to include a wider constellation of
both texts and social and political actions. With their emphasis upon practical rulership,
Fürstenspiegel bridge the gap between literary text and practical action, as the literary
components that comprise the Fürstenspiegel have the ultimate aim of producing action
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within the audience, namely the self-creation and self-authorization of a royal persona
capable to guiding the realm toward the end of felicity. The body of knowledge
represented by rhetoric functions within these texts as a tool for drawing connections
between universal categories, most often moral and constitutional frameworks, and
particular circumstances, the contingent matters that require deliberation to understand.
Within the genre, rhetorical theory is simultaneously developed and put into practical
action; in the same manner that an ars poetriae such as the Poetria nova teaches
strategies of composition through the enactment of those strategies,33 Fürstenspiegel
provide a theoretical foundation for deliberative rhetorical practice and then demonstrate
the efficacy of that foundation through the depiction of rhetorical practice by drawing
upon a large corpus of accepted cultural signifiers. Through the analysis of these
depictions of rhetorical practice, we can trace moments of resonance between literary text
and political action so as to uncover a more widespread rhetorical culture operant during
the late medieval period.
While the long history of the Fürstenspiegel saw the generic conventions of the
genre change over time, in general, the form of the genre was comprised of two related
textual traditions: Aristotelian virtue ethics and Biblical and classical exempla. To begin,
Fürstenspiegel are characterized by their grounding in antiquity, often in the form of an
antiquarian authority such as Aristotle, as a recovery of lost knowledge, which serves the
dual purpose of lending authority to the teaching of the Fürstenspiegel and distancing the
actual author of the Fürstenspiegel from its contents. While not uniform, the textual
construction of a Fürstenspiegel often articulated a theoretical construct based upon
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philosophical principles, most often drawn from Aristotle and later Aquinas, and then
provided examples of these constructs in practice through their depiction in exempla. As
Richard F. Green has described it, this pedagogical construction operated as an education
through history, with dense and abstract theoretical constructs being paired with wellknown and accessible literary texts. In the rhetorical situation posited by such a textual
form, sovereigns come to internalize the theoretical construct communicated through
exempla as they employ their grammatical-rhetorical training to interpret the meaning
concealed by the “enigmatic examples and signs” that characterized the exempla.34
Additionally, the Fürstenspiegel aimed to be comprehensive in its educational program.
Often drawing upon the Aristotelian division of the sciences, the Fürstenspiegel provided
a complete overview beginning with natural philosophy, continuing through the moral
education of the sovereign, and concluding with matters of practical rulership, first the
household and then the kingdom.35 The movement from knowledge of the world, to
knowledge of the self, to knowledge of governance depended upon the idea foundational
in the medieval period that the body of the individual functioned as a microcosm of larger
social structures.36 The Fürstenspiegel, in short, aimed to produce good governance
within the kingdom by first improving the moral character of the sovereign. To make
connections between the theoretical concepts articulated at the beginning of the
Fürstenspiegel and the exempla that demonstrated these examples, authors turned to the
art of rhetoric.

34

R. F. Green, Poets, p. 78.
A similar tradition can be found in medieval Greek texts, with the division including study of the self
(hexis), the household (oikos), and the city-state (polis).
36
E. Porter, “Gower’s Ethical Microcosm and Political Macrocosm” in Gower’s Confessio Amantis:
Responses and Reassessments, ed. A. J. Minnis (London: D. S. Brewer, 1983), 135-62, at 140.
35

15

The Fürstenspiegel, then, serves as an ideal case study in medieval rhetorical
historiography because its very composition provides a double layer of rhetorical
intervention. First, both Latin and vernacular Fürstenspiegel provide extended
discussions of rhetoric and situate a knowledge of rhetoric within the broader moral and
political education of the young sovereign. In this manner, Fürstenspiegel serve as an
extension of the grammatical-rhetorical training of the sovereign’s youth. By drawing
upon the literacy skills developed in a sovereign’s youth, the genre invites the sovereign
to engage in the rhetorical and discursive construction of his own royal identity. While
the rhetorical theory presented in these Fürstenspiegel do not prepare the sovereign for a
life of oral deliberation in the forum, the adaptations made to rhetorical theory by
Fürstenspiegel authors center the authority of the sovereign and reimagine deliberative
rhetoric not as a collection of strategies for composition but rather as a reasoned capacity
that allows the sovereign to determine the end of felicity. The deliberative rhetorical
theory championed by these texts requires rhetorical historiography to shift its
understanding of how deliberative rhetoric functions—a movement from exterior to
interior persuasion. Second, the rhetorical composition of the genre itself provides an
example of rhetoric intervening across power differentials to enact social change, in this
case through the didactic disciplining of the sovereign under moral and legal frameworks.
While, in the Latin West, there always existed a culture of advising the sovereign, the
rhetorical composition of the Fürstenspiegel allowed authors to couch criticism of the
sovereign, his behavior, and his court behind the veil of literary language and
symbolism.37 In the same manner that Aristotelian inductive reasoning allows the
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individual to persuade without coercion by centering the audience’s interpretation, the
literary nature of the Fürstenspiegel allowed the author to educate without seeming to
educate and, in that way, preserve both his own reputation and that of the sovereign. The
rhetorical nature of the Fürstenspiegel’s composition allows for the analysis of the
efficacy of rhetorical strategies to persuade in situations where there is a power
imbalance between writer and audience.
Situated at the intersection of moral, political, and rhetorical education, the
Fürstenspiegel, due to its widespread and continued circulation throughout the late
medieval period, also allows for the tracing of how theories of rhetoric and depictions of
rhetorical practice shifted over time as Aristotelian texts were recovered and
disseminated and as the language of composition shifted from Latin to vernacular. In
particular, the composition of Fürstenspiegel was greatly influenced by the recovery of
Aristotelian moral and political treatises, and later Fürstenspiegel often couch their
definitions of rhetoric in Aristotelian rather than the Ciceronian concepts that dominate
medieval rhetorical treatises. Further, in English, the first vernacular discussions of
rhetoric as a body knowledge are found in Fürstenspiegel. By comparing the definitions
and depictions of rhetorical practice as they appear in Fürstenspiegel across a relatively
short time period, it is possible to speculate how dramatic shifts in access to ancient texts
and literary composition impacted understandings of rhetoric as a social practice. As I
will argue throughout this dissertation, across the late medieval period, examining
Fürstenspiegel reveals how conceptions of rhetoric shifted from being primarily
grounded in logic and dialectic, to being grounded in hermeneutics and interpretation,
and finally being grounded in composition and performance. This shift in the foundations
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of rhetorical theory was accompanied by a corresponding change in the educational
curriculum that comprised grammatical-rhetorical training and the disciplinary status of
rhetoric as a body of knowledge.
Moving beyond Murphy
As a project firmly grounded in revisionist rhetorical historiography,38 this
dissertation defines medieval rhetoric as not merely a textual tradition divorced from
political praxis but instead as a cultural disposition toward the use and interpretation of
language according to certain accepted norms that emerge out of and in response to
particular material exigencies. As Carole Blair has argued, traditional historiographic
methods often elide culture and the social meaning-making practices that comprise
culture and thereby represent rhetoric as a dead object of study rather than as a living
moment of intervention.39 Rather than focusing upon the narrow set of handbook
traditions defined by Murphy, this dissertation will make the case that Fürstenspiegel
themselves, while not meta-rhetorical in the sense of providing sovereigns with specific
strategies of invention, function as rhetorical treatises in their capacity for training
38
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sovereigns to engage in rhetorical practice through the process of moral education.
Making this argument requires expanding the traditional medieval rhetorical canon to
include texts that have not been considered “rhetorical” in the sense of articulating
specific theories of rhetorical practice by modern scholarship. While any analysis of
medieval rhetoric must necessarily engage in source study and manuscript reception, I
supplement these traditional historiographic methods by placing rhetorical texts, here the
Fürstenspiegel, into conversation with a wider archive of contemporary political texts,
most importantly, personal correspondences, parliamentary rolls, chronicle histories, and
literary propaganda. Through this surviving archive of political texts, it is possible to
trace the enactment of particular political actions and measure the extent to which the
implementation of these actions shares resonances with the rhetorical practices depicted
in the Fürstenspiegel. While I do not want to suggest a causal relationship between the
rhetorical precepts laid down in Fürstenspiegel and the political actions of particular
English monarchs in either direction, analyzing the extent to which the rhetorical theory
articulated in Fürstenspiegel found a manifestation in contemporary politics can reveal a
broader culture of medieval rhetorical practice.
Drawing upon this tradition of revisionist historiography, this dissertation
recognizes that the co-constitutive nature of rhetoric and culture necessitates research
methodologies that are capable of carefully contextualizing rhetorical texts within the
larger constellation of cultural practices that engender these texts with the possibility for
rhetorical intervention. In contrast to much of the recent scholarship in medieval
rhetorical historiography, this dissertation’s discussion of deliberative rhetoric is less
concerned with “abstract[ing] from the situated case some central or essential qualities”
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and more concerned with exploring “the cultural exigencies that enable or encourage
multiple modes of rhetorical response.”40 That is to say, the discussion of deliberative
rhetoric as it is defined and depicted in medieval Fürstenspiegel does not only attempt to
trace how medieval authors adapted classical rhetorical theory to suit their own purposes
but also to suggest that these adaptations were, in turn, precipitated by the material
cultural exigencies operant during the late medieval period, notably the wider cultural
disposition toward grammatical-rhetorical training and symbolic interpretation. In
referring to culture as a consideration in rhetorical practice, this dissertation follows
Powell et al. in defining culture broadly as “meaning-making as it is situated in specific
cultural communities…any place/space where groups organize under a set of shared
beliefs and practices.”41 Such a definition of culture implies that an extended time period
situated within a specific location, in this case, the late medieval Latin West, can be
comprised of many competing rhetorical cultures that, while they may draw upon certain
shared foundational beliefs and dispositions toward language use, adopt specific
rhetorical practices that are generated and foreclosed by particular cultural exigencies.
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze how the meaning-making practices articulated in
Fürstenspiegel came to be culturally authorized and how these practices manifest in the
wider rhetorical-political culture of the period. Naturally, this orientation to rhetoric as a
cultural act also requires revising historiographic assumptions that portray rhetorical
actors and authors as neutral arbiters of a received rhetorical tradition rather than
“historical and sociopolitical beings…people in specific relationships to power, privilege,
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authority, and entitlement.”42 Consequently, this dissertation is careful to situate medieval
authors and political figures within their immediate cultural contexts and acknowledges
that their conception of deliberative rhetorical practice is intimately connected to their
own relatively privileged relationship to power. The deliberative theories of rhetoric
contained within Fürstenspiegel make no attempt at democratic representation or
implementation; instead, by limiting effective rhetorical practice to only those who
possess nobility of character and extensive education, these theories work to consolidate
the power of a powerful and privileged segment of society.
Since this dissertation takes as its aim locally situated moments of rhetorical
intervention rather than transcendent rhetorical principles, the objects of analysis
considered in this study function as case studies in rereading the rhetorical tradition. For
each analytic chapter, a Fürstenspiegel serves as the main object of analysis, but the
exegesis of each Fürstenspiegel is supplemented by a wide archive of contemporary
philosophical and pedagogical texts that function to situate the Fürstenspiegel within the
intellectual culture of its production. Rather than examining the genre’s depictions of
rhetorical theory and practice as a reception of the rhetorical tradition,43 my theoretical
orientation toward Fürstenspiegel as rhetorical artifacts understands authors as making
genuine rhetorical interventions within their cultural, social, and political spheres. The
case studies, then, function to understand how the adaptations made by Fürstenspiegel
authors were informed by cultural dispositions toward language use and were aimed at
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addressing particular social problems. In so doing, the case studies follow Copeland’s
admonition for medieval rhetorical historiography to depart from totalizing narratives and
instead study the full complexity of textual relations as they exist in hyper-local
contexts.44 While the rhetorical theories of the Fürstenspiegel form the foundation of
each analytical chapter, these precepts are then measured against the political actions that
characterize contemporary political crises that correspond to the social problems
examined by the genre. By collecting a wide range of primary sources, each chapter
creates a conversation between the moment of rhetorical intervention represented by the
Fürstenspiegel and the wider political culture in which the genre circulated. If
Fürstenspiegel aim to answer a social problem, examining moments of actual political
crisis allows us to measure the efficacy of these theories in practice. The case studies
examined do not attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of rhetorical practice or to
suggest a causal relationship between text and action; rather, they endeavor to documents
how specific authors employed rhetoric to address social issues created by particular
cultural exigencies.
The Fürstenspiegel under consideration in this dissertation are bound
chronologically from a period corresponding to 1150-1450 and geographically within the
political culture of England. In total, the three analytical chapters of this dissertation will
focus upon John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, John Gower’s Confessio Amantis, and John
Lydgate’s Fall of Princes. This late medieval period is productive toward analysis as it
included two pivotal moments in rhetorical historiography: the mid-twelfth century neoAristotelian renaissance that followed the translation of Aristotle’s work into Latin and
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the transition to the vernacular composition of philosophical and rhetorical texts that
flourished in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Examining Fürstenspiegel
composed across a long time period allows for the investigation of how the recovery of
Aristotelian texts and shifting pedagogical practices influenced the institutional status of
rhetoric and precipitated new possibilities for rhetorical intervention. Further, by
comparing Latin to vernacular Fürstenspiegel, it is possible to trace how vernacular
languages that lacked the authoritative power of Latin justified rhetoric as a vernacular
body of knowledge. As texts that circulated within a similar English political milieu, the
Fürstenspiegel under consideration all react to changing cultural exigencies and provide
examples that demonstrate how rhetorical practice shifts as political figures operating
under particular constraints employ rhetoric in response to new social problems to meet
the expectations of differing audiences.
Represented as a series of research questions, the general methodology of each
analytical chapter follows the following pattern: 1. Within a particular Fürstenspiegel,
how does the author figure rhetoric as a body of knowledge? 2. To arrive at this
definition, what sources did an author implicitly and explicitly draw upon to arrive at this
definition, and to what extent did the author make adaptations to this rhetorical tradition?
3. What do these adaptations suggest about the broader culture’s disposition toward
rhetoric? How do the philosophical and pedagogical texts circulating at the time of the
Fürstenspiegel’s composition generate and foreclose the possibilities of rhetorical
intervention? 4. How does the Fürstenspiegel employ rhetorical practice to address a
particular social problem? 5. In the contemporary political culture, where does this social
problem appear and to what extent do political actors employ rhetorical practices that
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share resonances with the rhetorical precepts articulated in the Fürstenspiegel? 6. Finally,
reading the Fürstenspiegel alongside the political archive, what conclusions can we draw
about the rhetorical culture of late medieval England? By answering these questions, I
provide a series of case studies that demonstrate the persistence of deliberative rhetoric
and a broader rhetorical culture during the late medieval period.
Overview of Chapters
This dissertation examines the definitions and depictions of rhetoric found in
medieval English Fürstenspiegel and proceeds through a chronological reading of the
tradition from John of Salisbury, to John Gower, to John Lydgate. In the second chapter
of this dissertation, I read John of Salisbury’s defense of the trivium, the Metalogicon, as
a sister-text to his Fürstenspiegel, the Policraticus. In his defense of grammar, rhetoric,
and logic, John of Salisbury constructs a grammatical-rhetorical system in which
grammatical interpretation provides the raw material upon which rhetorical-dialectical
methodology is enacted. Through this interaction between grammar, rhetoric, and
dialectic, the individual develops their capacities for reason and prudence. John’s
rendering of grammatical and rhetorical knowledge as necessary for the development of
prudence reflects his incomplete understanding of prudence as an Aristotelian virtue,
which is unsurprising considering he did not have access to the Nicomachean Ethics.
When John’s system is translated to the political sphere, grammar and rhetoric are put to
use primarily in the interpretation of civil law, which the sovereign must guarantee
through his administration of equity. For John, the effective administration of equity
depends upon the sovereign’s capacity to interpret the civil law in line with the perceptual
framework dictated by the natural law given to man by God. In the act of interpreting the
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law, the sovereign must employ an Aristotelian rhetorical-dialectical methodology to
distinguish between the letter of the law and its intended sense in execution. To
demonstrate this rhetorical system in actual practice, I examine a small selection of
John’s written correspondence on ecclesiastical court cases, where the judge takes on the
role of the sovereign. These cases reveal how grammatical interpretation and rhetoricaldialectical methodology were actively applied in the construction of legal defenses and
prosecutions.
The third chapter of this dissertation turns to the example of rhetoric found in
Book 7 of Gower’s Confessio Amantis and analyzes the relationship between rhetoric and
ethics in the Fürstenspiegel genre. For Gower, rhetorical practice is restricted to the
expression of truth through plain language and requires that a rhetorician possess a
virtuous disposition. In particular, Gower’s definition of rhetoric expresses an anxiety
over the potential for elevated language to induce sensory desire that leads the audience
to pursue their own desires rather than the common profit. In this chapter, I argue that
Gower most fully depicts his system of rhetorical practice through two exempla, the tales
of Lucrece and Virginia, that demonstrate how fleshly lust can complicate the act of
rhetorical deliberation and how authoritative figures can productively leverage the
ambiguity found in contingent situations to achieve their political aims through the
centering of their own interpretation. Within the wider rhetorical and political culture of
fourteenth-century England, this rhetorical practice is found in the attempted
canonization of Edward II by Richard II. This episode serves as a productive coda to
Gower’s theory of deliberative rhetoric as Richard struggles to control the interpretation
of Edward’s body because he himself lacks a virtuous disposition.
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In the fourth chapter, my analysis Lydgate’s fifteenth century Fall of Princes
traces the increasing recognition of rhetoric as a legitimate discipline in the secondary
schools and royal court of medieval England and argues that Lydgate’s emphasis upon
rhetorical stylistics reflects this broader cultural trend. By the late fourteenth and early
fifteenth centuries, rhetoric became separated from grammar as a discipline taught in
secondary schools, and the teaching of rhetoric became an authorized subject within the
king’s household. As Lydgate adapted the De casibus tradition to more closely align to
the ethical framework found in the Fürstenspiegel, his amplifications of Boccaccio’s and
Premierfait’s definitions of rhetoric denote a theory of rhetorical authorship in which a
rhetorician’s use of ornamentation and eloquence are the main determiners of effective
persuasion. For Lydgate, this theory of rhetoric is embodied in the person of Cicero, who
uses sweet oration and rhetorical performance to achieve his political goals.
Finally, the dissertation’s concluding chapter articulates the four main
interventions that study of the Fürstenspiegel as a rhetorical genre makes to the field of
medieval rhetorical historiography. First, I argue that the Fürstenspiegel tradition
provides a chronological case study that supplements existing scholarship on that traces
the recovery of Aristotelian texts through the medieval educational system. Second, the
definitions of rhetoric found across these three Fürstenspiegel all draw upon notions of
the virtue of prudence, which suggests modern scholarship should more fully embrace the
connection between these two capacities. Third, the repeated use of exempla to articulate
rhetorical practice in Fürstenspiegel denotes that this literary genre was understood by
medieval authors not only as ethical and didactic but also as fundamentally rhetorical.
And, fourth, the deliberative rhetorical theories presented by Fürstenspiegel authors are
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forms of culturally specific advice that demonstrate how political theory and rhetorical
theory are co-constitutive. In short, this dissertation concludes that Fürstenspiegel
provide an effective textual tradition for analyzing the broader culture of medieval
rhetorical practice.
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CHAPTER II
RHETORIC AS THE FOUNDATION OF LEARNING: JOHN OF SALISBURY’S
METALOGICON AND POLICRATICUS
In the middle of the twelfth century, the philosophical tradition of the Latin West
was reinvigorated by the recovery and wide circulation of the Aristotelian logical texts of
the Organon. Although Marius Victorinus had translated the Categories and De
Interpretatione in the fourth century and while Boethius’ translations of these texts had
wide circulation,45 the other books within the Organon—the Analytica Priora, the
Analytica Posteriora, the Topica, and De Sophisticis Elenchis—did not circulate widely
until Arabic scholars translated the Greek works into Latin in the twelfth century.46
Naturally, the recovery of Aristotle’s logical works had a profound impact on the theory,
practice, and teaching of the medieval trivium, comprised of logic, rhetoric, and
grammar. At the time when pedagogical theorists such as John of Salisbury came to enter
the newly constituted and institutionalized universities of the Latin West, they would
have been confronted by a recovered Aristotelian tradition that both challenged and
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supplemented the traditional methods of education with which they would have been
familiar. By the mid-twelfth century, the dialectical methodology found in the Categories
and Porphyry’s Isagoge that had dominated entry-level logical education came to be
supplemented by the fuller treatment of logic found in the final four books of the
Organon.47 This more robust treatment of logic likewise necessitated a reexamination of
rhetorical theory as it was taught in schools and practiced in contemporary politics. For a
student like John, who stood as inheritor to both the Neo-Platonic theories of the School
of Chartres and the newly recovered Aristotelian inheritance, it would have felt as if the
traditional trivium were being challenged and expanded in provocative ways. In short, the
trivium was under siege, and John would devote his masterwork on medieval pedagogy
to its defense.
Given this context, it is not surprising that rhetoric, the larger trivium, and the
medieval liberal arts education would become a contested space. In his Metalogicon,
John of Salisbury assigns himself the duty of defending the verbal and logical arts of the
trivium against those, like the fictional strawman Cornificius, who argue that logic and
eloquence cannot be systematically learned but rather are gifts indiscriminately awarded
by nature (Met. 1.6, p. 24).48 While the challenge of teaching grammar, rhetoric, and
logic alongside ethics traces back to classical discussions found in Plato and Isocrates,49
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the Cornifician position articulated by John also represents a wider distrust in the
methodical Aristotelian approach to language use.50 As John explains, the Cornificians
propose to disregard the rules of language and skip over foundational learning so that
they may speak however and whatever they like and focus upon the newly in vogue
category of logic (1.6, p. 26). Rather than treating the constituent elements of the trivium
as arts, the Cornificians conceive of language as a primarily political tool, as a scheme for
flattering those in power to further one’s own ends. For a scholastic philosopher like
John, influenced as he was by the School of Chartres and the tradition of joining Mercury
with Philology, he understands the use of language as foundational to both philosophy
and virtue, which necessitates that the components of the trivium function as systematic
arts.
This contention over the role of grammar, rhetoric, and logic was not confined to
the theoretical texts of the cathedral schools and universities but also extended to the
practical judicial and political realms. Written in conjunction with the Metalogicon, John
also composed a Latin Fürstenspiegel, which he dedicated and delivered to Thomas
Becket in 1159. John’s grouping of his defense of the trivium with his text on sovereignty
and political theory suggests that he understood the verbal arts to be a necessary
component of good kingship. Indeed, in the Policraticus,51 John cites the need for the
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prince to be “proficient in letters” as it provides him with the capacity to interpret and
reflect upon the very divine law that he must guarantee as sovereign (Pol. 4.6). He further
expounds that the end of philosophy for the sovereign is to attain true knowledge of the
self (Pol. 3.4). Such self-knowledge, however, can only be attained through an education
in letters that provides the individual with the dialectical method and capacity for
determining the truth of both propositions as a whole and the terms that comprise
propositions (Met.4.2, p. 81). However, despite serving as one of the premier educational
theorists of the twelfth century, within rhetorical historiography, John’s contributions to
rhetorical theory have been glossed over. In part, the lack of serious treatment of John’s
rhetorical theory from scholars of rhetorical history stems from early commentary that
noted John’s relatively sparse treatment of rhetoric, especially compared to logic and
dialectic.52 As Murphy has discussed, John’s subsummation of rhetoric to logic within the
trivium descends from his insistence upon viewing the individual disciplines of the
trivium as arts “as opposed to formulae or materia,” and, consequently, John has no issue
with reconciling the Aristotelian dialectical methodology within the grammaticalrhetorical tradition exemplified by texts such as Donatus’ Ars Grammatica.53 While early
scholarship acknowledges that John understood rhetoric and the other components of the
trivium were constituted as systematic arts, it rather ignored the extent to which
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Aristotelian dialectical methodology, which contains many aspects of rhetorical theory
and practice, informed the whole of John’s philosophical and political systems.
Though John’s conflation of rhetoric and dialectic under the larger category of
logical reasoning has damaged his reputation as a rhetorician, he has received a much
warmer reception in the history and philosophy of political thought. Despite John’s
extensive writing on the logical arts of the trivium, contemporary scholarship has been
much more interested in unpacking the various metaphors that are used throughout the
Metalogicon and Policraticus to exemplify John’s theory of the political state. Most
famously, Books 5 and 6 of the Policraticus establish a corporal metaphor that advances
a “secular political theory” in which the prince rules the body politic from the place of the
head, with clerics occupying a position outside the body proper in the same way that the
eternal soul is not coterminous with the physical body.54 In contrast to the anatomical
model shared by political theorists preceding John, his organic metaphor adopted a
“physiological” approach to describing the political state in which all members of the
body worked “according to a shared principle.”55 Although contemporary scholarship has
examined the importance of a medieval political theory whose foundation lies in
cooperation rather than antagonism, it has, at the same time, elided a key component that
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makes such a communal state possible—the capacity for rulers, as the head of the state,
to determine the proper end of action. As a reading of the Policraticus alongside the
Metalogicon reveals, the effective constitution and governance of a political state requires
a head of state who possesses the capacity for discernment that emerges from prudential
knowledge.56 Over the next chapter, I will argue that, for John, his insistence upon the
Aristotelian dialectical method and his incomplete understanding of Aristotelian virtue
ethics leads him to closely associate prudential knowledge with grammatical-rhetorical
knowledge. As will become evident, as disciplines, rhetoric provides the methodology for
arriving at the truth of contingent situations, and grammar provides the materia upon
which rhetorical methodology is put into practice, which leads John to consequently
conflate grammatical and rhetorical knowledge under the larger banner of the trivium that
he seeks to defend.
John’s collected writings, then, function as an ideal case study for examining the
liminal position of the rhetoric as it was articulated during the recovery of Aristotle in the
twelfth century. At the time of the Policraticus’s composition, John would have had
access to the Organon, but the not the Ethics, the text that would dominate and comprise
later Fürstenspiegel. As the foundation of education within the Latin West pivoted
toward Aristotelian influence, the definitions and depictions of rhetorical practice found
in Fürstenspiegel likewise adapted to the theories of language use articulated within the
Organon. Such shifts within the linguistic and pedagogical foundations of the
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Fürstenspiegel naturally affected the sovereign’s role within the political state. In
particular, in the Policracticus, John’s incomplete understanding of prudence as a type of
knowledge compels him to delineate a different form of knowledge as the foundation for
the practice of virtue and language. Perhaps unsurprisingly, John turns to the trivium and
his philosophy of language as the knowledge that helps the king determine particular
matters in contingent situations and leverage this knowledge toward virtuous action.
Compared to later Fürstenspiegel that follow a more standardized model, the Policraticus
is constructed in a haphazard manner, with theoretical precepts along the continuum form
philosophy to flattery being introduced and explicated without an overarching
philosophical principle; instead, the pedagogical function of the text is constrained to the
exegetical marginalia that provide commentary on the main sections of the text.
According to Julie Barrau, the text’s construction and its dedication to Beckett suggests
that the Policraticus is intended not primarily as a Fürstenspiegel focused upon practical
action but rather as a philosophical treatise devoted to the constitution of a political
state.57 However, as Irene O’Daly has argued, divorcing the theory presented in the
Policraticus from its practical application runs the risk of interpreting the text in an
anachronistic manner that ignores the social action performed by the genre. Instead, she
argues that the Policraticus must be understood more broadly as a Fürstenspiegel that
seeks not only to instruct the king in ethical behavior but also the whole of polity.58 Much
like the organic, physiological metaphor analyzed by Nederman, O’Daly’s examination
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of John’s theory of the body politic emphasizes the spirit of cooperation that exists
between its constituent parts but does not fully recognize the extent to which
grammatical-rhetorical knowledge makes this cooperation possible. As I will demonstrate
throughout this chapter, the political theory espoused by John across the Policraticus and
Metalogicon cannot function if the sovereign does not possess a robust knowledge of
grammar and rhetoric.
In this chapter, I use John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon, Policraticus, and collected
letters to answer the following questions: How did the recovery of Aristotle supplement
the dominant Ciceronian tradition of medieval rhetorical theory? And, how did this shift
precipitate new understandings of the political role of rhetoric as it was practiced? To
answer these questions, I first examine how reading functioned as an active practice for
developing prudential knowledge by analyzing some of the resonances between Hugh of
St. Victor’s Didascalicon and the works of John of Salisbury. Then, I describe John’s
definitions of rhetoric and prudential knowledge as they appear in the Metalogicon and in
his source texts. Then, turning to the Policraticus, I articulate how knowledge of the
trivium prepares the sovereign for dealing with the practical realities of rulership. Finally,
by examining John’s early letters, I demonstrate how John put the rhetorical precepts that
he articulated in the Policraticus to his own use in his capacity as the secretary of
Archbishop Theobald. Ultimately, this case study will demonstrate how, for John,
knowledge of grammar, rhetoric, and logic were fundamental to the functioning of his
imagined philosophical and political systems.
The Trivium, Memory, and Reading
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The whole of John’s theory of education and, more broadly, the entirety of
medieval education as it relates to the trivium, imagined its students as containing two
distinct but related capacities—natural or immanent talent, natura, and the ability to
apply, exercitatio, precepts of a systemic art, ars, in a given situation.59 As understood by
medieval theorists, an individual’s natural talent describes his natural intelligence, which
is often rendered as a capacity for discernment. However, in the same manner that
philosophy is a dead branch of knowledge without the vivifying effects of rhetoric, an
individual’s natural talent will wither if not cultivated through the consistent practice,
exercitatio, informed by a systematic method of study, here, for John, the arts of the
trivium. Although John is obviously concerned with the actual exercises that students
undertake within the arts of the trivium,60 in his refutation of the Cornifician position, he
is primarily concerned with challenging the notion that natural talent in speech obviates
the need for the systematic treatment of language. For this reason, John elaborates his
educational theory on the relationship between natura and ars. In the medieval schema,
natural talent is cultivated through the application of artistic principles via the influence
of the memory and reason. By way of example, drawing upon a division that goes back to
Isocrates, John distinguishes between those naturally talented orators who composed the
first successful orations by chance and those later rhetoricians who discerned the central
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artistic precepts from these first disputations and developed a systematic method for
composing new disputations (Met. 1.11, p. 35). While natural talent provides the initial
spark to invent the art, in this case logic and rhetoric, the actual development of the art
and its ultimate implementation comes about through the concerted effort of study.
Each of these capacities, in turn, is connected through the activity of the memory.
As John explains, nature “first evokes our natural capacity to perceive things, and then, as
it were, deposits these perceptions in the secure treasury of our memory,” and reason,
through “careful study” determines which sense perceptions should remain within the
memory to serve as the foundation for scientific inquiry (Met. 1.11, p. 34). John
summarizes this central tenet of his educational philosophy through his proclamation that
nature “begets the habit and practice of study, which proceeds to provide an art, and the
latter, in turn, finally furnishes the faculty whereof we speak” (Met. 1.11, p. 34). For
John, while a successful student must possess a certain natural intellect, this intellect
would go to waste if not accompanied by a robust education that serves to enlarge the
number of sensory perceptions stored within the memory and to train the student how to
access them put them to use.
While John’s project of defending the trivium does not permit extended
discussion of the role of memory in the development of the student, his close
contemporary Hugh of St. Victor provides a compelling model for the relationship
between the arts of the trivium and the development and activity of the memory.61 For
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Neo-Platonists like Hugh of St. Victor and the School of Chartres, the act of silent
reading was not a solitary act of meditation but instead a “hermeneutical dialogue”
between two memories, those of the reader and author.62 Citing the examples provided by
Petrarch and Gregory the Great, Mary Carruthers argues that the act of reading produces
a “memory phantasm” within the reader that “is both a likeness (simulacrum) and one’s
gut level response (intentio) to it.”63 For higher-level reading practices such as
tropological interpretation, the hermeneutical dialogue between the reader’s own memory
and the memory of the author compels the reader to consider “what the text means to us
when we turn the words, like a mirror, upon ourselves, how we understand it when we
have domesticated it and made it our own.”64 In other words, the act of reading involves
taking up heretofore unconsidered perspectives and utilizing the reason to synthesize
these perspectives to the practical actions that characterize one’s life. This model of
reading closely resonates with the social aims of the Fürstenspiegel genre, which seeks to
engage the sovereign in the remaking of his own persona through the development of
prudential knowledge. As John would have understood it, the reading of exempla was not
merely a recreation of school exercises but rather an intimate sharing of experiential
knowledge.
For Hugh, the mind itself is Platonic in nature, with its form being determined by
the nature of the sensory perceptions that it collects: “the mind, imprinted with the
likenesses of all things, is said to be all things and to receive its composition from all
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things and to contain them not as actual components, or formally, but virtually and
potentially” (Did. 1.1, p. 47). The mind, then, takes within itself two types of knowledge,
which Hugh distinguishes as the intellectible or understanding, “pure and certain
knowledge of the sole principles of things,” and the intelligible or knowledge or
imagination, the “sensuous memory made up of the traces of corporeal objects inhering in
the mind” (Did. 2.1, pp. 66-7). As the mind forgets itself through the enticement of
“sensuous forms,” it becomes necessary for the mind to restore itself “through
instruction” so that the individual may once again recognize himself, the central pursuit
of philosophy (Did. 1.1, p. 47). As Hugh explains throughout his Didascalicon, the form
of this instruction occurs primarily through the activity of reading and interpretation
through which the individual determines the historical, allegorical, or tropological senses
of passages and incorporates these interpretations into the storehouse of the memory to
serve as the foundation for future knowledge, which Hugh divides into four, the
theoretical, the practical, the mechanical, and the logical. Following Boethius, Hugh
designates logical knowledge as the starting point of education because logic itself is
necessary to know “what form of reasoning keeps to the true course of argument” so that
the individual may determine “the imperishable truth of things” (Did. 1.11, p. 58). As it
relates to the genre of the Fürstenspiegel, Hugh’s elevation of logical knowledge to the
forefront of education demonstrates the emphasis that writers of the genre placed upon
the systematic exegesis of grammar, rhetoric, and logic in the openings of their texts.
This logical education provided their audience with the tools necessary for interpreting
and discerning the truth of the practical and mechanical knowledge that followed.
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Drawing upon a metaphor common within the rhetorical tradition, Hugh
compares the development of the mind through systematic study to the construction of a
structure, and, in so doing, he demonstrates how reading and interpretation serve as the
keystone for the development of the student. For Hugh, the intellectible and the
intelligible are only properly understood when accompanied by a relevant foundation
found in the memory, which itself is developed through two activities: “reading and
meditation” (Did. 3.7, p. 91). While meditation serves as the developmental activity for
those whose minds are perfected, reading is useful to those who are just beginning their
journey toward higher knowledge. As an interpretive practice, reading conveys meaning
through three modes, the historical, which provides a straightforward and literal narrative,
the allegorical, which communicates the mysteries of the church, and the tropological,
which teaches how to act ethically (Did. 5.2, p. 120). The order of reading that Hugh
proscribes follows the movement of understanding within the intellect—a movement
from the physical thing to the idea signified by that thing. Following Aristotle’s De
interpretatione, Hugh recognizes the internal act of interpretation as beginning with the
culturally determined signifier of the “word,” progressing to the “concept” represented by
that word, before finally arriving at the ”thing” signified by the concept held within the
memory (Did. 5.3, p. 122). Upon recognizing the “thing” ultimately represented by the
“word,” the intellect returns to higher-order abstract modes of thought through which it
comes to understand the “idea” communicated by the “thing” and to “arrive at Truth”
through the contemplation of this “idea” (5.3, p. 122). As this pattern of interpretation
demonstrates, within the broad medieval theory of education, the memory serves as that
capacity which connects sensory perceptions with the faculty to translate these sensations
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to the larger universal knowledge that they represent and communicate. The memory
comes to serve as the storehouse of sensory perceptions that the reason confirms as useful
for the intellect to draw upon in those contingent situations that require interpretation. As
Hugh will explain later in the Didascalicon, in the same manner that sensory perceptions
serve as the foundation upon which contemplation and understanding operate, the act of
reading history serves as the foundation for the later allegorical and tropological
interpretation of texts.
The role of sensory perception as the foundation of understanding necessitates the
importance of reading within the individual’s education. As an extension of the neoPlatonic and Aristotelian traditions, the medieval theory of education expounded within
the School of Chartres emphasized that sensory perceptions formed the foundation of all
scientific knowledge; however, those individuals beginning their journey toward higher
knowledge may lack the repository of sensory perceptions held within the memory
necessary to engage in higher-order abstract thinking, interpretation, and contemplation.
To address this lacuna within the memory, Hugh advocates that individuals engage in
reading, as the act of reading works dually to “instruct the mind with knowledge” and
“equip it with morals” (Did. 5.6, p. 127). As Hugh understands it, reading of this sort
produces knowledge through two modes, the mode of example, in which the individual
learns correct behavior through the interpretation and imitation of another’s actions, and
instruction, in which the individual is brought to knowledge through the didactic
explanation of methods of self-discipline (Did. 5.7, p. 128). Of the three modes of
reading, it is the interpretation of history and the literal sense communicated by narration
that most closely aligns with the exemplary and didactic functions of interpretation
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insofar as it provides the learner with knowledge of “what has been done, when it has
been done, and by whom it has been done” (6.3, p. 135-6). In fact, Hugh views a broad
knowledge of history as a prerequisite for allegorical and tropological interpretation in
the same way that sensory perception precedes the production of higher knowledge: “The
foundation and principle of sacred learning, however, is history, from which like honey
from the honeycomb, the truth of allegory is extracted” (6.3, p. 138). In Hugh’s
educational framework, the reading and interpretation of history functions to provide the
individual with a collection of experiences that can be held in the memory in lieu of
sensory perceptions and thereby supplement the foundational knowledge base upon
which abstraction and contemplation depend. Hugh’s prescription for the reading of
history strongly corresponds to the educational aims of the Fürstenspiegel genre, which
seeks to illustrate its theoretical and philosophical precepts through the example provided
by history.
However, historical interpretation in and of itself is not enough to provide
individuals with the knowledge necessary for philosophical pursuit. As Hugh explains,
the ambiguity and difficulty of particular passages and the difference between a passage’s
literal meaning and the sense communicated by the passage necessitates the possession of
“certain principles of faith” that form the “starting point” of all interpretation. Similar to
Augustine’s admonition that the interpretation of holy scripture should always center the
principles of loving God and loving one’s neighbor,65 Hugh establishes that the structural
foundation of knowledge should privilege certain ethical and philosophical precepts that
inform all higher modes of knowledge production and interpretation: “Truly, the
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judicious student ought to be sure that, before he makes his way through extensive
volumes, he is so instructed in the particulars which bear upon his profession of the true
faith, that he may safely be able to build onto his structure whatever he afterwards finds”
(Did. 6.4, p. 142). In so doing, the student can ensure that his interpretation does not
privilege the literal meaning of a passage at the expense of the sense of the passage, and
vice versa.
Although Hugh was referring specifically to the interpretation of scripture, this
general precept is transposed into the educational theory that animates the Fürstenspiegel
genre. Indeed, from a pedagogical perspective, the construction of Fürstenspiegel within
the Letter to Alexander tradition, insofar as the genre couches the interpretation of its
exempla through the philosophical lens explicated at the beginning of its texts, provides
the young nobility who comprise its audience with the perceptual framework that governs
the whole literary force of the text. In so doing, the Fürstenspiegel simultaneously
addresses the two problematics that Hugh identifies as affecting the act of reading for
young readers. Through its extended use of historical exempla, the Fürstenspiegel
supplies its readers with the necessary foundation upon which later allegorical and
tropological interpretation can occur; at the same time, the literary ambiguity present
within these historical exempla is ameliorated by the perceptual foundation
communicated in the opening of each Fürstenspiegel’s discussion of philosophy and
ethics. Beyond guiding the reader to correct interpretation, the perceptual framework that
opens the Fürstenspiegel also addresses the desire-producing effect that rhetorical fiction
can have on the individual through its ability to excite arousal through the “stateliness or
arrangement of words,” which may compel the reader to privilege the sense over the
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letter, or vice versa (Did. 5.7, p. 128). The guiding hermeneutics found in the opening of
the Fürstenspiegel reframe the historical exempla shared later in the text so that their
narrative elements recede in prominence when compared to the “virtues set forth” by the
historical examples that the reader ideally desires to emulate (Did. 5.7, p. 128). The
inherited tradition of generic instruction ensures that the audience of the Fürstenspiegel
trains the capacity for interpretation at the same time that they develop the storehouse of
memory necessary for future allegorical and tropological interpretation.
When considered holistically, the Fürstenspiegel addresses the four divisions of
knowledge that Hugh identifies in the Didascalicon. Hugh’s division of knowledge
includes theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, mechanical knowledge, and logical
knowledge. Within the Fürstenspiegel tradition, these branches of knowledge are
represented respectively in teaching the young nobility how to interpret sensory
perceptions, how to live an ethical life, how to manage one’s household, and how to
determine truth from falsehood. Across these four modes of knowledge, it is the first,
theoretical, and the last, logical, that form the perceptual framework that governs the act
of reading. When viewed through Hugh’s scientific schema, the Fürstenspiegel’s
consistent discussions of rhetoric extend beyond rhetoric’s immediate civic and political
applications; instead, rhetoric’s positioning within the larger discussion of theoretical
knowledge is designed to figure rhetorical knowledge as a prerequisite and supplement to
philosophy and contemplation. Since reason operates within the intellect to discern which
sensory perceptions are worth storing within the memory to serve as the foundation for
scientific knowledge, naturally, the reason itself must be developed through concentrated
and systematic study. As Hugh explains, reason becomes exercised through the activity
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of discernment, an extension of logical knowledge. Rhetoric, contained as it is within the
broader category of logical knowledge, is concerned with “the conceptual content of
words,” particularly “invention and judgment,” which instruct in how to discover and
judge the veracity of arguments (Did. 2.28-30, pp. 80-1). While dialectic is concerned
with determining absolute truth from falsehood, rhetoric’s object of analysis is limited to
“persuading to every suitable thing” (Did. 2.30, p. 82). Since Fürstenspiegel always
supplement their discussions of philosophy and science with examples drawn from
contingent situations in the form of exempla, readers must possess both a strong
knowledge of dialectical methods, which help readers determine the truth of universal
principles, and knowledge of rhetorical methods, which proscribe which actions are most
suitable for a given situation.
Though Hugh did not compose a Fürstenspiegel of his own, his discussion of the
acts of reading and interpretation productively supplement the educational theory that
informs the social action performed by the genre of the Fürstenspiegel. At its core, the
Fürstenspiegel worked to cultivate the natural talent possessed by the young nobility by
providing a wide range of historical exempla upon which the nobility could base their
behavior and enact ethical action. If the authors of Fürstenspiegel hoped to achieve their
aim of providing an education capable of disciplining the person of the sovereign, this
education had to include a robust discussion of logical knowledge—the very knowledge
that empowered readers to discern both truth and ethical action. Rhetorical knowledge,
then, encompassed not only its classical associations with civic action but also extended
to a contain an internal disposition toward the interpretation and expression of language.
The rhetorical disposition advocated by the Fürstenspiegel served as a tool, much like the
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virtuous disposition taught by the Fürstenspiegel, that sovereigns could use to authorize
their sovereignty.
John’s Rhetoric
As the self-proclaimed sole true inheritor and interpreter of Aristotle, the writings
of John of Salisbury provide an excellent example of the initial Aristotelian influence on
the Fürstenspiegel tradition in the Latin West. Born in 1120, John studied with the
Chartres school under the preeminent teachers and language theorists of his day, most
notably Peter Abelard, William of Conches, and Thierry of Chartres. After completing
his education, in 1148, he joined the household of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury,
where he served as a secretary in charge of Theobald’s correspondence. Due to his vocal
opposition to Henry II’s policies curtailing the power of the English church, John was
banished from the royal court in 1156-7 and took up residence in France. It was during
this time that he composed his most extensive treatment of rhetoric, the Metalogicon.
In the Metalogicon, John defines rhetoric as the art of eloquence and the “faculty
of appropriate and effective verbal expression” that accurately represents the intentions of
the soul (Met. 1.7, p. 26). As is typical in twelfth-century rhetorical theory, John locates
the origin and purpose of speech within the Ciceronian tradition that associates the
production of speech with the development of civil society. As John notes, the marriage
of speech with reason “has given birth to so many outstanding cities, has made friends
and allies of so many kingdoms, and has unified and knit together in bonds of love so
many people” (Met. 1.1, p. 11).66 John notes that nature has “elevated man by the
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privilege of reason” and “distinguished him by the faculty of speech” and that both of
these capacities are necessary for individuals to “attain the true crown of happiness”
(Met. 1.1, p. 9). Indeed, drawing on Martianus Capella, John views the capacities of
eloquence and reason as mutually constitutive, with reason moderating eloquence’s
potential for driving individuals away from truth and with eloquence providing reason
with a foundation for expression so that it is not “feeble and maimed” (Met. 1.1, p. 10).
Following Cicero, John describes eloquence and expression as the arts that actualize and
vivify the theoretical precepts understood by philosophy. As Keats-Rohan has stated,
John recognizes that “rational powers are useless without the verbal arts to bring them to
life,” and Aristotelian logic serves as a method for determining probabilistic “truths in a
world which is otherwise reliant on sense data.”67 In short, John assigns three categories
for the exercise of rhetorical knowledge: commerce, “what contract could be duly
concluded;” education, “what instruction could be given in faith and morals;” and
politics, “what agreement and mutual understanding could subsist among men” (Met. 1.1,
p. 11). By designating rhetoric as governing these three realms of practice, John positions
rhetoric as a more voluminous capacity than found in Latin rhetorical theorists such as
Cicero.
In fact, in the opening of the Metalogicon, John implores his audience to
understand the use of language in its broadest possible sense. Following Boethius,68 John
designates logic as “the science of verbal expression and [argumentative] reasoning”
rather than designating only argumentative reasoning. In such a formulation, eloquence,
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which itself governs verbal expression, is sublimated into the larger category of logic.
Consequently, for John, rhetorical knowledge is inextricably linked with all forms of
rational knowledge and the virtues that extend out of rational knowledge. As John
explains later in the Metalogicon, the rational knowledge of logic functions as the
foundation for “the whole activity of prudence,” which itself is the “root of all virtues”
through its capacity to investigate truth and take truth as its subject matter (Met., 2.1, p.
74). Drawing on Cicero’s De officiis and Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii,
John limits the domain of prudential knowledge to the investigation of truth and defines
its methodology as equivalent to the art of argumentative reasoning. According to John
then, prudential knowledge is gained through the systemic implementation of logical
reasoning, which “discloses manners of disputation and analyzes the construction of
proofs, as well as provides methods whereby we may distinguish what is true from what
is false, and what is necessary from what is impossible” (Met. 2.3, p. 78). This conception
of prudential knowledge is quite different than the Aristotelian conception articulated in
the Nicomachean Ethics, a text that had not been translated in wide circulation by the
mid-twelfth century.69 For Aristotle, although prudence is also associated with truth in its
capacity for determining the proper end of deliberation, prudential knowledge is not a
systematic art but rather a habituated disposition developed through experience that is
still responsive to teaching and learning. While both Aristotle and John understand
prudential knowledge as foundational to the practice of virtue and as concerned with
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determining the truth of particular situations, John departs from Aristotle by conceiving
of prudential knowledge as something that can be systemically and explicitly taught in
the same manner as argumentative reasoning. This shift in the functioning of prudential
knowledge leads John to position verbal and logical knowledge as the very ground from
which virtuous practice sprouts.
Later in the Metalogicon, John provides a fuller treatment of prudential
knowledge that closely associates prudence with linguistic knowledge and the operation
of reason. Drawing primarily on Cicero,70 John recognizes prudence as that capacity
within the mind which discerns sensory information to determine what is correct and
what is incorrect so as to systematically turn information into knowledge (Met. 4.11, p.
221). Consequently, the faculty of prudence is necessary to the whole program of
Aristotelian science, which takes sensory information as the foundation of all higher
knowledge and seeks to always arrive at moderate behavior, which following Aristotle,
involves identifying the mean. As John describes it, the operation of prudence assesses
the present and the past so as to determine the correct course of future action:
prudence looks to the future, and forms providence; recalls what has happened in
the past, and accumulates a treasury of memories; shrewdly appraises what is
present, and begets astuteness or discernment; or takes full cognizance of
everything [whether past, present, or future], and constitutes circumspection (Met.
4.12, p. 222).
In principle, John’s recognition of prudential knowledge drawing upon memory echoes
the Aristotelian designation of prudence being developed through lived experience, but
John is less inclined to assign experience and memory as the primary capacities for the
determination of truth. Indeed, John is skeptical of the efficacy of prudence since

70

Cicero, De Officiis, trans. W. Miller (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 1.5.15.

49

prudence itself is “handicapped as it is by errors begotten by sense perceptions,” which
hinders prudence as it aims to investigate and comprehend the truth of particular
situations (Met. 4.14, p. 224). These errors may descend from sensory information
apprehended in the moment as well as from human memories, which are themselves
fallible due to the influence of sensory perception. Since John understands human action
be focused upon “the ability to make circumstantial determinations regarding the proper
course of conduct,” sensory error represents a major obstacle in John’s adapted
Aristotelian system.71 Thus, in John’s system of scientific knowledge, prudence must be
supplemented with “Philologia” which orients the individual toward the enactment of
“reason,” “nature’s power to discriminate and distinguish immaterial entities, in order to
examine things with sure, unvitiated judgment” (Met. 4.15, p. 225). The capacity of
reason, in turn, is developed through systematic study, involving each component of the
trivium. With the help of systematic learning, reason ascends to its rightful place upon the
throne of judgment, “situated between the chambers of imagination and memory, so that
from its watchtower, it may pass upon the judgments of sensation and imagination” (Met.
4.17, p. 229). For this reason, John draws a philological distinction between prudence and
wisdom, with prudence simply operating as the “appetitive delight” that orients the
individual to desire truth (4.29, p. 247).72 In other words, prudence alone cannot
investigate and determine the truth. It may help the individual to desire the truth and
provide the individual with a repository of sensory information upon which to draw their
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discernments, but the prudential impulse must also be checked by the operation of reason,
which John understands as developed through the study of grammar, rhetoric, and logic.
For John, then, the trivium, does not only function as the foundation for higher
study in philosophy and natural science but also provides the individual with knowledge
necessary to determine the truth of contingent matters. As David Bloch has shown,
though John viewed himself as an inheritor of the Aristotelian scientific method, his
actual discussion of the Posterior Analytics reveals a lack of direct knowledge of the text.
Instead, Bloch has demonstrated that the scientific method described by John in the
Metalogicon is fundamentally “probabilistic” and therefore derived from dialectical and
rhetorical principles, rather than the first principles that characterize Aristotle’s
discussion of science.73 As John further categorizes the art of argumentative reasoning, he
divides the genus of logic into two species, necessary logic, concerned with absolute
truth, and probable logic, concerned with likelihood (Met. 2.3, p. 79). John divides the
category of probable logic into dialectic, which uses syllogisms to investigate “the
meanings expressed by words” and rhetoric, which uses induction and oration to
investigate the same (Met. 2.4, p. 81). Dialectic and rhetoric are further delineated by
their respective audiences and purposes, with dialectic being employed primarily in
interpersonal conversations carried out in educational spaces and rhetoric being used to
move large audiences to collective action (Met. 2.12, p. 102). Rhetoric is lastly
distinguished from dialectic in taking its object as questions concerning particular
circumstances whereas dialectic is concerned with “reasoning of a more general nature,
and does not of its own right descend to particulars” (2.12, p. 102). In both rhetoric and
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dialectic, John identifies a system for determining the truth of any given situation and for
verbally expressing this truth in a manner that can lead others to the same conclusion.
Crucially, John understands the rhetorical-dialectical methodology outlined here to be
applicable to all branches of science, despite rhetoric and dialectic having no distinct
subject matter of their own. John’s emphasis on Aristotelian logic seems designed to
address the potential issues that may arise from a scientific system that takes sensory data
as its foundational knowledge.
In fact, within John’s educational system, scientific knowledge precedes ethical
knowledge and serves as the soil from which virtue sprouts. Philosophical inquiry and
virtuous practice are themselves dependent upon the literacy practices that characterize
the trivium: “reading, learning, meditation, and assiduous application” (Met. 1.23, p. 64).
John understands these basic literacy practices to be necessary for the flowering of virtue
as they provide individuals with the scientific knowledge that directs them toward the
practice of virtue. In turn, these basic literacy practices are the domain of grammar,
which, alongside sensory perception, “is the basis and root of scientific knowledge,”
since its domain is the training of the mind “to understand everything that can be taught
in words,” including both interpretation and expression (Met. 1.23, p. 64; Met. 1.21, p.
60). However, it must be acknowledged that it was not only John’s sense of prudential
knowledge that looked to rhetorical-grammatical knowledge for its establishment and
development. As O’Daly has demonstrated, John’s ethical system drew on the Ciceronian
rhetorical distinction between the honorable and the expedient as the ends of action for
deliberative rhetoric.74 By reconciling the Greek concept of oikeiôsis to the Christian
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tradition of caritas, John developed an ethical system in which concern for oneself was
consciously subsumed to a broader concern for one’s community. Consequently, the
ethical political state is comprised by its various components working to achieve their
predetermined social role—the honorable—in cooperation with the whole body politic so
that the ends of the state can be achieved—the expedient. Naturally, the constituent parts
of the body politic cannot determine expedient ends on their own. This determination
depends upon the head of the state possessing the capacity to determine prudently the
ends for which the state should aim. While scientific knowledge is necessary for the
practice of virtue, it is not sufficient in and of itself. Scientific knowledge must be
accompanied by “grace,” which “brings about the willing and the doing of good” as well
as “the faculty of writing and speaking correctly to those to whom it is given” (Met. 1.23,
p. 65). For John, grammatical knowledge provides individuals with the scientific
knowledge necessary for the operation of reason, but the actual judgment of reason is
also dependent upon the acceptance of grace, which orients the individual to put their
scientific knowledge to the enactment of the good. As it relates to the development and
exercise of prudence, grammar—that is, the interpretation of the authors—provides the
raw material that is treated by John’s rhetorical and dialectical methodology. Through
this treatment, the individual trains the intellect to pursue the course laid out by prudence.
If logic, comprised of dialectic and rhetoric, functions as the method through
which truth is uncovered, then speech likewise functions as the instrument through which
truth becomes articulated through deliberation. John does not imagine the act of
reasoning to be abstracted and divorced from sensory perception; rather, John describes
the act of reasoning as being “clothed in speech,” both unvoiced internal speech and
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voiced external speech, which enter into the sensory perception “through the ears with the
aid of words” (Met. 2.12, p. 102). As Daniel McGarry has argued, for John, the
enactment of eloquence works “as the eternalizing complement of reason, [through
which] individual thinking is projected on a social scale to achieve enduring cooperative
results” (pp. 668-9).75 In this understanding, the act of reasoning depends upon speech as
the instrument of its expression, for, without speech to enliven “thoughts of judgments,”
reason itself would be “dead and powerless” (Met. 2.12, p. 102). Consequently, for John,
the end of a dialectical education includes not only instruction in the dialectical
methodology but also the grammatical-rhetorical “to forge a strong, versatile, and
efficacious instrument [of speech], and to provide instruction in its use” (Met. 2.12, p.
102). John succinctly describes the copulative relationship between speech and reason by
denoting that reason “frequently conceives from speech” insofar as the faculty of speech
vivifies the “prudent exercise of the human mind” (Met. 1.1, p. 11). As John systematizes
it, the faculty of reason, as the governor of deliberation, determines what is true via the
sensory information gathered through perception. To operate effectively, however, during
the process of deliberation, reason must employ language to interpret truth and the
instrument of speech to express it. Without speech, abstracted universal knowledge
cannot be leveraged toward practical action.
For these reasons, John argues that species of logic such as dialectic and rhetoric
not only represent a systemic knowledge for interpreting and expressing truth but also
serve as the categories of knowledge that “organize and vivify” other branches of
knowledge (Met. 2.11, p. 101). In contrast to the Cornificians, John does not believe that
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rhetoric and dialectic themselves possess a standardized body of knowledge for their own
sake but rather believes that rhetoric and dialectic are valuable insofar as their
systematized methods are applied to practical disciplines to encourage the operation of
reason. It is unsurprising, then, that John categorically distinguishes between those who
are “Verbose, rather than eloquent” through the creation of “verbal leaves that lack the
fruit of meaning,” a distinction that John further expands on in the Policraticus between
flatterers and philosophers (Met. 1.3, p. 13). While dialectic and rhetoric can be used to
determine universal principles, the determination of these principles is only useful in “its
application to particular cases” (Met. 2.11, p. 100). The student of rhetoric and dialectic is
challenged not only to “talk about definitions, arguments, genera, and the like” but also to
apply the methods used to determine these categories across “the several branches of
knowledge” (Met. 2.9, p. 95). No matter the specific branch of knowledge, the
systematized methods of dialectic and rhetoric can be used to categorize the branch of
knowledge, determine the universal first principles that characterize the branch of
knowledge, and apply those principles to particular cases. John’s larger defense of the
trivium as a necessary component of a liberal arts education proceeds from this concept
that the systematized knowledge of the trivium, grammar with interpretation, logic with
deliberation, and rhetoric with expression, is the very knowledge that makes higher
learning obtainable.
Within this system of knowledge, rhetoric functions as an art of expression that
leads the audience toward concluding what is probable in contingent circumstances and
“estimating utility or goodness,” a definition drawn from Cicero (Met. 1.15, p. 46). While
John dedicates the majority of his theoretical discussion of the trivium to defining the role
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of grammar and articulating dialectical methodology, his discussion of speech
emphasizes the need for “clarity and easy comprehensibility” (Met. 1.19, p. 56). Rhetoric
itself is closely conflated with the art of grammar, which John designates as governing
the use of figures of speech and rhetorical tropes. Under John’s conception of rhetorical
invention and organization, an orator must be cognizant of “schemata together with
rhetorical tropes, sophisms which envelop the minds of listeners in a fog of fallacies, and
the various considerations which prompt the speaker or writer to say what he does, and
which, when recognized, make straight the way for understanding” (Met. 1.19, p. 56).
Rhetorical invention, then, is comprised of two bodies of knowledge, “the precise force
of each and every term” used in an oration and the various circumstances surrounding an
oration, including the speaker himself, the exigency of the speaking occasion, and the
nature of the audience (Met. 1.19, p. 58). With these factors in mind, the rhetorician can
invent and draw upon common topics that help the audience to determine what is most
probable for a given situation.
While John clearly understood the whole of Aristotle’s Organon to be valuable,
he isolated the eighth book of Aristotle’s Topics as the foundation of all disputation and
rhetorical practice. Indeed, throughout the Metalogicon, John develops a linguistic
metaphor to describe the course of scientific study, with the foundational Categories
functioning as the “alphabetic,” On Interpretation as the “syllabic,” the first seven books
of the Topics as the “verbal,” and the eighth book of the Topics as the end of reasoning
(Met. 3.10, p. 190). Following the opinion of Cicero and Quintilian, John finds the eighth
book of the Topics to provide both “the principal source of the rules of all eloquence” and
“the initial starting point for the study of rhetoric” (Met. 3.10, p. 190-1). Echoing his
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earlier audience-centric distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, John further explains
that dialectic finds its end in convincing of probable truth while rhetoric’s end lies in
persuading toward communal action (Met. 3.10, p. 193). Since a rhetorical oration is
performed for a crowd whose capacity for reason cannot be wholly known, the
rhetorician must rely upon the “more gentle” strategy of induction rather than the
coercive syllogism that is best suited for disputation with a reasonable individual (Met.
3.10, p. 192-3). Following Aristotle, John delineates two rhetorical tools that fall under
the broad umbrella of inductive reasoning, inference and example.76 By utilizing
inductive reasoning, the rhetorician aims to persuade his audience to accept a universal or
particular proposition that proceeds from several instances. John directly cites Cicero to
explain the most effective way to guide an audience to accept a given proposition is to
draw from examples that are widely known and accepted within a given cultural milieu
(Met. 3.10, p. 193).77 As it concerns the sovereign’s rhetorical practice, the sovereign
must be inclined toward using inductive reasoning because an “illiterate person” is more
inclined to accept a proposition through inductive reasoning by example rather than
deductive reasoning by syllogism (Met. 3.10, p. 199).
As John understands it, the problem with rhetorical practice that proceeds by
inference and example is that successful interpretation requires the audience of a speech
or text to have a certain collection of sense data stored within the memory. While the
rhetorician is primarily focused upon the act of invention, his audience is occupied with
the constitutive act of interpretation. When relying upon inference and example

76

See Aristotle, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topica, trans. H. Tredennick and E. S. Forster (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), Top. 1.12, 105a15-19.
77
Citing Cicero, De Inv. 1.31.53

57

especially, rhetorical oration is dependent upon the audience’s capacity to leap from
particular situation to universal principle, for example, the warranted proposition within
the enthymeme, which John identifies as “both the greatest secrets of success and the
chief obstacle to progress” (Met. 3.10, p. 197). This reliance upon the audience’s capacity
for inference requires that effective rhetoricians clearly establish and delimit the universal
propositions to which they appeal through example. Additionally, persuasion concerning
a contingent matter is only possible when all “disputants…correctly understand the issue
under discussion” so that oration and disputation can focus on the primary issue of
discussion rather than devolving into quibbles over the precise meaning of terms, the very
disruptive act that John accuses the Cornificians of consistently undertaking (Met. 3.10,
pp. 193-4). For these reasons, the rhetorician is obliged to take care in determining the
precise meaning of each term used within an example since “a single statement may
readily imply several propositions…[and]…several statements may be reduced to a single
proposition” (Met. 3.10, pp. 197). The rhetorician is most effective, then, when he
expresses himself through “Unsophisticated and straightforward ways of putting things,”
which allows him to conceal the ultimate intention of any given oration while also
assisting the audience in its apprehension of the connection between particular examples
and universal principles (Met. 3.10, p. 193). As becomes evident in John’s contemporary
political writings, the efficacy of political rhetoric is intimately connected to a
sovereign’s extensive background literary knowledge from which he may draw suitable
examples and his natural talent for rendering these examples in a relatively
straightforward manner, since this knowledge serves as the material for the development
of prudence. Much like the broader category of scientific knowledge, an individual’s
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rhetorical skill descends from the combination of grammatical, rhetorical, and dialectical
study and God-given grace.
Since rhetoric finds its persuasive capacity through inductive reasoning, when
compared to syllogistic demonstration, it is particularly susceptible to sensation as a
power of the soul. Following Aristotle, John explains that universal principles, and first
principles in general, “derive their credibility from the fact that they are inductively
inferred from particular things” (Met. 4.8, p. 215). This point of order within the
Aristotelian scientific system was clearly a major point of emphasis for John, as he
includes one of his longest direct quotations from Aristotle to clarify this concept:
The only possible way to conceive universals is by induction, since we come to
know abstractions by induction. But unless we have sense experience, we cannot
make inductions. Even though sense perception relates to particular things,
scientific knowledge concerning such can only be constructed by the successive
steps of sense perception, induction, and formulation of universals…Sense
perception is a prerequisite for memory; the memory of frequently repeated sense
perceptions results in experimental proof; experimental proofs provide the
materials for a science or an art (4.8, p. 215).78
As is clear from this citation, sensory perception provides the basis for the production of
memory. As sensory perceptions of particular circumstances are repeated, they become
the foundation from which universal first principles are extracted, which themselves form
the basis of systematic knowledge. Since rhetorical persuasion is co-constitutive between
rhetor and audience, the effective rhetorician must invent and adapt examples that access
the audience’s collective memories and lead them to infer what is most probable in a
given situation. To determine this, the audience relies upon the faculty of their
imagination, which “conceives of the future in terms of present or past perceptions” (Met.
4.10, p. 219). This process, however, is not infallible as the imagination may impress an
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incorrect image upon the soul, causing the act of judgment to be deceived (Met. 4.11, p.
221). For this reason, especially when engaging in political oratory, it is imperative to
draw upon examples and referents that are widely understood and accepted within a
cultural milieu. Since rhetorical persuasion, by default, must rely upon inference and
example, if the examples chosen for a given oration do not possess a commonly
understood referent, the oration’s efficacy will be vitiated as the audience may struggle to
connect the particular situation to an abstracted universal principle.
The Metalogicon provides a full treatment of John’s limited understanding of
rhetoric’s role within the Aristotelian system of science. For John, rhetoric functioned as
an extension of logic, closely conflated with dialectic, but focused upon the proving of
probability through induction for large audiences. By creating sensory perceptions that
imprint the memory, rhetorical oration prompts audiences to engage the faculty of
imagination to see the future as it may be by drawing upon their stored memories. From
these particular situations, prudence may guide the individual to abstract universal
principles, but this process must be informed by the judgment of reason, which itself is
developed through systematic study of the trivium, particularly grammar. Rhetorical
practice, then, is characterized by the invention and adaptation of sense data that are
widely accepted and understood by a given audience. As John transitions from his
theoretical to practical political writing, he provides a map for sovereigns aiming to
navigate the challenge of political oration. Under John’s rhetorical-grammatical system,
effective political oration focuses upon identifying the dominant characteristics of a
particular situation, adapting those characteristics to reference an abstracted universal
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principle, and expressing those adaptations in a manner that can be easily understood by
an audience.
Rhetorical Knowledge and the Interpretation of the Law in the Policraticus
While the central concern of the Policraticus lies in the distinction between true
philosophy and self-flattery within the royal court, John both employs rhetorical theory
throughout his composition of the text and explicates the importance of rhetorical
practice for the sovereign. As John explains in the dedication to Thomas Becket that
opens the Policraticus, sovereigns must engage with an education in letters both so that
they may have a lasting legacy in the manner of historical monarchs such as Alexander,
Caesar, and Constantine, and that they may, through education, ensure that “the soul is
purged of its defects and is revivified even in adversity by a mysterious and serene
cheerfulness” (Pol. 1.ded.). From the beginning of the text, John claims the primary
problem of sovereignty lies in the self-deceptive nature of fortune, which has granted
sovereigns and the wider nobility with such “wealth and pleasures” that precipitate a
“craving for self-indulgence” (Pol. 1.1). As the nobility become accustomed to having
their every desire satisfied, their intellect becomes oriented toward pursuing pleasure
rather than truth. John defines this phenomenon as the act of the “creature of reason
becom[ing] a brute,” which results in pride destroying understanding and undoes the
Ciceronian motif of reason and eloquence establishing civilization and common welfare
(Pol. 1.1). This problem is further confounded by the presence of sycophantic flatterers
within the royal court whose constant praise of the sovereign deludes him into seeing
himself as other than he actually is. This tension between self-deception and truth forms
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the continuum through which John examines the role of educating the prince, ideally a
consistent orientation toward philosophy and away from flattery.
In the same manner that rhetoric and dialectic vivify the scientific arts, a
sovereign’s education is only effective insofar as its first principles can be practically
applied to the art of rulership. For sovereigns, the end of philosophy lies in its innate
capacity to uncover the truth and thus to help them resist the self-deception of flattery.
Therefore, the sovereign’s education in the liberal arts, which for John includes the whole
of the trivium, focuses upon sharpening the skill of discernment into “an instrument
which sharpens the mind amazingly and distinguishes individual things, the one from the
other, by the peculiar attributes of their nature,” or, to borrow language from the
Metalogicon, to develop prudential knowledge (Pol. 2.18). John designates the ultimate
goal of a liberal arts education to be in the precise understanding of one’s self “through
the consideration of what he himself is” (Pol. 3.2). However, while John focuses in the
Policraticus upon self-knowledge, we must recognize that self-knowledge for John does
not carry its modern connotations; rather, as Brian FitzGerald has argued, when
considered within the physiological metaphor of John’s body politic, knowing oneself is
the means by which “the renewal of the political community” occurs.79 Consequently, the
first inquiry that a sovereign must undertake in philosophy involves answering the
questions implied by the ten categories. Once these questions have been addressed, the
individual can use these answers as the foundation for answering the practical and ethical
questions that characterize sovereignty. However, this philosophical program is always
threatened by the flatterer who “always speaks to give pleasure, never to tell the truth”
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(Pol. 3.4). As the sovereign navigates the royal court, he must be conscious of the role
that flattery plays in turning philosophical contemplation into the “deceptions of vanity”
that guide the individual to vice (Pol. 3.4). Philosophical contemplation, then, closely
resembles the course of trivium education described in the Metalogicon. Of course,
philosophical contemplation concerns the answering of ethical questions, but these
questions can only be addressed once the individual precisely understands the terms and
propositions that comprise particular questions, which necessitates a robust competency
in both the interpretation and expression of words. Throughout the Policracticus, John
consistently employs exempla that demonstrate how effective rulership intimately
descends from a sovereign’s trained capacity to interpret truth apart from flattery and to
also except criticism as an educational tool when appropriate.
For John, a sovereign’s skill in grammar, rhetoric, and logic are essential insofar
as his interpretive and analytical capacities are employed in the service of guaranteeing
and maintaining the rule of law within the realm.80 In John’s political system, a prince is
distinguished from a tyrant in that a prince is “obedient to law,” a law which John
identifies as descending from the natural order laid out by God (Pol. 4.1). As the head of
this order, the prince serves as “the public power and a certain image on earth of the
divine majesty” (Pol. 4.1). The prince, therefore, serves as a natural exemplum, whose
actions are interpreted by the public community and form the foundation of virtuous
activity within the kingdom. For this reason, the prince must be especially conscious of
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the public persona that he embodies, as this persona actively functions as the avatar of
God’s majesty upon the earth. It is unsurprising, then, that John would call upon the
prince to embrace the tenets of philosophy so that he may know himself accurately and
completely because to do otherwise would threaten the prince’s persona as an image of
equity within the kingdom. According to Richard Rouse and Mary Rouse, John’s
references to equity in describing the law handed down by God suggest that John is
identifying “justice with custom,” specifically suggesting that a tyrant in one who seizes
prerogatives that have not traditionally been afforded to the crown.81 While John
acknowledges that the prince is “an absolutely binding law unto himself” insofar as the
prince ideally should not fear the “penalties of the law” (Pol. 4.2), he defines the effective
sovereign as one who does not abuse this “special situation” of being above the law to
follow his own private will but instead administers the law equitably to further the
interests of the public community (Pol. 4.3).82 However, within John’s system, this does
not imply that the prince himself operates without restriction with regard to the
implementation and interpretation of the law. Indeed, drawing on the example of the
priests of Levi, John distinguishes between the civil law of the realm that is “impressed
upon the page” and the natural law of God that is “written in the book of his [the
prince’s] heart” (Pol. 4.6). As the prince administers equity throughout the kingdom, he
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must draw upon his grammatical and rhetorical knowledge to ensure that his
interpretation of the civil law corresponds to natural law.
A capable prince, then, is defined through his capacity to interpret the meaning
and stricture of civil law and align it with the characters of virtue that characterize the
natural law. As John acknowledges, no written civil law can fully account for the
complexities and ambiguities that emerge from contingent and particular situations, those
moments that “are supported by the authority of neither faith, sense, nor apparent reason,
and which in their main points lean toward either side” (Pol. 7.2). In these moments, it is
the duty of the prince to administer equity to the public community in line with the
principles of natural law. This process naturally entails that the prince be “a diligent
reader [and] a disciple of the law” so that he does not “distort the law as captive to his
own discretion, but he accommodates his discretion to meaning and integrity” (Pol. 4.7).
In this capacity, the prince’s primary role is to safeguard the language of the law and its
ultimate interpretation. John is less concerned that the precise terms of the civil law be
slavishly followed and is more interested that the spirt of the natural law be preeminent, a
process that relies upon the prince engaging his rational faculties: “the ruler may be
allowed some direction over their terms, yet still the integrity of the law must be
conserved through the rational balancing between the honorable and the useful” (Pol.
4.7). The prince’s role in interpreting the law necessitates his proficiency in letters and
learning, and, if the prince lacks this capacity, he must draw upon advisors have been
trained in literacy practices (Pol. 4.6). However, relying upon counsellors alone is
problematic given the potential for flattery to deceive the sovereign from knowledge of
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himself. The prince’s primary duty, then, requires his competency in interpretation and
expression.
By consistently utilizing historical exempla, John simultaneously demonstrates
the efficacy in adopting non-coercive inductive reasoning as the primary evidence in a
proposition and models the course by which political rhetoric should be effectively
implemented. John employs his own style of leveraging historical exempla in
straightforward language to achieve his own aims throughout the Policracticus. As he
explains in the prologue to the seventh book, he asks his audience of nobility to pay
attention not to the “superficial meanings of [his] words but the source of the thought and
the thought to which they lead,” which he explains is the unadorned truth gathered from
historical authors (Pol. 7.prol). And, like the princes to which he writes, in moments
when historical examples do not resonate with a particular situation, John incorporates
examples that are “culled from daily usage and experience” (Pol. 7.prol.). In particular,
John draws upon historical exempla that, taken together, craft the ideal sovereign’s
disposition toward language, both interpretation and expression. In the fourth book of the
Policraticus, John clarifies that the historical lives of previous rulers function as texts
provided by the grace of God upon which contemporary rulers may base their own
actions:
Accordingly, their deeds are incitements to virtue; their words are so many
lessons in moral matters. Ultimately their lives, in which vice was subdued and
captured, have been constructed like triumphal arches consecrated to posterity:
arches which list their magnificent virtues, proclaiming in everything the faithful
acknowledgement that all these excellent acts were done not by our hands, but by
the Lord’s (Pol. 4.6).
As princes encounter these historical examples and when they read in general, their
attention should focus on “those matters which lay the foundation of the life of the state”
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(Pol. 7.9). Considering that many historical examples of effective rulership come from
non-Christian princes, the particular details of a given example are less preeminent than
the virtuous action that the example points toward. While the sovereign must have a
working knowledge of philosophy and virtue, insofar as it is necessary for the sovereign
to know himself, this knowledge must be leveraged toward the action of administering
equity.
To fulfill his role as guarantor of the law, the efficacious prince must draw upon
the historical examples provided by his distinguished forebearers so that he may direct
royal policy toward common equity. During the process of interpreting historical
exempla, John calls upon the prince, in his capacity as the interpreter of the law, to
engage in exegesis that does not seek to translate “everything in the syllable-to-syllable”
but rather to express “the essence of the author,” in this case, the natural law impressed
on the soul by God (Pol. 5.2). To illustrate his point, John provides the common example
of Lycurgus, the Spartan king who, after revising the Spartan legal system, demanded and
received a pledge of loyalty that the new laws would not be changed until he had returned
from a trip. Rather than returning, Lycurgus elected to live in perpetual exile in Crete so
that his law would remain eternal. In a similar exemplum, John cites the model of
Codrus, the king of the Athenians. During a war between the Dorians and Athenians, the
oracle predicted that the Dorians would be successful in battle as long as they did not
kills Codrus. Upon hearing the prediction, Codrus entered the Dorian camp, allowed
himself to be killed, and, in this manner, preserved the Athenian state (Pol. 4.3). While
these exempla were commonly cited in medieval political tracts, for John, the
metaphorical importance of these exempla lie in their close connection between the
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actions of the sovereign and the interpretation of common law. Found within a larger
discussion of the prince’s role as a minister and the nature of faithful ministry, these
exempla literally exemplify John’s political worldview. As John understands it, the
precise terminology of any common law is less important than the higher spiritual law to
which the common law must necessarily point. For this reason, John describes princes as
inferior to ministers, even as they themselves are the ministers of the state in their
capacity to administer equity. In the cases of both Codrus and Lycurgus, the
interpretation of their common law is guaranteed through the sacrifice of their physical
bodies. The preservation of the law and its interpretation is thus understood as the
ultimate expression of sovereign power.
Once the sovereign has assembled the raw material provided by grammatical
interpretation, he may then move to administering equity through the production of
eloquence and oratory that harmonizes contingent situations with truth through the
employment of the rhetorical-dialectical methodology. While John does not go as far as
to claim that eloquent oration can produce truth and knowledge, he does believe that
linguistic expression can make the truth widely accessible to a given population. The
effective orator is defined by his ability to regulate “language according to the
requirement of the theme and [make] the theme appropriate to the occasion” (Pol. 7.12).
Eloquence is not confined solely to the invention of an oration but, given John’s close
conflation between rhetoric and dialectic under the broad category of logic, also contains
the capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood, specifically through “the ability
to detect the sophistries of false reasoners” (Pol. 7.12). As the image of equity in the
kingdom, the prince’s rhetorical practice must also aim toward reconciling the realities of
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mortal existence with higher spiritual aims, a process that relies on “mak[ing] language
harmonize with facts and facts with the times” (Pol. 7.12). Such a disposition toward
language entails a broader habitual orientation toward virtue as eloquence cannot be
“attained without rules for wisdom,” as the speaker who lacks an orientation toward
wisdom lacks the capacities of discernment to either produce speech that harmonizes
particular and contingent facts with universal principles or to identify sophistical
reasoning as it appears in other arguments (Pol. 7.14). The ideal sovereign orator, as John
imagines it, is one who draws upon historical example to interpret the particular facts of a
situation and aligns his judgment with the natural law that governs all creation. To
achieve this rhetorical practice, the sovereign must possess a keen sense of discernment, a
broad philosophical understanding, and the desire to commonly administer equity.
As explained throughout the whole of the Policraticus, the sovereign’s
relationship to the linguistic arts is defined by the connected dual responsibilities of
resisting the impulse of flattery to self-deception and harmonizing particular facts with
the precepts laid out by natural law. While the connection between flattery and equity, on
the surface, may not seem obvious, under John’s political model, the prince’s role as the
image of equity and avatar of the embodiment of natural law necessitates that the prince
possess accurate self-knowledge, as this knowledge forms the basis of the virtuous
disposition that commonly administers equity throughout the kingdom. Since the civil
law that the prince guarantees cannot accommodate all possible contingent situations, in
moments when the prince must utilize his capacity for discernment, he must aim his
discernment at reconciling the political needs of the kingdom with the laws of morality
that define Christian polity. To aid the prince in this duty, John recommends a broad
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knowledge of history so that the prince may draw upon the example of distinguished
forebearers. Once the prince has a complete knowledge of himself so that he may resist
the impulse to indulge flattery, he may fulfill his duty as the guarantor of the civil law
and embodiment of the natural law. Thus, John’s political system or, at least, the prince’s
role within this political system, is underwritten by a foundation in the liberal arts. For
this reason, John’s pairing of the Policraticus and the Metalogicon as sister texts that
intimately connect politics and the liberal arts makes perfect sense.
The Sharing of Exempla and the Construction of Persona
In line with Hugh’s suggestion that the perceptual frameworks that govern
interpretation be practically developed through the accretion of particular examples,
John’s Fürstenspiegel seeks to construct the rhetorical persona of the sovereign primarily
through the act of rhetorical compilation, or compilatio—that is, the selection and
deliberate ordering of pieces of information found in disparate works into a new text.83
While, in many ways, the tradition of medieval composition and invention, is dominated
by the act of compilation and the adaptation of complied materials by authors exerting
their own agency, John’s extended use of exempla within the Policracticus functions to
simultaneously provide his intended audience with a broad collection of examples to be
held in the memory and to guide the reader toward the development of an effective
rhetorical persona. As a collection of knowledge held in the memory, these exempla
serve as a foundation upon which a reader may build higher-order allegorical and
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tropological interpretations; at the same time, the allegorical and tropological
interpretations made possible by the foundation built by the historical exempla aid the
sovereign in constructing an effective rhetorical persona that authorizes his own
sovereignty. For John, the act of compiling historical exempla serves as an effective
method for collapsing the distance between himself and the sovereign, explicating the
perceptual framework found in his Metalogicon and Policraticus, and teaching the
sovereign how to ethically engage in rhetorical interpretation and performance.
While John consistently constructs the text of the Policraticus to follow the order
of interpretation defined by Hugh in the Didascalicon, in his discussion of the sin of
vainglory, John provides his most succinct example of how the gathering of historical
exempla can develop a rhetorical persona that allows for higher-order interpretation and
ethical governance. The sin of vainglory, the desire for the possession of false praise that
does not correspond to one’s actions, serves as the fountainhead from which spring the
seven vices and is totally inimical to the rhetorical persona that John seeks to cultivate in
his audience. To emphasize the dangers of vainglory, in the second book of the
Policracticus, John inundates his readers with a collection of short historical exempla, 28
in total drawn from such illustrious figures as Plato, Alexander, Julius Caesar, and
Augustus Caesar, among others. John uses these examples to demonstrate how these
individuals displayed forbearance to resist the urge to accept flattering speech, which
produces vainglory in the individual (Pol. 2.14). According to Clare Mongale, John
understood the writing of history through a pedagogical lens in which the actions of
predecessors can “be a source to later generations for understanding the constellations of
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laws, duties, and customs that contributed to their present reality.” 84 In his Historia
pontificalis, John’s treatment of history mirrors his broad interest in dialectic as a
pedagogical tool. Within the Historia, history is presented as a series of conflicts between
men in which each individual attempts to establish his primacy over a particular situation.
The sheer number of exempla shared here by John suggests that the literal, narrative
knowledge contained within the exempla is of utmost importance to the ethical
governance of the realm. Unlike later Fürstenspiegel, which often accompany exempla
with exegesis of the sense communicated by the example, John’s historical exempla are
presented in quick succession without commentary, the only governing perceptual
framework being the framework that governs the whole book—to know thyself as a ruler.
The rhetorical structure of the Policracticus as described in this section mirrors the very
structure of the grammatical texts that John himself cited as influential to his own
learning of grammar and rhetoric as a student (Pol. 2.10). According to Karin Fredborg,
John took William of Conches’s Glosulae as his primary object of study for the art of
grammar.85 Within the Glosulae, William endows Lady Philosophy with the
characteristics of effective pedagogy: “‘Dame Philosophy follows the correct pedagogical
order in teaching, first building the faith so that the audience believes the teacher, then
giving the logical reasons so the proofs are stated.’”86 This construction closely parallels
the reading methodology advocated by Hugh of St. Victor, in which initial literal
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historical truths provide the foundation for the later exegesis of the allegorical and
tropological meanings behind these narrative events. Considered as a collection, the
exempla, then, seem designed to provide a reader with a broad collection of particular
examples that are used to exercise prudence. Considering the actual content of the
exempla makes this claim even more evident.
Across the exempla shared in the second book of the Policraticus, John depicts a
rhetorical persona in which a sovereign carefully measures the precise meaning of an
utterance, considers the author and context surrounding the utterance, interprets the
utterance in line with truth rather than flattery, and, finally, produces his own response
that prudently accepts criticism and rejects flattery. In the rhetorical paradigm posited by
here by John, a sovereign’s rhetorical efficacy is reflected in the capacity to resist the
impulse toward rhetorical action that satisfies his own desires so that the sense
communicated through the law can be preserved. In order to resist the effects of flattering
speech, the sovereign must possess a keen self-knowledge and a willingness to accept
criticism when it is warranted. While the whole of the exempla depicts this rhetorical
persona, it is especially evident in an exemplum that John adapts from Suetonius
concerning the Emperor Augustus and a veteran of his army who seeks his support when
called to court (Pol. 2.14). Though Augustus initially acts magnanimously in providing
the veteran with a distinguished lawyer for his defense, the veteran criticizes Augustus’
actions as fulfilling the technical requirements of the feudal relationship while violating
the close bonds of intimacy that ideally characterize it: “‘But, I, Sire, in your hour of need
at Actium, sought no substitute. I fought for you with my own hands’” (Pol. 2.14). Rather
than becoming angry at the shame brought about by these comments or allowing his own
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vainglory to color his response, Augustus accepts this criticism and agrees to serve in
person as the veteran’s defense. It is through the act of accepting criticism that Augustus
comes to restore the sense communicated by the laws governing subject and vassal
relationships. If flattery is the act which separates the individual from self-knowledge,
criticism serves as the balm of instruction that restores the intellect to its natural state. For
these reasons, John follows Augustine in declaring that rulers should “prefer to be
criticized by anyone whomsoever rather than be praised by one who is mistaken or who
flatters” (Pol. 2.14). The sovereign’s challenge lies in exercising prudence to determine
the difference between flattery and criticism and connecting these utterances to
perceptions held within the memory so as to determine the correct course of action.
Beyond depicting effective rhetorical practice, the compilation of exempla found
in the early sections of the Policracticus collect particular examples that function within
the memory as a foundation for the development of prudential knowledge and the higherorder interpretations that prudence makes possible. At the beginning of Book 7 of the
Policracticus, John transitions the form of his Fürstenspiegel from merely compiling
exempla together to engaging in tropological and allegorical interpretation; however,
such a rhetorical move is only possible because of the foundation established with the
earlier historical exempla. Throughout the Policraticus, John has used the literary
example of Gnatho from Terence’s Eunuch as a metonymy for all who flatter and
accomplish their aims through the deception of honeyed language (Pol. 3.4). To begin his
discussion of vice and virtue, John returns to the image of Gnatho and his braggart
captain Thraso to demonstrate the tropological and allegorical aspects of flattery (Pol.
7.1). Whereas earlier exempla did not include extensive exegetical commentary, by Book
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7, the historical sense of Gnatho and Thraso’s actions have been subsumed by the larger
discussion of how these actions are reflected within John’s contemporary courtly society,
with John declaring that “Terence has in that play depicted the life of very nearly all of
us” (Pol. 7.1). The recession of the narrative mode allows for an allegorical interpretation
that explains how flattery’s development of vainglory within the individual precipitates
the birth of sin, through pride, which reproduces itself along with “the whole jungle of
vices” (Pol. 7.1). The connections that John makes between the literary characters and the
birth of sin requires a level of abstraction absent in his earlier exempla that privileged the
“letter” of the exempla over the “sense” communicated.
In moving from allegorical to tropological interpretation, John’s later exegesis
works to reincorporate allegorical abstraction within the practical framework of action
necessitated by the genre of the Fürstenspiegel. As John considers Gnatho and Thraso’s
actions within a practical framework, he shifts his discussion to the theoretical confluence
of flattery and the art of rhetoric. Here, John is primarily concerned with the similar aims
found in flattery, criticism, and epideictic rhetoric; consequently, his discussion seeks to
demarcate the boundary between the ethical and unethical applications of speech. For
John, following Quintilian, speeches of praise find their object from three sources, “from
the mind or body or from external circumstances” (Pol. 7.2). When considering the
content of praise, John emphasizes that speech must be analyzed along three lines to
determine whether it points at truth or deceives with flattery, the person praised—the way
in which one earns praise—the person praising—the virtues and vices possessed by the
speaker—and the context surrounding the praise—the cultural mores that place different
values on certain virtues and vices (Pol. 7.2). As the allegorical moves to the
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tropological, John provides his audience with a methodology for enacting the rhetorical
disposition that he depicted earlier in the text. To enact this disposition requires that a
sovereign possess a robust memory, a certain level of prudential knowledge, and an
educated capacity for reading and interpretation.
As these curated examples show, John uses exempla to depict the ideal rhetorical
persona for a sovereign and, at the same time, to provide the sovereign with a model for
the development of prudential knowledge. Due to John’s incomplete understanding of
prudence as found in Aristotle, his version of prudential knowledge takes on many
aspects of the liberal arts trivium that he so ably defends across his corpus. Rather than
being comprised solely of lived experience, John’s prudential knowledge is developed
through the act of reading and the collection of particular examples that come to serve as
a foundation upon which higher-order abstraction can be based. Through abstraction, the
sovereign can accurately interpret particular situations by resisting the allure of flattery
and accepting the instruction of criticism. In John’s model, prudence’s act of discernment
follows a clearly developed path from the narrative and literal “letter” of a speech to its
allegorical and tropological “sense” that instructs why and how to live virtuously.
Maintaining the Sense of the Law
Although not composed from the perspective of the sovereign as articulated in the
Policraticus, John’s letters provide a trove of rhetorical practices that follow the precepts
laid out across his theoretical treatises on the liberal arts. In these letters, John describes
the role of the judge, who, like the sovereign, must work to orient their desire toward
discerning the truth and make his judgment in line with the equity of the realm. The
central thematic of John’s forensic rhetoric—that it is the duty of the claimant and the
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judge to harmonize the facts of a particular case with the natural law that governs
creation—serves as a consistently invoked focal point in John’s correspondences written
on behalf of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury describing the various cases held at
Theobald’s episcopal court. After being appointed to Theobald’s court in 1147, John
served as Theobald’s personal secretary until he was briefly exiled from the court at the
command of Henry II in 1156. In his capacity as Theobald’s secretary, John was tasked
with composing letters written to various Catholic luminaries, particularly Pope Adrian
IV, that both described the reasoning behind particular judicial decisions and advanced
certain cases that had been appealed by interested parties to the higher episcopal court in
Rome. In John’s collected letters, written both under Theobald’s and his own name, John
consistently grapples with defining the limits of the civil law in relation to the natural
law, with John dependably forwarding the preeminence of the natural law governed by
the episcopal court. In this short analysis of a small collection of John’s letters, I do not
want to suggest that a king such as Henry would necessarily agree with John’s reasoning
or enact his specific judiciary recommendation; rather I want to present John’s letters as
an example of an authoritative figure using the combination of grammatical material and
rhetorical-dialectical methodology to achieve prudential judgment in the same manner as
a sovereign, as theorized in the Metalogicon and Policraticus.
Across John’s dictaminal corpus, he advocates for the use of a rhetoricaldialectical methodology in which claimants invent their arguments under the general
precept that the grammatical interpretation of civil law is fundamentally determined by
natural law. While this phenomenon occurs throughout John’s correspondence, this
principle is succinctly presented in a letter composed by John on behalf of Theobald and
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sent to Robert Warelwast, Bishop of Exeter, who is determining an issue of succession
and possession of a church.87 At the conclusion of the letter, John provides his general
counsel on all matters in which the civil and natural law come into conflict: “The sum of
my counsel is this: that you should obey the law of God and the sacred canons in
accordance with your profession and, whenever you are faced with such difficulties,
should remember that it is safer to fall into the hands of men than into the hands of the
living God” (lt. 6, p. 11).88 Consistent with the political theory articulated in the
Policraticus, the counsel delivered by Theobald and John exhorts Warelwast to craft his
rhetorical intervention in a manner that harmonizes the facts of the situation with the
natural law, in this case, the disputed course of succession brought about through the
issuing of “illicit grants and substitutions” with the Apostolic precepts confirmed at the
Second Lateran Council (lt. 6, p. 11). In other words, Theobald and John recommend that
Warelwast invent his arguments following a perceptual framework that takes the
decisions of the Second Lateran Council as the foundation for disputing the illegally
granted order of possession. Through the presentation of the narrative facts of the case,
Warelwast can hope to persuade the judge through an allegorical argument that focuses
upon reconciling the flawed common law of succession with the supreme divine law. In
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the same manner that the narrative elements of historical exempla provide the raw
material that leads to sovereign to prudential judgment, the undisputed facts of the
Second Lateran Council provide the basis upon which Warelwast must build his
argument. This tension between the civil laws of succession and the episcopal court’s
privilege to admit course cases concerning prelatic matters serves as the dominant
impetus for John’s preserved correspondences.
When Theobald’s court is confronted by a similar question of episcopal
succession, the court employs one of the rhetorical practices described in John’s
theoretical works to advance the case to highest pontifical court in Rome. John’s
commentary on the case exemplifies the grammatical practice that Suzanne Reynolds has
identified as the dominant mode of reading during the twelfth century—namely the
recovery of authorial intention as a hermeneutic category, which “represents the most
profound erosion of the boundary between grammar and rhetoric.”89 The case in question
concerned the possession of the church of Chilham, which was contested by the monks of
St Bertin and Hugh of Dover. As mandated by Adrian IV, Hugh had been ordered to
vacate the church and “restore” its possession to the monks. However, Hugh argued that
the order could not be fulfilled as mandated because of the impossibility of “restoring”
possession of a property that had never fully come into a group’s possession (lt. 23, p.
39). Hugh’s argument hinged upon the distinction that possession of the church had been
granted to “a certain Odo,” who never transferred possession of the property to another
individual or group (lt. 23, p. 39). Given the facts of the case, Theobald’s court favors the
claim of Hugh, who consistently makes himself available for trial, over the monks, who
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refuse to sit for the trial until their property has been restored, but Theobald is hesitant to
advocate against the direct mandate of Adrian IV, who granted the original order of
restoration. Theobald’s court ultimately decides to forward Hugh’s interpretation of the
case and calls upon Adrian to hear his appeal, which itself is derived from what John has
described as the foundational rhetorical practice—that is, the precise definition of terms
that comprise a proposition so that authorial intention can be discovered. As Theobald
frames it, the appeal to be heard by Adrian consists in reconciling the specific language
of his mandate with the intent held by its author: “…your majesty had not ordered that
they should be instituted, but that they should be restored, and that in virtue of the word
‘restoration’ and others contained in your sacred rescript trial of the case was in the
fullest terms committed to us” (lt. 23, p. 40).
Unlike the sophistical reasoning that John condemns in his theoretical works,
Hugh’s argument receives purchase with Theobald’s court because it seeks to define
terms precisely rather than engage in linguistic trickery. In other words, rather than
quibbling over meaning without applying the dialectical method to practical action, Hugh
employs the Aristotelian logical methodology emphasized throughout the Metalogicon to
determine the intention behind Adrian’s statement. Hugh’s grammatical reading of
Adrian’s order allows him to develop a rhetorical defense that presents the issue of
inheritance within an Aristotelian dialectical framework. The grammatical text, Adrian’s
order, provides the material upon which Hugh can forward his dialectical argument. This
move within legal cases to adopt a more stringent methodology for determining proof
was not isolated to the ecclesiastical court but was experiencing a simultaneous
development in the civil legal system. Ranaulf de Glanville details a similar method for
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establishing truth in legal disputes: “The truth of the fact shall, then, be inquired into, by
means of many and various interrogations, made in the presence of Justices, and that, by
taking into consideration the probably circumstances of the facts, and weighing each
conjecture that tends in favor of the accused.”90 The outcome of the case ultimately
depends upon the judge’s linguistic capacity and his ability to center knowledge in his
judgment rather than to allow himself to become deceived through the influence of
flattery, a tactic employed by the monks in this particular case. As is revealed by this
legal matter, John’s foundational principle that connects knowledge of philosophy with a
broader literary knowledge was not merely a theoretical precept conceived to defend the
program of liberal arts education but also was actively employed to determine the
outcome of contingent situations.
This tactic of disputing the relevance of a given legal accusation by contesting the
precise term against which one was charged was employed consistently throughout
Theobald’s court, and, consequently, the effective operation of the court depended upon
the judge’s capacity to determine truth from falsehood through the raw material provided
by grammatical interpretation and effective rhetorical-dialectical methodology. Letter 65,
written by John of behalf of Theobald for Adrian IV, discusses a similar issue concerning
the rightful possession of a church, disputed between two claimants, identified as R. and
G. (lt. 65, p. 107). According to G., who initially possessed the church, R. illegally
dispossessed him from the church during the war under the advisement of Simon de St.
Liz II, earl of Huntington, without a judicial order. When G. contested R.’s actions, R.
and his men assaulted G. in a cemetery of a different church and compelled him to grant
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their illegal possession under threat of a “speedy death” by renouncing his claim in front
of the archdeacon (lt. 65, p. 107). When these accusations were brought to Theobald’s
court, each side employed different rhetorical strategies to support the truth of their
claims. G. relied upon what Aristotle has identified as inartistic proofs, specifically the
testimony of two priests who confirmed that G.’s life was threatened when he renounced
his legal possession of the church.91 On the other hand, R.’s advocates appealed to the
precise definition of the charges laid against R., with the whole of their legal defense
being posed in the following questions that are reminiscent of Aristotle’s Categories:
“Was he [G.] demanding possession of the church? What form of action was he [G.]
bringing? Or on what legal grounds was he [G.] demanding satisfaction?” (lt. 65, p. 107).
R.’s legal strategy involved not necessarily disputing the testimony of the priests, which,
by its very nature is difficult to contest, but rather aimed to dismantle G’s legal case by
challenging the imprecise terminology employed in G’s legal appeal, which has
unfortunately not been recorded by John in the letter. Unlike the earlier legal case that
married grammatical knowledge with rhetorical-dialectical methodology, R.’s legal
defense engages in the sophistical reasoning that John criticizes throughout his corpus of
theoretical texts. Here, the difference lies in how grammatical and rhetorical knowledge
is leveraged in the service of truth. In the case involving Hugh and the monks, Hugh’s
appeal sought to precisely determine the intention communicated by the papal order that
governed the whole interpretation of the case, since Adrian’s intent behind the use of the
word “restoration” determines the truth of possession, insofar as the monks cannot be
restored to something that they never possessed in the first place. In the latter case, R.’s
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attempt to precisely define terms does not aim at disputing the truth of the accusation of
coercion but rather seeks to complicate the legal process by questioning the end of the
G’s suit—namely, whether he seeks to repossess the church—rather than the truth of G.’s
accusation. The attempted defense employs a rhetorical-dialectical methodology, but this
process is not enlivened by the necessary raw material provided by grammar. For this
reason, the court was unconvinced by R.’s legal defense and “proceeded to make closer
inquiry into the truth of the matter, in order thereafter to elucidate the exact legal
position,” but, during this process, R. invoked his right to appeal and extended the court
date out to the future (lt. 65, p. 107). When read in conjunction with Hugh’s earlier case,
this latter case demonstrates how grammatical and rhetorical knowledge must be
accompanied by a broader knowledge of philosophy and desire to attain the truth. If
either of these elements are missing from the judge, he may lack the powers of
discernment necessary for administering equity.
The distinction drawn across these court cases between language put to the ends
of truth and language put to the ends of style strongly resonates with John’s own views of
language, deliberation, and argumentation as laid out in the Policraticus and
Metalogicon. While the person of Cornificius may be a strawman fabricated for the
purposes of defending the liberal arts tradition, the sophistical practices of Cornificius
were employed to some extent in John’s immediate coterie. In Letter 118, John decries
how the affordance of language to reveal truth has been undercut by his culture’s fixation
upon style at the expense of effective argumentation. In the letter, he criticizes a younger
contemporary who consistently rejects John’s counsel due to what the contemporary
perceives as incongruous Latin:
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It is expedient that what I say should be concealed from his eyes; for if perchance
he detects the clash of three vowels, I shall be forced to pay a fine for my lack of
euphony and my use of the wrong word. It would be useless to quote in my
defence abuses found in writers of authority to a young man who in answer cites
against me the strict laws of language, and keeps watch and ward over the rules of
the grammarians. (lt. 118, p. 194)
While John clearly values grammatical knowledge insofar as it provides the individual
with the ability to make himself understood and to interpret the lessons depicted in
literature, he views the ultimate aim of grammar to consist not in the production of
pleasing speech but rather in the communication of truth. For this reason, as it concerns
legal cases, John prefers “to win the case at the cost of [his] grammar, rather than to lose
it in order to speak grammatically” (lt. 118, p. 195). In support of this position, John cites
the careers of two contemporary priests who adopted differing rhetorical styles when
deliberating on ecclesiastical matters:
There were once two advocates (but now, it is said, they are shepherds of souls
holding the office of bishop at Lisieux, to wit, and Chichester) who proceeded by
different methods: the bishop of Lisieux preferred to spoil his case rather than his
speech, while he who is now bishop of Chichester yielded to him in elegance of
style, but snatched the glory of victory from him by his careful attention to the
matter at hand. (lt. 188, p. 195)
Whereas Arnaulf, bishop of Lisieux, employed sophisticated Latin, his excessive
rhetorical ornamentation earned him a censure at the Council of Tours. On the other
hand, Hilary, bishop of Chichester, was widely regarded as the most effective English
jurist and defended Henry II at Sens in 1164. Despite Hilary’s deficiencies in Latin
composition, his extensive knowledge of logic allowed him to effectively communicate
the truth of a given situation. This vignette of rhetorical practice reiterates the challenge
faced by those who must adjudicate legal cases and constructs the binary that operates
across all of John’s theoretical writings. The effective judge and orator, under John’s
rhetorical model, must always aim at uncovering and communicating the truth, but this
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aim is consistently challenged by the realities of linguistic expression, which in the
culture of twelfth century England often valued sophisticated Latinity over the pursuit of
truth.
So, what are we to conclude from the depiction of rhetorical practice in John’s
personal correspondence and in his letters written on behalf of Theobald? Across the
letters, John and Theobald reiterate that effective rhetorical practice begins first with the
precise definition of terms that comprise a proposition. When these terms are confirmed,
the individual can move forward to the determination of truth through the employment of
rhetorical-dialectical methodology. When confronted by contingent legal situations, the
primary aim of the judge or the sovereign should be to harmonize the civil law with the
natural law, a process that engages the rational capacity of judgment.
Conclusion
John’s two texts meant to provide a robust moral and logical education for the
nobility demonstrate how the slow recovery of Aristotle affected the philosophical,
epistemological, and pedagogical aims of the Fürstenspiegel genre. As it relates to
rhetoric, John’s incorporation of Aristotelian methodologies and epistemologies resulted
in the close association between logical and rhetorical expression. Indeed, for John, the
two were so closely intertwined under the larger umbrella of logic that rhetorical
invention in and of itself found its expression through the precise analysis of the terms
that make up a proposition. John’s privileging of the logical aspects of rhetorical practice
even caused rhetoric to take on some aspects of prudential knowledge—insofar as John
imagined grammatical and rhetorical knowledge substituting for experiential knowledge.
For the ideal rhetorical sovereign envisioned by John, rhetorical practice involved the
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training of prudence through the act of reading and interpretation to determine truth from
vanity and thereby ensure that sense of the laws that governed the kingdom were never
sublimated to their literal meaning—an act that required the sovereign to have a keen
self-awareness. As we will see through the next two case studies, as Aristotle’s corpus
was further recovered, the epistemological role of rhetoric within the division of sciences
would once again shift, this time to a position governing politics and ethics. From John,
though, we can see an Aristotelian thinker pushing the boundaries of contemporary
knowledge concerning rhetoric. Given John’s goal of preserving the trivium as the
premier method of education, his contributions to the rhetorical tradition have been
overlooked. However, considered within the context of the Fürstenspiegel genre, John’s
theoretical treatment of rhetoric provides the sovereign with a method for authorizing his
own sovereignty through the maintenance of law and order
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL RHETORIC AND ITS ETHICAL COMPONENT: GOWER’S
“LUCRECE’ AND “VIRGINIA” AND RICHARD II AND EDWARD II
By the late fourteenth century, the shifting cultural and philosophical landscape of
western Europe produced corresponding changes within the genre of the Fürstenspiegel.
First, as recovered Aristotelian texts circulated more broadly within the Latin West,
Fürstenspiegel incorporated Aristotelian concepts and definitions, particularly of virtue,
into their discourses on the proper dispositions of sovereigns. Second, following the
broad literary trend toward the vernacular, Fürstenspiegel began to be composed in
vernacular languages rather than in Latin. While vernacular Fürstenspiegel authors still
relied upon well-known classical and Biblical stories, their rendering of these stories
within their vernacular languages allowed them to adapt the particular narrative details of
each tale through the process of translation to better reflect their contemporary political
needs and situations. As these two traditions became represented in the container of the
Fürstenspiegel, the composition of Fürstenspiegel themselves became much more
strongly inflected by the discursive category of “literature,” with the traditional emphasis
on the natural and moral sciences being supplemented with extended fictive exempla
designed to represent the moral categories that Fürstenspiegel sought to incubate in their
target audience. As I will argue in this chapter, the widespread circulation of Aristotelian
philosophy, the compositional shift toward the vernacular, and the heightened importance
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of fictive exempla all combined to shift the definitions and depictions of rhetoric found
in Fürstenspiegel. While earlier Latin Fürstenspiegel positioned rhetoric as closely
aligned with the aims of logic, these later vernacular Fürstenspiegel associated rhetoric
with the practice of hermeneutics, specifically conceiving of rhetoric as an interpretive
act that opened the space for political intervention.
In Book 7 of the Confessio Amantis, English poet John Gower broke with his
immediate rhetorical tradition by elevating the practice of “Rhetorique” to an
epistemological category on the same level as “Theorique,” knowledge of the natural
world, and “Practique,” the practical action of rulership (lines 7.30-49).92 As Rita
Copeland has demonstrated, Gower’s adaptation of the traditional Aristotelian division of
the sciences did not spring out of the ether but rather served as the culmination of a
gradual shift in defining rhetoric that can be traced through the writings of authors such
as Brunetto Latini and Giles of Rome.93 Although Brian Vickers has made the
provocative claims that medieval rhetoricians’ adaptations to their inherited rhetorical
tradition represent a fragmentation of classical rhetorical theory put to utilitarian uses and
that the cultural and political climate of the medieval period foreclosed the possibility of
a native deliberative tradition,94 Gower’s positioning of his discussion of rhetoric within
the genre of the Fürstenspiegel suggests that he understood rhetoric as an inherently
political practice and that the knowledge contained under the category of rhetoric was
instrumental for the governance of a kingdom.
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While recent scholarship has traced medieval adaptations to the classical
deliberative theory present in medieval meta-rhetorical handbook traditions, these studies
have focused upon the constraints of medieval political environments rather than the
praxis of these adaptations by rhetorical actors. Shawn Ramsey has shown that the social
practice of consilium, the offering and acceptance of counsel between lord and vassal,
functioned as a deliberative tool for addressing contingent and uncertain situations for
writers such as Latini and Thierry of Chartres.95 Evidence of deliberative rhetoric is even
stronger in the traditions of English vernacular literature, in which poets such as Geoffrey
Chaucer grappled with reemergent Aristotelian notions of citizenship and
constitutionality. Matthew Giancarlo has argued that these vernacular writers, by
appropriating the voice of the commons, provided a didactic moral framework through
which a sovereign could function as the self-authorized embodiment of law within the
kingdom.96 However, unlike the deliberative rhetorical practices espoused by these earlier
writers, which fundamentally draw upon democratic traditions of counsel, Gower depicts
rhetoric as a hierarchical system specifically adapted for the monarchy in its melding of
rhetorical practice with Aristotelian virtue ethics. Thus, Gower’s Confessio Amantis
represents an important and overlooked contribution to medieval rhetoric.
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Given the close relationship between grammatical and rhetorical instruction and
the teaching of moral virtues, it is not surprising a vernacular poet such as Gower would
turn to the Fürstenspiegel as the container for his rhetorical advice. Drawing on the
Pseudo-Aristotelian tradition of the Secretum Secretorum, the Fürstenspiegel provided
princes with an education in moral virtue by presenting the audience with classical and
Biblical exempla that must be interpreted to uncover the meaning concealed by the text’s
fictive and poetic elements.97 Despite frequently containing explicit discussions of
rhetorical practice, the genre of the Fürstenspiegel has been analyzed primarily as
disciplining sovereigns within moral or legal frameworks.98 In line with a classical
tradition stretching back to Cicero and Quintilian,99 the Fürstenspiegel closely associated
proper rhetorical practice with ethical instruction, particularly the development of
prudence. By teaching its audience strategies of interpretation and deliberation through
fictive exempla, the genre of the mirror for princes posited a truly Aristotelian conception
of deliberative rhetoric in which rhetoric is a trained capacity developed through
habituation and deliberation to always determine the proper course of political action.
In this genre of texts, rhetorical practice often assumed many of the ethical
aspects of the virtue of prudence—the virtue most commonly associated with the capacity
for discerning the proper end of deliberation—though rhetorical practice involves the
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oratorical expression arrived at through deliberation rather than merely the act of
deliberation itself. Within Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, the most widely
circulating Fürstenspiegel of the late medieval period,100 this concept is represented by an
analogy between an archer and his arrow and the sovereign and his state. Just as the
archer “ruleth þe schot and the arwe to þe mark,” it is “more spidefol þat a kyng knowe
þe end and felicite þan it is þat þe people knowe it, for þe kyng ruleth þe people” (Gov.
1.1.5). As a sovereign, the king is tasked with deliberating and determining the end of
“felicite,” so that the people of the realm, who may lack the sovereign’s habituation
toward virtue, can prosper through peace and common profit. To determine these virtuous
ends requires a sovereign who is both habituated toward virtue and skilled in the
rhetorical arts of interpretation and deliberation, the very capacities trained by the
Fürstenspiegel.
Within Book 7 of the Confessio Amantis, Gower explores the tension that
emerges when proper rhetorical practice is dependent upon a sovereign’s habituation to
virtue. Despite being both the “first known discussion of rhetoric in the English
language” and the first vernacular English Fürstenspiegel,101 Gower’s actual discussion
of rhetoric and his depictions of rhetorical practice found in Book 7 are relatively
understudied. While modern scholarship has persuasively traced how Gower’s
designation of rhetorical practice as revealing “pleine trouthe” is complicated by the
slipperiness of language, I argue that Gower provides a theory of deliberative rhetoric
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that centers the role of the virtuous sovereign who leverages the very hermeneutic gap
inherent in language to achieve political praxis that aims to preserves peace and common
profit in the kingdom. By defining rhetorical practice in this way, Gower draws a close
connection between the sovereign’s role as the moral guarantor of “trouthe” within the
kingdom and the rhetorical practices of deliberation that guide the sovereign and, by
necessity, the kingdom, toward the aim of felicity. In Gower’s scheme, rhetoric functions
as the second part of philosophy and as a reasoned capacity that allows individuals to
connect knowledge of particular, contingent circumstances with knowledge of natural
universal truths so that they may determine the proper course of moral action. This act of
deliberation naturally requires the individual to be properly habituated toward virtue, a
quality most commonly held in Gower’s view by the upper classes. Through the exempla
in Book 7, Gower explores the following question: If the commons of the kingdom are
incapable of engaging with reasonable speech, what consequences emerge when
authoritative figures leverage the ambiguity of linguistic and non-linguistic signs to serve
their own individual profit rather than the common profit of the kingdom?
In this chapter, I answer this question by exploring the shift toward defining
rhetoric as a hermeneutic and interpretive art as represented in two distinct but related
moments in late fourteenth century England: Gower’s depiction of rhetorical practice in
Book 7 of the Confessio Amantis and Richard II’s attempted canonization of his greatgrandfather Edward II during the earliest years of his majority. I argue that, in both this
literary and political case, rhetorical practice functions as an individual’s capacity to
interpret ambiguous signals, in both cases by interpreting the meaning concealed behind
violated bodies. The characters in Gower’s exempla and Richard himself both leverage
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the ambiguity surrounding violated bodies to open a space for political intervention
through the act of interpretation that serves either the common good, in Gower’s
exempla, or singular profit, in Richard’s political program. To fully develop this
argument, I establish a theoretical framework that demonstrates Gower’s indebtedness to
the inherited tradition of Aristotelian virtue ethics. With this tradition as a framework, I
proceed to examine Gower’s philosophy of language and the political estates as found
across the whole of his trilingual corpus. These theories ultimately inform the theory of
deliberative rhetoric that Gower espouses in Book 7 of the Confessio. Next, I analyze this
theory of rhetoric and trace its connection to the moral virtue of chastity through a close
reading of Gower’s depiction of rhetorical practice as found in his versions of the
Lucrece and Virginia myths. Finally, after fully defining Gower’s theory of deliberative
rhetoric, I conclude the chapter by reading Gower’s theory of deliberative rhetoric into a
contemporary political situation, Richard’s attempted canonization of Edward. Through
these combined analyses, I aim to show the wide extent to which deliberative rhetoric
circulated in late medieval England and how the theories of rhetoric found in
Fürstenspiegel could be inflected within contemporary political action.
Gower’s Rhetorical Tradition
Gower’s elevation of rhetoric to an epistemological category in the Confessio
reflected the medieval occupation with hermeneutics, specifically the interpretation of
symbolism. Following Augustine, the object of medieval hermeneutics was to interpret
the hidden meaning concealed by the ambiguity inherent in conventional signs. In De
doctrina Christiana, Augustine distinguished between natural signs, which signify
“without desire or intention of signifying (sine voluntate atque ullo appetitu
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significandi),” and conventional signs, which are used by rational creatures to convey
“the motion of their souls, or that which they have sensed and understood (motus animi
sui, vel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet)” (Doc. 2.1.2; 2.2.3).102 Drawing upon distinctions
common to classical rhetorical theory, Augustine extended his semiotic theory to
encompass both linguistic (verba) and non-linguistic (res) signs and clarified that
linguistic signs should be interpreted in line with the intention or will of the sign-maker.
As Augustine explains, the problem of interpretation lies in the conventional signs of
language and the things which they signify being designated as either literal signs, which
signify that which they are held to represent by convention, or as figurative signs, which
signify something beyond that which they are held to represent by convention (Doc.
2.10.15). This theory manifests in four traditional levels of hermeneutics: the literal, the
tropological, the allegorical, and the anagogical. In the thirteenth century, Thomas
Aquinas expounded upon these traditional divisions and clarified that these four modes of
interpretation are more perfectly divided into the literal, “whereby words signify things
(qua voces significant res),” and the spiritual, “whereby things signified by words have
themselves also a signification (qua res significatae per voces, iterum res alias
significant)” (ST I, q. 1, art 10).103 Under the Aquinan model, words themselves are
always to be interpreted in the literal sense in that they conventionally signify things,
which themselves also carry signification. By interpreting things as signs, the spiritual
sense of a sign can be uncovered either as tropology, when the interpretation teaches one
how to act, as allegory, when the interpretation reveals hidden truth, or as anagogy, when
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the interpretation details perfected action. Put simply, words, for Augustine, and things,
for Aquinas, often carry two significations: one that represents the conventional
understanding of the signified and one that signifies a higher meaning concealed by the
form of the signifier. As this hermeneutical model suggests, discovering the literal
meaning communicated by language was relatively simple, but the discovery of true
meaning relied upon an individual’s capacity for determining to what extent the things
signified by words functioned as ambiguous signs (signa ambigua), which were divided
into particular signs (signa propria) and figurative signs (signa translata).
Thus, for both Augustine and later Aquinas, interpretation is understood as a
fundamentally embodied act that depended upon the individual’s capacity to decode
sensory information and connect this information to concepts held within the memory. As
R. A. Markus explains, Augustine’s semiotic theory centers the individual at the moment
of both the sign’s production and interpretation.104 For Augustine, figurative signs, both
words and things, are imbued with their “determinate meaning or range of meaning” by
the “sign-maker’s activity.”105 However, the figurative sign can only be understood by
“the subject to whom the sign stands for the object signified” when the interpreter is able
to connect the sign, understood by convention, to an already existing concept within the
subject’s memory.106 As a doubly embodied act carried about between sign-maker and
sign-interpreter, Augustine’s hermeneutics recreated the classical controversy between
scriptum, the literal meaning of the word, and voluntas, the intended signification
communicated by the sign-maker. To interpret truly, the sign-interpreter must determine
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meaning through the lens of the sign-maker’s voluntas. According to Kathy Eden, the
scriptum vs. voluntas controversy became inflected within Augustine’s hermeneutics as a
distinction between the literal interpretation of ambiguous signs (signa propria), which
understands a sign only as its literal signification, and the figurative interpretation (signa
figurata), which seeks the truth symbolized by the thing itself.107 Augustine clarifies that
some ambiguous signs must be interpreted literally while others must be interpreted
figuratively, depending upon sign-maker’s voluntas (Doc. 3.5.9; 3.10.14).108 Since
humans lack direct intellection, their interpretation of ambiguity is informed primarily by
their sensory perceptions and their capacity to connect these sensations to mental
concepts already existing within the memory, which expose the individual to fallibility
and confusion. In short, the hermeneutic problem, as understood by Augustine and
Aquinas, concerned the embodied nature of interpretation, which pitted the signinterpreter’s potentially fallible sensory perceptions against the sign-maker’s voluntas, or
intention.
The embodied nature of interpretation creates an interesting cultural and political
problem. If correct interpretation is always dependent upon potentially fallible sensory
perceptions and the capacity to connect these sensory perceptions to mental concepts in
the memory, then a disposition inclined toward moral virtue and a wide range of
particular experiences is necessary for any individual who aims at symbolic
interpretation, especially within a political space. As the Fürstenspiegel genre adapted the
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education of the prince within a Christian framework, authors drew upon Aristotelian
virtue ethics, which denoted a close relationship between the virtue of prudence and the
individual’s habituation toward virtue and capacity for deliberation. In the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle explains that, while intellectual virtues are developed through explicit
instruction, moral virtues emerge as “a result of habituation” (NE 1103a-15).109 For
Aristotle, the process of habituation is realized as individuals develop moral virtues “by
first exercising them” (NE 1103a-31). An individual is only able to embody a virtue
through the enactment of virtuous actions, which ultimately produces a disposition or
habituation toward virtue. As medieval authors drew upon Cicero’s discussion of
Aristotelian virtue ethics and applied this framework toward the ends of preparing a
sovereign for the act of governance within the Fürstenspiegel genre, they emphasized the
importance of a sovereign who exhibited the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance,
courage, and justice (Latini 1993, 2.56).110 As textual representations of emergent
political theory, the Fürstenspiegel genre focused most closely upon those virtues that
center a sovereign’s actio, or the practical elements of rulership.
These dual emphases resulted in Fürstenspiegel authors following Aristotle in
articulating prudence as the most important virtue for the development of the sovereign.
For Aristotle, prudence is the intellectual virtue most closely associated with habituation
because it is the knowledge produced by prudence that is concerned with “particular
facts” that “come to be known from experience” (NE 1141b-15). As a type of knowledge,
prudence contains both knowledge of universals, what the individual should aim at, and
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particulars, which necessitates that a “decree is to be acted on, as the last thing reached in
deliberation” (NE 1141b-27). For Aristotle, deliberation involves determining “what is
useful toward the end” that has been set by prudence, and good deliberation involves
melding reason with experience and habituation to arrive at “correctness in thought,”
which requires both the aim of something good and correct inference (NE 1142b-15-35).
As Aquinas clarifies, prudence operates within the reason “to regulate the means
(disponere de his quae sunt ad finem)” of moral virtues “by applying universal principles
to the particular conclusions of practical matters (applicans universalia principalia ad
particulares conclusiones operabilium)” (ST II-II, q. 47, a. 6). Unlike other intellectual
virtues, prudence, as a form of knowledge, is not developed solely through explicit
instruction but rather through experience in the act of deliberation, which requires one
drawing upon his habituation to virtue. For this reason, Aristotle emphasizes that
prudence is not a knowledge that can be possessed by the young because they are “not
experienced, since experience takes a long time to produce” (NE 1142a-15). Young,
inexperienced rulers lack the knowledge of particulars and experience necessary to
become prudent, so Fürstenspiegel aimed to provide sovereigns with exempla that
simulate the experience necessary for proper governance.
Much like Aristotle’s theory of habituation, the exempla that comprised
Fürstenspiegel aimed to cultivate moral virtue by providing individuals with experience
deliberating on particular and contingent matters as they interpreted the tropological or
allegorical meanings concealed through the exempla’s poetic and fictive elements. As J.
Allan Mitchell has shown, exempla should not be understood as static objects of
interpretation that teach a single normative moral but instead as functioning to become
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literally embodied within the future lives and actions of the sovereign as the sovereign
applies the teachings of the exempla to discover “how to live a moral life.”111 When
confronted by an exemplum, the sovereign is prompted to interpret a particular situation,
most often the narrative action and puzzle of the text, and to connect this to a larger
universal principle, the didactic moral of the tale, through his habituation toward virtue.
Within the Fürstenspiegel genre, the sovereign’s interpretation of exempla participates in
the co-construction of “ethical systems that guide the individual choices rulers must
make.”112 Consistent with medieval political theory, this act of co-construction between
text and sovereign posits a corporate fiction in which the Christian sovereign is depicted
as an always-in-construction “exemplary figure, concretizing in a single subject-position
the moral values that the audience shares.”113 As Giancarlo has argued, the
Fürstenspiegel serves as a textual, didactic regimen through which the sovereign
constructs and limits his own sovereignty through the “embodied praxis” of interpretation
aimed at moral virtue.114 Through this “licit performance of power and regiminal selfgovernance,” the sovereign disciplines himself under a pre-existing moral framework so
that his political authority “can be exercised for the good of the community through the
establishment of peace.”115 For exempla to be effectively interpreted, a sovereign must
draw upon his existent habituation toward virtue as he utilizes prudential knowledge to
determine the correct end of his own deliberation. While not a perfect replacement for the
experience of age that informs prudence, this interpretive process constructs a virtuous
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disposition that provides the sovereign with one of the most important practices of ruling:
deliberating on uncertain matters to arrive at a conclusion informed by prudence that
guides the realm toward the end of felicity.
Within this tradition, while the end of deliberation—correct moral action that
produces common profit—is relatively straightforward, the process of deliberation is
complicated by the realities of sensory perception, which can mislead the intellect toward
bad judgment. Aristotle and later Aquinas identified pleasure as a passion of the bodily
senses belonging to the sensitive part of the soul. This sensitive part of the soul itself is
“governed by reason (regulatur ratione)” and therefore must “be tempered and checked
through reason (temperari et refraenari per ratione)” (ST I-II. Q. 31 a. 5 ad. 3). Indeed,
as Jordan Loveridge has shown, for Aquinas, the very act of deliberation depended upon
the “sensory experience ordered within the memory.”116 Under the Aquinan model,
sensory perception and memory produced phantasia within the mind that aided the
process of rhetorical deliberation by helping to “bridge the gap between singular and
universal reasoning” through the storage and recollection of “specific representations of
events and phenomena” that can be connected to universal generalizations, as informed
by prudence.117 However, while sensory perception and its concomitant pleasure can aid
in deliberation, it can also hinder the use of reason by distracting the reason, by being
contrary to reason, or by fettering the reason (ST I-II. Q. 33 a. 3).
Therefore, a sovereign with a virtuous disposition must supplement prudential
knowledge with its associated virtues, particularly the virtue of temperance. Aquinas
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identifies temperance as “that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason
(quae inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem)” and as functioning to ensure the
sensitive part of the soul is governed by reason rather than sensual pleasure or pain (ST
II-II. Q. 141 a. 1). Later writers such as Latini thus cited temperance as the virtue that
aligned moral habituation with prudential knowledge aimed at common profit. Latini
defines temperance as the virtue that ensures the soul privileges reason in the act of
deliberation by “oppos[ing] the desire for delight, for if a person allows himself to be
overcome, reason remains subject to desire, and desire has its own end.”118 While the
operation of temperance is not always a conscious act, in the sense of deliberation, the
possession of a temperate disposition helps the individual to determine the ends that aim
at common profit rather than individual profit, and, thus, a sovereign’s temperate
disposition inclines him to lead the realm toward felicity.
Exempla, as fiction and therefore a productive type of knowledge according to
Aristotle, can stimulate both aspects of sensory apprehension, that which produces the
pleasure of truth and inclines the individual toward proper interpretation and that which
overstimulates the senses and prompts the individual to forego reason in favor of bodily
pleasure. Fürstenspiegel, with their emphasis upon inculcating moral virtue in the
sovereign, employ fictive exempla to simulate the process of deliberation and provide the
sovereign with a wider range of mental concepts and experience in tempering the sensory
pleasure that can complicate deliberation. In the Aristotelian classification, rhetoric, as an
art, is concerned with production while prudence is concerned with action (NE 1140a18). As Matthew Irvin has demonstrated, for Gower, like other Fürstenspiegel authors,
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the exempla shared throughout the Confessio call attention to the role of fiction, fictio, in
the development of moral virtue in the sovereign, actio.119 The use of fictive exempla to
teach ethical virtue can be traced back to 12th century medieval commentaries in which
poetry and fiction was depicted as “probable and believable so that its utility could be
clearly communicated to an audience of young readers,” who would draw upon these
examples to guide moral behavior.120 Exempla function to provide the sovereign with an
education in prudence, the ultimate end of virtue, through the interpretation of fictive
particular, contingent circumstances that themselves work to construct an ethical and
moral framework that habituates the sovereign toward virtue.121 As Latini explains,
prudential knowledge, here the ethical and moral framework constructed through the
interpretation of exempla, is necessary to confirm the individual’s habituated impulse
toward virtue: “Works of the soul exist according to the measure of moral virtue and
according to the measure of prudence and quickness of wit and astuteness; therefore,
virtue directs the thoughts of man to what is just, and prudence, that is to say, sense
confirms these things.”122 For exempla to fulfil their pedagogical function within
Fürstenspiegel of providing an education in prudence, they required a sovereign who
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possessed a temperate disposition and the grammatical and rhetorical training necessary
to interpret the fictive elements of the text.
Rhetorique and Chasteté
Gower’s elevation of rhetoric to the epistemological category governing both
ethics and politics reflected his understanding of language use as foundational to both of
these realms of knowledge as well as his overarching moral philosophy. Modern
scholarship on Gower has found within his corpus, primarily in his three major works, the
French Mirour de l’Omme,123 the Latin Vox Calamantis, and the English Confessio
Amantis, an overarching moral philosophy that, over time and in response to the political
crises of Richard’s reign, evolved into a political philosophy that emphasized the
reasonable government of the individual as a model for the effective government of the
political state. As John H. Fisher, Gower’s first modern biographer and major critic, has
laid out, Gower’s political and moral writings are grounded by the foundational belief
that “when [social] order is not maintained, chaos ensues.”124 Since, for Gower, the
natural state of society is represented by accord between the estates whose members aim
at achieving “comun profit” within the political state, he views the conduct of the
individual as the means by which the political state constitutes and maintains itself (CA
prol.377). Naturally, in this society, the conduct of the king and his corresponding
“propria persona” reflect the moral health of the entire kingdom, and this persona is the
primary determinant for the maintenance of social order between the estates that

123

The Mirour de l’Omme is a modern title. On Gower’s tomb, his reclined head rests on a pile of his three
major works. On the tomb, the Mirour is given the title Speculum Meditantis, presumably to match the
grammatical construction of the other two texts.
124
John H. Fisher, John Gower: Moral Philosopher and Friend of Chaucer (New York: New York University
Press, 1964), 173.

103

constitute the kingdom.125 Such a construction leads Russell A. Peck to conclude that
sovereignty and common profit function as “psychological as well as political concepts”
for Gower and that Gower’s works as a whole position the problem of right rule as a
negotiation between following true counsel—generative love that privileges natural
truth—and self-flattery—destructive desire that satisfies appetite.126 Put in its simplest
terms, Gower’s moral philosophy is that juvenile self-love should mature, through the
intervention of reason, into love of common profit as the individual ages.
According to Gower, common profit can only be achieved when the individual
and political state are both governed by reason rather than desire or appetite—a process
that ensures that love is put toward productive rather than destructive ends.127 For
individuals, government by reason involves living a life devoted toward truth and
avoiding sin, especially those sins that transgress the oaths of one’s station, such as
priests violating orders of chastity or peasants mimicking the behavior of higher estates
by, for example, making binding formal agreements with one another (VC 1.2, 1.7, 1.9,
1.12, 3.23). As these individuals, who serve as microcosms of the political state, come
together, their individual proper moral conduct ensures social order rather than social
chaos within the kingdom as each estate acts in accordance with the natural state allotted
to them. While modern scholarship has defined Gower’s moral philosophy and
illuminated the connection Gower draws between individual moral conduct and the
health of the kingdom, it has relatively elided the extent to which proper language use,
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both on the individual and societal levels, is figured as a component of government by
reason aimed at achieving common profit.
As revealed across the arc of Gower’s corpus, the foundations of Gower’s moral
philosophy, with its emphasis on the role of truth to preserve social order, are based upon
a linguistic conservativism in which each estate’s correct behavior relies upon individuals
within each estate properly using and leveraging language to achieve accord and peace
within and across the three estates. Indeed, such a linguistic conservatism is even how
Gower constitutes his own narrative authority in the Vox. While Gower criticizes disorder
in the realm, he repeatedly cites the proverbial claim that “The voice of the people agrees
with the voice of God” and that he himself is articulating the “common voice” of the
people in his text (VC 3.15.1260-70; 5.1.10-20). Here, even as Gower describes the revolt
of the commons against the realm in the Vox, he cites the common voice as incapable of
communicating falsehood and insulates himself from criticism through the invocation of
proverbial truth. As Gower imagines it, individual language use should follow the
example of prayer where a man:
Must pray with absolute plainness,
He says, when a man prays to God,
Without speaking elaborately
And without double meaning,
He will speak a plain word,
From a plain thought, for God,
Will not hear a double tongue. (ML 10226-31)128
When elaboration and double meaning enter into one’s moral conduct, the potential arises
for discord to enter into the political state as well-ordered estates transform into unruly
mobs through the intervention of unreasonable and false language. In Gower’s ideal
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society, as depicted in both his descriptions of the estates in the Vox Clamantis and the
Prologue to the Confessio Amantis, social order is guaranteed and maintained by a
linguistic conservatism in which the ambiguity inherent in language use does not produce
interpretations of speech that depart from the intention of the speaker. In the Prologue to
the Confessio, Gower makes an explicit connection between semiotic ambiguity, sin, and
political discord as God punishes Nembrot for building the Tower of Babel:
Wherof divided anon ryht
Was the langage in such entente,
Ther wiste non what other mente,
So that thei myhten night procede.
And thus it stant of every dede
Where Senne takth the cause on honde
It may upriht night longe stonde;
For Senne of his condicioun
Is moder of division
And tokne whan the world schal faile. (CA prol.1022-31)
In line with medieval commentary on the Babel story, Gower views the division of
languages at Babel as a further consequence of sin separating humanity from direct
intellection in the Garden of Eden. Once ambiguity enters into language—once signs no
longer perfectly signify—political enterprise, in this case, the construction of the Tower
of Babel comes to an end and is replaced by division and discord. Gower expands upon
this theme in Book 5 of the Vox in which he graphically narrates how improper language
dismantles the political state:
A tongue sets quarrels in motion, a quarrel sets battles in motion, battles set
people in motion, people set swords in motion, swords set schisms in motion, and
schism brings ruin. A tongue uproots rulers from their kingdoms, sends estates up
in flames, and pillages homes. A tongue loosens marriage bonds, and makes into
two what God has declared to be one. (VC 5.880-90)
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As Gower makes explicit here and throughout his corpus, proper language use is
foundational to and precedes political action. Harmony between the estates and peace
within the kingdom can only occur when ambiguity has been removed from language.
When we consider the close relationship between habituation, deliberation,
prudence, and temperance, Gower’s elevation of rhetoric to an epistemological category
seems designed to produce a theory of rhetoric that addresses the traditional tension
between sensory desire and truth by limiting rhetorical practice to only those who possess
a reasonable, temperate disposition. While Gower’s reputation as a rhetorician has
improved from the earliest scholarship,129 modern conversations tend to emphasize
Gower’s theory of speech and plain truth, in which the rhetor is charged with using
language to perfectly represent “the hertes thoght which is withinne” (CA 7.1512).130
These interpretations often center Gower’s adaptation of the Ciceronian myth of
rhetorical origins found in Latini. Rather than following Latini in associating the
development of rhetoric with “a primal social compact which generates verbal signs as
part of the forging of society,”131 Gower instead identifies rhetoric as a freely-given gift
of God that serves as the “ethical foundation” that morally obligates humanity to “ne
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schifte / Hise wordes to no wicked us” (CA 7.1519-20).132 For Gower, language is merely
borrowed from a higher power, and it is incumbent upon humanity to put it to proper—
that is, ethical and virtuous—use, especially considering that rhetoric forms the
epistemological category governing ethics and politics. Consequently, rhetoric must
ascend to the top of the traditional trivium with “Gramaire” and “Logique” functioning
respectively to “speke upon congruité” and distinguish “Between the trouthe and the
falshode” (CA 7.1529-33).
In the same manner that prudence determines the end of action, Gower represents
rhetorical speech as determining the end of the intention of the soul, which he views as a
moral imperative to represent correctly. Since language is our only means for revealing
these intentions, Gower declares that the “word above alle erthli things / Is vertuous in his
doinges” (CA 7.1547-8) in its capacity to do both good and evil. As Gower explains, the
fundamental problem of rhetoric is the hermeneutic gap that exists between the
conventional signs of language and the intentions of the speaker, which he describes as
when the “word to the conceipte / Descordeth in so double a wise” (CA 7.1554-5). As
Gower explains through his exemplum on the Catiline Conspiracy, eloquence can
“excite” sensory pleasure within the audience, which can result in the audience being
moved toward individual desire rather than common profit and virtue (CA 7.1618).
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Gower’s theory of rhetoric is thus dependent upon a rhetorician whose reasonable and
temperate disposition habituates him toward engaging in rhetorical interpretation and
practice that aim at truth and common profit.
For Gower, proper language use closely resembles Aristotle’s theory of
habituation insofar as language and deliberation direct an individual toward morally
correct conclusions that inform virtuous actions. For this reason, Gower declares that
language is the “techer of vertus,” precisely because it is through language that
individuals deliberate and bridge the gap between universal moral principles and the
particulars of contingent situations (CA 7.1520). As a science, rhetoric is concerned with
the justification and selection of words that correspond with the aim determined by
prudence so that the rhetor may “knette upon conclusion / His argument in such a forme /
Which mai the pleine trouthe enforme” (CA 7.1636-8). In the same manner that virtue of
character is “concerned with pleasures or pains” and an individual’s lack of virtue stems
from “pursuing or avoiding the wrong [pleasures and pains]” (NE 1004b-10-25), proper
language use is complicated by its accompanying sensory perceptions. While love of
truth should make plain speech pleasing as “Whan wordes medlen with the song,” words
that have been “Coloureth in another weie” can lead an audience away from truth through
sensory excitement (CA 7.1586, 7.1625).
As modern scholars have shown, Gower’s adaptations to the Aristotelian
rhetorical tradition are preoccupied by the rhetorical possibilities that accompany sensory
desire. Citing the influence of Giles of Rome, Georgiana Donavin argues that Gower’s
definition of rhetoric is an “Aristotelian psychomachia of inventio…in which Reason and
Will conjoin to produce morally compelling speech,” with rhetoric exciting the passions

109

of the soul and in the process “moving the Will toward intellectual contemplation of the
Good” and prompting the Intellect toward probable reasoning.133 When the whole project
of the Confessio is interpreted through the lens of Aristotelian psychological allegory, the
character of Genius functions as the Imagination that attempts to mediate the desire of
Amans, representing the Will, through the intervention of Reason, to arrive “at a
compromise between sensual desire and reason.”134 While ethical speech can guide the
soul toward virtuous action through the pleasure produced by intellectual truth, improper
speech can excite the senses through ornamentation that seems pleasing but leads the
audience away from virtuous action. Within the context of the Fürstenspiegel, it is
through the very interpretation, internalization, and embodiment of the moral lessons
taught through fictive exempla that the reader develops prudential knowledge to ward
against the emotional excesses that rhetoric often excites and, in turn, comes to possess
the virtuous disposition necessary for effective and ethical rhetorical practice.
Gower’s solution to the classical problem posed by sensory desire is to restrict the
type of speech that is classified as rhetorical to encompass only “the reverence/ Of
wordes that ben resonable” (CA 7.1524-5). As the freely-given gift of God, proper
language use takes on a religious significance for Gower, especially considering that
proper language use ensures that “pes [is] sustiened” within the realm (CA 7.1576). Due
to language’s inherent ambiguity and potential for arousing unproductive sensual desire,
Gower ascribes language with the power to sow harmony and discord within the
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kingdom. In both of his exempla on improper rhetoric, Gower emphasizes that rhetorical
speech can either serve the common profit, as in the case of Silanus’ speech against
Catiline, or subvert the common profit, as when Ulysses persuaded Antenor to betray
Troy or when Caesar’s eloquence set the judges’ “hertes to pité” as he pled for Catiline’s
life (CA 7.1621). By equating rhetorical speech with reasonable speech, Gower
functionally limits rhetorical practice to only those individuals who are capable of
moderating their desire and putting language to its appropriate use.
While individuals on their own possess the capacity for self-government by
reason—that is, after all, the underlying foundation of the Fürstenspiegel as a genre—
collections of individuals are vulnerable to the influence of desire excited through
eloquent language. As Gower articulates in the first book of the Vox Clamantis, the
peasantry, in particular, are prone toward unreasonable behavior, which Gower depicts
through their transformation from men into “irrational brutes (brutorum…irracionis)”
who “had no power of reason (nil racionis erat)” (VC 1.3.178, 1.3.238). When the realm
is faced with contingent, uncertain matters, the peasantry’s general lack of reason
necessitates the elevation of a sovereign authority capable of tempering the passions of
the crowd, interpreting the hidden truth concealed by ambiguity, and guaranteeing
government by reason throughout the realm. As Gower demonstrates within the Vox,
when the commons are subjected toward pleasing language, they lack the deliberative
capacity to moderate their desires to productively engage with deliberative rhetoric.
Gower depicts the speech of Wat Tyler, represented as a jay skilled in the “art of
speaking (arte loquendi),” but not necessarily the science of rhetoric (VC 1.9.681). As a
jay, Tyler recreates the sounds of pleasing language and leads the crowd to be deceived
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by his “ambiguous words (Vocibus ambiguis)” that are not aligned with virtue, which he
declares shall no longer remain in the world (VC 1.9.703). The crowd becomes aroused
by Tyler’s persuasive shouting to follow his unreasonable course of action, ultimately
resulting in the discord of the Peasants’ Revolt (VC 1.9.718).
As Gower later adapted this theory of deliberative rhetoric into the context of his
Fürstenspiegel, he selected exempla that demonstrate how the stability of the realm
depends upon a figure of authority who can ethically interpret uncertain and contingent
matters for an audience who lacks deliberative and hermeneutic capacities. For Gower, a
sovereign’s rhetorical efficacy is intimately tied to his propria persona, “the truthful,
decorous ways in which he relates his persona to his political context,” which involves
closely matching one’s words to his actions.135 Given the contingent situations that
characterized the medieval English court, a sovereign’s effectiveness in matching his
persona to the political context relied upon his capacity to correctly interpret ambiguous
situations and express his interpretation and intentions regarding these matters in a
manner that could not be misunderstood. To properly use language necessitates that the
rhetor be habituated toward virtue so that the end of his deliberation points toward what
prudence has identified as the end of happiness, which, as Aristotle explains, requires a
particular type of education in one’s early life—the very education provided by the
Fürstenspiegel. Gower thus enacts a truly Aristotelian conception of deliberative rhetoric
in which effective rhetorical practice consists of the reasoned capacity to leverage the
hermeneutic gap of language to achieve political action that is aligned to the rhetorician’s
virtuous disposition and the common profit of the realm.
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Since sensory desire can affect the sovereign’s intellect during the moment of
deliberation and interpretation, Gower cites the need for a sovereign who has a chaste
disposition. Of the five areas that he defines as constituting practical rulership, “Trouthe,”
“Largesse,” “Justice,” “Pité,” and “Chasteté,” Gower most openly explores how
sovereigns leverage rhetorical practice toward political ends in his discussion of chastity.
While Gower never explicitly refers back to his definition of rhetoric in the chastity
exempla, it is highly suggestive that Gower’s most robust depictions of the practice of
rhetorical interpretation and its political consequences are found in the exempla that
model chastity, specifically the tales of Lucrece and Virginia. As Scanlon has argued, for
Gower, chastity functions as a natural law that applies external Christianized morals to
curb the appetite of the sovereign.136 However, when considered within a rhetorical
paradigm, a habituation toward chastity prompts the sovereign to deliberate on contingent
matters in line with common profit rather than his own bodily desire.
Gower’s preoccupation with the role of deliberation in rhetorical practice compels
him to warn against those moments in which ethical deliberation becomes governed by
individual desire rather than reasonable judgment. As Gower explains, being habituated
toward chastity ensures that a sovereign “schal mesure / His bodi, so that no mesure / Of
fleisshly lust he scholde excede” (CA 7.2435-7). Gower acknowledges that lust can create
sensory phantasia within the individual that produce a “fool impression / Of his
ymaginacioun” that allows for self-deception and the centering of one’s own desires
rather than the common profit (CA 7.4271-2). Much like the sense phantasia identified
by Aquinas as central to the process of connecting “singular and universal reasoning,”137
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the “fool impressions” that Gower describes function rhetorically within the mind to
connect particular contingent circumstances to larger categories of moral action.
However, rather than aiding the judgment, these fantastic impressions produce selfdeception that causes the individual to follow his own desires and be thrown “fro his
astat,” losing control of his reasonable judgment (CA 7.4303). By centering his own
chaste interpretation, the sovereign leverages proper language use to ensure that peace is
maintained between the estates. In short, Gower establishes a dichotomy between
pleasurable and reasonable rhetorical interpretation wherein chastity operates as a
habituated virtue that ensures that sovereigns promote the common profit rather than their
individual desires during the process of deliberation.
Through his narration of the Lucrece myth, Gower demonstrates how a sovereign
may leverage the ambiguity inherent in contingent matters to create a discursive space
through which deliberative action and political intervention can take place. In the myth of
Lucrece, Gower adapts the traditional tale where Lucrece’s suicide following her rape by
a member of the Tarquin family inspires the people of Rome to overthrow the monarchy
and establish a republic. During the medieval period, the Lucrece myth circulated within
an extensive commentary tradition in which narratives depicting women’s violated bodies
to represent “allegories or moral traits or cognitive processes” elided the actual violation
in favor of exegesis.138 As Andrew Galloway has shown, in Gower’s time, the Lucrece
myth was especially popular as an object of hermeneutical glossing through which
medieval commentators distinguished their own Christian values from the “institutional
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and social values of ancient Rome” that Lucrece embodied in the classical versions of the
myth.139 As the Lucrece myth was adapted within a Christian moral framework, the
hermeneutical focus of the myth centered on an extended discussion of the sinfulness of
Lucrece’s suicide, with Augustine famously commenting that Lucrece’s suicide is sinful
because it was committed “not for love of purity, but for the burden of her shame (non est
pudicitiae caritas, sed pudoris infirmitas).”140 However, as Gower adapted this myth to
the Confessio, he drew upon this hermeneutical tradition while also distancing himself
from the moral question of Lucrece’s culpability.
Within the aims of the Fürstenspiegel genre to develop prudential knowledge,
Gower’s particular adaptations to the exemplum reveal a concern with depicting
rhetorical practices that are inclined toward chastity. Gower transposes the tale as a
political and rhetorical exemplum by following Ovid and Livy in focusing upon the
characters of the Tarquins and Brutus so as to reposition the narrative as a commentary
on “the importance of social responsibility for the private as well as the public face of the
ruler,” a particular concern for young monarchs such as Richard II.141 As an exercise in
connecting universal principles to the virtuous action necessitated by contingent
situations—the very role of rhetoric in Gower’s classification of the sciences—Gower’s
version of the Lucrece myth provides the audience with five depictions in which
authoritative figures are compelled to leverage their interpretation of ambiguity
surrounding contingent matters to achieve either common or individual profit. Through
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these moments, Gower models his ideal view of a rhetorical sovereign, one who bridges
the hermeneutic gap created by ambiguity, disseminates his interpretation as “pleine
trouthe,” and leverages this interpretation to preserve peace and common profit within the
realm. The characters of Aruns and Brutus thus come to serve as rhetorical foils through
which Gower demonstrates the need for rhetorical skill to be accompanied by a
habituation to virtue, especially the virtue of chastity. When rhetorical practice is not
married to a virtuous disposition, as is the case with Aruns, there can be extensive
political consequences that descend from individual desire displacing common profit as
the end of rhetorical deliberation.
The action of Gower’s tale closely follows his primary source, Ovid, though he
also draws a few scenes from Livy and includes a few novel adaptations. The tale
presents two distinct narrative episodes. In the first, Aruns, a member of the ruling
Tarquin family of Rome, deceives the Gabines and conquers the city through the betrayal
and slaughter of Gabii’s prominent citizens after correctly interpreting his father’s
ambiguous symbolic action. In the second, Aruns rapes Lucrece, who, following Roman
customs, commits suicide to preserve her reputation for chastity. Lucrece’s cousin,
Brutus, then inspires the Roman people to overthrow the monarchy and establish the
Roman Republic by invoking the example of Lucrece. In Gower’s version, the “Lucrece”
myth functions as an exemplum that trains young sovereigns to interpret ambiguity in
line with their habituation toward virtue by depicting the very action that it models in its
primary characters, Brutus and Aruns.
From Rhetorical Deliberation to Individual or Common Profit
Through the character of Aruns, Gower demonstrates the consequences that arise

116

when authoritative figures leverage ambiguity for individual profit rather than the good of
the realm. While Aruns obviously functions as the negative moral example of the myth,
Gower does portray him as a keen interpreter of ambiguity and, at times, a savvy political
actor, but his production and interpretation of ambiguity always aim at his own individual
profit rather than the common profit of the kingdom. In the beginning of the tale, Gower
includes two scenes that emphasize both the need for authoritative figures to gloss
ambiguity and the importance of rhetorical deliberation that is aligned with virtue. The
tale begins with Aruns making twelve wounds upon his back to simulate abuse by his
father, the king of Rome, so that he may infiltrate and overthrow the city of Gabii (CA
7.4615). When Aruns enters the city, he is arrested as an enemy combatant, but he
displays his wounded back and provides a rhetorical performance that hermeneutically
glosses this ambiguous non-linguistic sign: “‘I am hier at your wille, / Als lief it is that ye
may spille, / As if myn oghne fader dede” (CA 7.4627-9). The Gabines are affectively
moved, “token pité on his grief,” and do not interrogate the “trouthe” of the wounds but
instead draw pleasure from this change in their own political fortunes as they find it
“wonder lief / That Rome him hadde exiled so” (CA 7.4643-5). The Gabines accept
Aruns’ hermeneutical gloss at face value and allow their interpretation of the ambiguity
produced by Aruns to be determined by their reaction to the pathos of the situation, much
like the judges that Gower depicts in the case of the Catiline conspiracy.
The Gabines’ error in judgment reveals their lack of the virtue that Giles identifies
as “caucio,” the capacity to know that “speculatif falsnesse is som tyme imelded with
sothnesse” and that there is a difference between that which is “good but in semynge”
and that which is “good in dede” (Gov. 1.2.8). In this opening to the tale, Gower
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establishes two themes that are relevant to his larger discussion of the role of rhetoric
within the royal court. First, he demonstrates the problematic that arises when sovereigns
produce, interpret, and leverage ambiguity to serve their own individual profit. Second,
for the larger audience of his Fürstenspiegel, which includes the advisors of the king, the
negative exemplum of the Gabines provides a model for the potential consequences that
emerge when deliberation arrives at ends that benefit the common profit accidentally
rather than essentially. As Gower understands it, successful political communities are
ultimately constituted around figures who can properly interpret ambiguity in line with
their habituation to virtue, specifically their possession of the faculty of prudence which
guides the realm to felicity.
As the scene in Gabii continues, Gower demonstrates the importance of rhetorical
practice precipitating political action that is informed by a virtuous disposition rather than
an individual desire. Once again, Gower emphasizes Aruns’ interpretive skill. After
Aruns pledges his “trouthe” to the Gabines and gains control of the city’s defenses, he
sends a messenger to his father Tarquin for instruction on how to conquer the city.
Tarquin gives no direct verbal counsel; instead, he strikes the heads off the lilies in his
garden and tells the messenger that this action “Schal ben in stede of thin ansuere” (CA
7.4683). Aruns understands “what it mente” and “sette al his entente” upon achieving the
desire of his father (CA 7.4691-2). Aruns reads beyond the surface level of the symbolic
action and understands the intention of his father, namely, to gather and kill the
prominent Gabine citizens to force the city to surrender. In one of his few novel
adaptations to his source text, Gower emphasizes the slaughter of the entire city that
comes about due to the improper use of rhetoric, which is absent in Ovid and Livy:
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“…the Romeins, / …tok and slowh the citezeins / Withoute reson or pité, / That he ne
spareth no degré” (CA 7.4697-700). Across these two interpretive moments, Gower
emphasizes the close relationship between embodied rhetorical interpretation and
political action. The presence of ambiguous and contingent visual signs—the wounds on
Aruns’ back and Tarquin’s striking of the lilies—necessitates that authoritative figures
possess a strong interpretive capacity so that they may leverage these contingent
situations to achieve political action, but, in this case, political action ultimately
undermines the common profit because Aruns lacks a virtuous disposition.
Rhetorical practice, here, functions less as a heuristic for persuasive speech and
more as a reasoned capacity for interpreting truth and leveraging that interpretation to
achieve political action. Aruns, as a rhetorician, fills the liminal space of the hermeneutic
gap created by the ambiguity of a figurative sign to achieve his own political ends.
Gower’s stress upon Aruns breaking his pledge of “trouthe” shows the danger inherent in
this embodied theory of deliberative rhetoric. As Gower claimed in the Vox, since the
commons of the kingdom are morally impoverished and lack a virtuous disposition that
moderates their desires, they are reliant upon the “trouthe” of the sovereign to accurately
gloss ambiguous contingent situations that they lack the hermeneutic capacity to
interpret. When the sovereign is not habituated toward virtue, he may guide the realm
toward what is pleasing to his own ends, here the brutal conquering of the Gabines. Since
the ethical implementation of deliberative rhetoric depends entirely upon the “trouthe” of
the sovereign, a sovereign must be fully habituated toward virtue, which, according to
Aristotle, is impossible for those whose youth precludes experience.
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If Aruns models improper rhetorical interpretation, his political, moral, and
rhetorical foil within the exemplum, Brutus, functions as a distillation of ethical rhetorical
action. Brutus is introduced to the narrative when the Roman contingent visits the temple
of Phebus, where a snake devours the Romans’ sacrifice as punishment for the
sacrilegious treatment of the Gabines. When the Romans inquire as to “what mai this
signefie,” Phebus answers that “which of hem ferst kisseth / His moder, he schal take
wrieche / Upon the wrong” (CA 7.4717, 7.4730-2). As in the interpretive scene that opens
the exemplum, the collective populace is faced with an ambiguous and contingent visual
sign—the snake devouring the sacrifice—and lacks the interpretive capacity to uncover
the meaning concealed by the ambiguity. Like Aruns, Phebus himself provides a verbal
hermeneutic gloss, but this verbal gloss is itself merely magnifies the ambiguity of the
situation.
In contrast to the earlier scene with the Gabines, in this situation, the
interpretation of the ambiguity magnified by Phebus’ verbal hermeneutics is carried out
by Brutus, a character identified as having a virtuous disposition aligned with the
common profit of the kingdom. Brutus reveals his rhetorical skill by exploiting the
ambiguity present in Phebus’ statement, dropping to his knees, and kissing the ground
since “th’erthe of every mannes kinde / Is moder” (CA 7.4743-4). By recognizing the
figurative meaning behind Phebus’ statement, Brutus first fulfils the prophecy before the
literal-minded Romans who wait until returning home to kiss their mothers. Gower
emphasizes this moment of rhetorical skill by comparing Brutus to the other Romans
present in the temple who “were blinde / And sihen noght so fer as he” (CA 7.4738-9;
7.4744-5). In this contingent moment, Brutus’ interpretation of the prophecy does not
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rely solely on the intention of Phebus; instead, he recognizes that the ambiguity of the
prophecy allows for the leveraging of interpretation in line with the common profit of the
kingdom, in this case, the eventual expulsion of the Tarquins. While, in certain situations,
the leveraging of ambiguity can undermine the common profit of the kingdom, Brutus’
habituation toward virtue ensures that his interpretations of ambiguity ultimately serve
the good of the kingdom.
Since, for Gower, embodied rhetorical deliberation and interpretation function as
the first steps in political action, he is particularly concerned with the internal deliberation
that connects contingent sensory experiences to the larger moral categories of virtue that
govern deliberation and moral action. As the exemplum progresses, Aruns’ contingent
returns to Rome to settle a bet on who has the most loyal wife, and Aruns encounters
Lucrece, the wife of his cousin Collatin. While spying, Aruns and Collatin witness an
unknowing Lucrece pledge her desire to see Collatin return home in a long speech that
culminates in the outpouring of Lucrece’s tears, a motif that is repeated later in the
exemplum (CA 7.4812-35). Upon seeing this image of Lucrece, Aruns is struck by love’s
“fyri dart” and “The resoun of hise wittes alle / Hath lost,” which results in a non-literal
reading of Lucrece that elides the intention behind her unselfconscious actions and
instead substitutes an interpretation that centers Aruns’ individual desire (CA 7.4852,
4850-1). When Aruns departs from Collatin’s home, he is plagued by the sensory image
of Lucrece. For Aruns, prudence’s regulation of internal deliberation is disrupted by the
self-deception of desire, which ultimately results in the subversion of common profit in
the kingdom.
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Across 30 lines of texts, Gower describes how the internal process of deliberation
functions, a movement from initial thought, to the production of sensory phantasia that
Aquinas cites as central to the deliberative process, to ultimate interpretation. As he goes
to bed, Aruns begins to “thenke upon” the image of Lucrece, producing a sensory
phantasia within his mind as he “pourtreieth hire ymage” in his memory that is
represented by Gower as a textual blazon of Lucrece’s features and actions (CA 7.4872,
7.4876). When confronted by the sensory phantasia of Lucrece, Aruns is “soupled” to
“The lustes of his fleissh fulfille,” and his rhetorical deliberation arrives at a non-literal
reading of Lucrece as an object of male lust rather than the virtuous and chaste wife that
her actions represent (CA 7.4890, 7.4894). As Karla Taylor has demonstrated, Aruns’
attraction to Lucrece stems from her embodiment of femininity, perfectly represented by
the natural accord between her inner self, her “entente,” and her chaste body, her
“semblant,” which forms a sharp contrast with Aruns’ own ambiguous and unreadable
body.142 Aruns’ process of deliberation is perverted by his sensory phantasia and, as a
consequence, he interprets Lucrece’s femininity in line with his own sensual desire and
individual profit rather than through a virtuous disposition. Aruns’ fundamental lack of
chastity prevents him from moderating his desire, affects his process of rhetorical
deliberation and embodied interpretation, and ultimately drives his appetitive actions.
From Rhetorical Deliberation to Political Action
As the exemplum concludes, in the characters of Brutus and Lucrece, Gower
models his ideal political orator, one who bridges the hermeneutic gap created by
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figurative signs and contingent situations, communicates his interpretation to the
commons in plain speech, and serves the common profit. Following Aruns’ selfdeception, Aruns rapes Lucrece, rendering her body in an ambiguous, unreadable state,
much like Aruns’ body at the beginning of the tale. As Irvin has argued, in contrast to the
hermeneutical tradition of Augustine and Gower’s contemporaries, Gower’s depiction of
Lucrece within the exemplum does not read against her behavior in an attempt to chart
her actions within a Christian moral framework; instead, Gower elects to strip Lucrece of
direct speech and depicts Lucrece’s virtue and communication within a paradigm that
relies upon the expression of natural signs that perfectly encapsulate her intention and
makes her chastity impossible to misinterpret.143 Following the rape, Lucrece’s body
transitions into a liminal state where her “desguised” clothes and “unkemd” hair belie the
earlier natural expression of her “wommanhiede” (CA 7.5201-3), which thereby prompts
Collatin to request a hermeneutical gloss of her ambiguous body: “Why sche so sore
hireself beweileth, / And what the sothe wolde mene” (CA 7.5038-9). Lucrece’s family
can recognize that there is a “sothe” concealed by her violation and understand Lucrece’s
intention to express despair, but, like the Gabines and Romans before them, they need a
hermeneutical explanation for the ambiguity represented by her violated body.
In contrast to Phebus’ verbal hermeneutic gloss that magnified the ambiguity of
the situation, Lucrece’s perfect embodiment of virtue compels her to provide a gloss that
avoids the potential for misinterpretation. Though Lucrece resists verbalizing her trauma,
she eventually realizes “sche most nede” to explain the tale to her family so that they may
correctly understand the cause of her violation (CA 7.5047). Whereas Ovid has Lucrece
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explicitly verbalize her violation—“‘Must I owe this also to Tarquin,’ she said. ‘Must I
speak, speak, this unhappy one, my own shame? (‘hoc quoque Tarquinio debebimus?
eloquar' inquit, / 'eloquar infelix dedecus ipsa meum?')”—Gower glosses over this direct
speech (2.825-6).144 Instead, in direct parallel to Tarquin’s symbolic cropping of the
lilies, Gower emphasizes Lucrece’s symbolic action of taking a sword and committing
suicide so that “…the world ne schal / Reproven hire” (CA 7.5063-4). Lucrece’s final
action, holding the hem of her dress as she falls so “That no man dounward fro the kne /
Scholde eny thing of hire se,” works rhetorically to prompt deliberation that moves
beyond the literal and into the symbolic through its representation of her interior
“wommanhiede,” in stark contrast to the violated state of her body revealed by a surfacelevel sensory interpretation (CA 7.5073-4). In this instance, Lucrece’s ability to cut
through the ambiguity wrought on her violated body descends from her perfect
representation of chastity and habituation to virtue, much in the same manner that the
effective sovereign’s interpretation and leveraging of ambiguity aims to advance the
common profit of the kingdom. As becomes evident as the exemplum continues,
Lucrece’s somatic expression of symbolic actions aims at reconciling the conflicts that
are operant within her political and domestic spheres.
While Lucrece’s natural somatic expression extends beyond the domestic sphere
into the body politic of the state, her status as a woman ultimately prevents her from
engaging in public rhetorical deliberative practice. Gower’s silencing of Lucrece
represents his most substantial revisions from Ovid, and these revisions serve the purpose
of excluding women from the political sphere in favor of representing the domestic
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sphere as the body politic.145 Extending Diane Watt’s argument, Gower’s revisions also
serve the purpose of demonstrating how authoritative figures can leverage ambiguous
contingent situations to serve the common profit, as long as the interpretation of that
ambiguity is aligned to a virtuous disposition. Through her act of suicide, Lucrece
collapses the domestic and political into a single sphere and reconciles the tension
inherent within both through her natural expression of her virtue. While Lucrece’s suicide
is restricted to the domestic audience, her cousin Brutus, who has already demonstrated
his rhetorical skill, translates this act from its immediate domestic aftermath into its larger
political contexts.
Through the character of Brutus, Gower again depicts rhetorical practice as an
extension of prudence, a reasoned and trained capacity to uncover the truth of contingent
circumstances and connect this interpretation to larger categories of virtue and thereby
bring about political action. While Gower gives us no description of Brutus’ rhetorical
training or previous experiences, his skill as a rhetorician descends from his perfect
orientation and habituation toward virtue. In contrast with Aruns and even Lucrece’s own
family, Brutus does not base his interpretation of Lucrece upon his visual sense but rather
his “herte,” an automatic turn toward his virtuous disposition (CA 7.5083). After Brutus
removes the sword from Lucrece’s body, he swears that “he thereof schal do vengance”
upon those who have violated Lucrece, thereby fulfilling the prophecy he initially
interpreted correctly at the Temple of Phebus (CA 7.5087). Gower, following Ovid,
confirms that Brutus has correctly interpreted Lucrece’s actions by having Lucrece’s
body posthumously support Brutus’ case for revenge when she displays a “contienance,”
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moving her eye “at laste" to behold Brutus (CA 7.5088-9). Isabelle Mast notes that, in
this moment, Lucrece’s body seems to acknowledge the role that it will be playing in the
subsequent overthrow of the Tarquins through Brutus’ translation of her symbolic action
from the domestic to the political sphere.146 By interpreting contingent matters through
his capacity for judgment and reason, Brutus is later able to leverage his interpretation to
serve common profit through the eventual overthrow of the Tarquins.
In the final scene of the exemplum, Gower depicts how authoritative figures can
gloss ambiguity through the use of plain speech to bring about political change. While
Brutus honorably places Lucrece’s body upon a “beere,” his actual rhetorical argument
depends not upon the display of Lucrece’s violated body but rather upon his plain telling
of the case and the potential of this telling to translate a domestic occurrence into a
political context (CA 7.5098). The precise source for the end of Gower’s tale is subject to
some debate. Though Gower seems to follow Livy by describing the Tarquins as deposed
by the people of Rome rather than escaping the city, details not found in Ovid, he does
not include Brutus’ long speech describing the Tarquins’ iniquity that was “not of a
character and temper of his heart that he had feigned up to that day (habita nequaquam
eius pectoris ingeniique quod simulatum ad eam diem)” (1.59),147 opting instead to report
that “Brutus tolde hem al the tale” (CA 7.5108) in a manner very similar to Ovid: “With a
shout, Brutus gathers the Quirites and reports the impious acts of the king (Brutus
clamore Quirites / concitat et regis facta nefanda refert)” (CA 2.849-50). For an
exemplum that consistently explores the tension between hermeneutical interpretation
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and rhetorical practice, it seems curious that Gower would elide direct reported speech
from one of his source texts. Gower instead emphasizes that it is through “the sothe herde
of the cas” that the people of Rome are capable of arriving at a moral and political
reading of the occurrence within Collatin’s household (CA 7.5105).
While it may seem counterproductive to exclude an example of ethical
deliberative speech, in a sense, the indirect report perfectly encapsulates Gower’s desire
for plain speech. Since the truth of the case is all that is reported, there is no possibility
for misinterpretation, as happened in each of the previous verbal hermeneutical glosses.
As Latini details, when an orator speaks on “an honest thing, there is no need of any
concealment” or rhetorical ornamentation.148 In this final scene, Gower takes this general
rule to its logical extreme. Through Brutus’ speech, the people of Rome move beyond the
immediacy of Lucrece’s violation and connect this singular violation to a larger moral
sickness within the body politic, with the actions of Tarquin family coming
…into remembrance
Of senne the continuance
Which Arrons hadde do tofore
And ek, long time er he was bore
Of that his fadre hadde do (CA 7.5109-13).
In a final literal embodiment of deliberative rhetoric, Brutus speaks with what Giancarlo
has identified as the “vox communis,” the totalized and universal perspective that unites
the divided commons so as to restore peace within the kingdom by drawing upon
penitential language.149 This voice, however, is only effective and possible because it
descends from Brutus’ embodied deliberation governed by reason. The commons’
political action is dependent upon Brutus’ interpretation, with his speech translating the
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singular act of domestic violence in the household into the continued violation of the
political state and leading to communal deposition: “Awey, awey, the tirannie / Of
lecherie and covoitise” (CA 7.5109, 7.5118-9).
Gower’s Virginia
Though the tales of Lucrece and Virginia are separated in Gower’s source Livy,
Gower recognized that each historical exemplum explores the same issues of rhetorical
practice and sensory desire and thus situates them next to each other in Book 7 of the
Confessio. In his version of the Virginia myth, Gower provides a second example of the
consequences that emerge when the desire of the male gaze breaks down the rhetorical
contract that exists between sovereign and community. Like Livy, Gower draws an
explicit connection between the two tales by positioning Genius’s vernacular moral that
concludes “Lucrece” as the guiding hermeneutic for the upcoming “Virginia” that
“rihtwisnesse and lecherie / Acorden noght in compaignie / With him that hath the lawe
on honde” (CA 7.5125-7). The “Tale of Virginia” follows the basic structure of Livy’s
narrative, though it does make a few adaptations, the elevation of Appius from decemvir
to king, and omissions, the elimination of Icilius’ position as tribune of the commons,
that remove the republican leanings of the tale’s moral and situate it more naturally
within the political contexts of late medieval England.150 In Gower’s “Virginia,” the king
of Rome, Appius, is struck by the beauty and virginity of Virginia after she walks
through the public spaces of Rome while her father, the knight Virginius, is leading the
armies of Rome against its enemies. Struck by desire, Appius intends to take possession
of Virginia while her father is away, but this is complicated by her betrothal to Ilicius.
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Eventually, Appius schemes with his brother Marcus to submit false testimony that
Virginia was Marcus’ slave. Alarmed by this sovereign overreach, the people of Rome
oppose Appius’ decision to remove Virginia from her father’s household and win a stay
in the legal decision for two days so that Virginius can return from the front to answer the
charges. When Virginius arrives, Appius again rules in favor of his own brother, despite
the dictates of the law. To preserve the virginity of his daughter, Virginius stabs and kills
Virginia and rides through the public spaces of Rome while displaying the still bloody
sword. In response to the debasement of Roman law, the common people rise up and
depose Appius. A. C. Spearing has argued that, in late medieval theories of authorship,
stories drawn from historical sources, such as Livy, were understood as factual, meaning
that the essential arcs of narratives could not be changed, while certain elements could be
downplayed or emphasized, corresponding to generic distinctions between historia and
fabula.151 As I will argue through this section, the changes that Gower makes and the
narrative elements he retains, once again position his version of the tale, nominally about
chastity, as an exemplum on proper rhetorical practice and the incommensurability that
arises when a sovereign, the guarantor of truth within the kingdom, allows for desire
rather than chastity to influence his interpretation of ambiguous signs.
When modern scholarship has tackled “Virginia,” it has primarily identified the
tale as an exemplum that seeks to define the limits of authority, whether that be legal
sovereign authority152 or its microcosmic reflection in the paternal authority of the
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family.153 Indeed, such readings of the tale, ones that privilege the political moral of the
exemplum rather than the narrative and characters of the tale, nicely complement
Gower’s own hermeneutical project within the whole of Book 7, in which he consistently
silences the voices of women characters, such as Lucrece and Virginia, to emphasize the
development of male characters and their embodiment of ideal sovereignty.154 For Eliot
Kendall, the exemplum essentially demarcates the limits of a sovereign’s authority within
the patriarchal marketplace of exchange, a marketplace that “reduces dependent women
to the function of sign,” in which the bodies of women were exchanged by men to
develop and secure inter- and intra-personal alliances.155 By falsely invoking the law to
disrupt the marriage of Virginia and Ilicius, Appius extends the bounds of civil law into
the “larger group of extensive interpersonal bonds” that characterize Roman patriarchal
familial society.156 In so doing, Appius exerts the supremacy of civil law over the familial
structure, resulting, ultimately, in these same interpersonal alliances uniting and
organizing to depose Appius and thus preserve their own legitimacy. Similarly, Maria
Bullón-Fernandez argues that, in addition to criticizing sovereign overstep, Gower’s
version of “Virginia” questions the role of the father within the patriarchal marketplaces
of exchange that occur when the nominally private space of the domicile become the site
of public interest. As Bullón-Fernandez notes, Virginius’ speech following the killing of
Virginia only acknowledges his “daughter’s shame” and “the effect that her shame”
would have upon Virginius.157 The death of Virginia serves not only to delineate the
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extent to which the sovereign’s reach extends into private space but also preserves the
supremacy of the father over the daughter’s body in public space, a stance Gower
implicitly criticizes.
However, in addition to defining the limits of sovereign authority, Gower’s
“Virginia” also explores the consequences that emerge when the rhetorical compact
between sovereign and state is thrown into discord through the influence of desire rather
than reason. J. Allan Mitchell has argued that Gower’s adaptation of Livy positions his
own “imaginative uses of example” against “Livy’s historical facticity” that imagines
Roman public virtue, embodied within Virginia, as a “politically ideal and authentic”
representation of the moral good that accompanies republican government.158 Rather than
portraying the staid speeches of male characters as the rhetorical force that brings about a
return to republican rule, it is the “marvel,” a fundamentally visual symbol, produced
through the metaphor represented by Virginia’s death that brings the commons to depose
Appius.159 Consequently, for Mitchell, Gower’s “Virginia” exposes the tension inherent
in Gower’s theory of polity that privileges rhetorical and legal plainness while, at the
same time, relying upon exempla to accretively, reiteratively, and discursively construct
the very concept of kingship itself. While Mitchell concludes that, concerning the
problem of sovereignty, “the gap between individual desire and public policy must be
mediated by the tools of fiction,”160 I will argue that the fictional rhetorical exempla
employed by Gower in this section on chastity serve to demonstrate the necessity of a
sovereign does not transgress the relationship between an ambiguous sign and its
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intended referent when he is thrown into “riote” by desire. This interpretation is one that
is implicitly endorsed by Gower’s own Latin hermeneutic that accompanies the tale in
which he explains that Appius’ “fulfillment of his desire (propositum sui desideria)”
produces “false witnesses in judgment (falsis testibus in iudicio)” who declare Virginia to
signify as other than what the people of Rome know to be true (CA 7.5137 ff). This
transgression of signs brought about by false interpretation engendered through desire
leads Virginius to kill his own daughter to preserve her as “a dead virgin (virginem
mortuam)” rather than “a live whore (meretricem viunetem)” (CA 7.5137 ff). As Gower
makes clear through his guiding hermeneutic, the Virginia exemplum is fundamentally a
story about the rhetorical intervention that must take place when a sovereign leverages
his interpretation of signs to achieve his own individual desire rather than the common
profit of the realm.
“A man of such riote”
As in “Lucrece,” the political tension of “Virginia” arises when the sight of the
semiotically stable body of a woman, a sight normally reserved for the private space of
the domicile, engenders desire in the body of a sovereign, throwing the sovereign’s body
and the kingdom for which it is emblematic into disorder. Like Lucrece, Virginia is
described as a “gentil maide” whose body naturally and perfectly signifies her chastity
(CA 7.5135). Virginia’s semiotic stability is understood throughout Rome where it is
reported “that so fair a lif / As sche was nought in al the toun” (CA 7.5138-9). When this
report reaches the “ere” of Appius, “al his herte hath set afire,” and he is compelled by
the “flour desire” to “longeth unto maydenhede” and satisfy the “blinde lustes of his will”
(CA 7.5141-7). Gower’s depiction of Appius’ blossoming desire is one of his notable
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expansions from his source text in Livy. Whereas Livy begins his narration with Appius
already “inflamed with a criminal passion,” Gower expands the scene to show a perverse
application of the Aquinian epistemology that characterizes his theory of deliberation and
his larger philosophical critique of desire and its role in the rhetorical hermeneutics that
characterize kingship.161 Much like the case of Aruns and Lucrece, it is not merely the
sight of the woman which initially produces desire in Appius but rather the report of
Virginia’s chastity. Gower captures the embodied nature of this desire as he emphasizes
that desire is produced as sensory information enters the body, in this case, through the
“ere” of Appius (CA 7.5141). As in Aquinian epistemology, once the sensory information
becomes embodied, it produces perception within the mind, rendered by Gower as
“thoght” (CA 7.5142). However, within Appius’ mind, the next stage of the
epistemological process, conception, is perverted as “the blind lustes of his will”
intervene with Appius’ memory not to correctly match the signifier of “maydenhede”
with its signification but instead to misread the sign and, consequently, Virginia’s body,
as inducing sexual desire (CA 7.5147; 7.5145). Once Appius allows his body to be
governed by desire, he becomes “a man of such riote,” a sovereign whose body and
intentions are incapable of both being reconciled to the civil law of the land and being
interpreted by his subjects. In short, the sensory phantasia produced within Appius’ mind
cloud his deliberative capacity and ensure that his interpretation of Virginia as a sign
descends from his own bodily desires rather than from a moral disposition.
As the narrative continues to depict Virginia’s trial, Gower emphasizes the
impossibility of proper governance when the sovereign himself becomes governed by
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desire. However, it is important to note that, for Gower, proper governance is intimately
tied to the practice of rhetorical hermeneutics. As desire rules Appius, he fails in his
capacity as sovereign to both interpret the law correctly and to disseminate this true
interpretation to his subjects. Even as Appius tramples upon the rights of Virginius and
Virginia, Gower is careful to consistently reinforce that Appius does so while operating
within the legal and political system that comprises the kingdom. It is not the legal and
political institutions themselves that produce inequity but instead Appius’ perverse
interpretations of these systems that are nominally designed to aid the king in the practice
of rhetorical hermeneutics. As a king should, Appius looks to counsel on this issue, but
the counsel he follows is that of his brother, Marcus, another man of riot, who conspires
with him to produce false “witnesse” to claim that Virginia belongs to the household of
Marcus (CA 7.5177). Unlike in “Lucrece,” where the commons needed the guiding hand
of Brutus to interpret the sign of a woman’s body, the people of Rome, who know
Virginia’s virtue and parentage firsthand, recognize these claims a “falshed everydel” and
plead to Appius upon the “comun lawe” to allow Virginius to address these false claims
(CA 7.5186-8). Since Virginia’s body has not yet been violated, for the people of Rome,
it still functions as a signa ambigua propria that requires nothing more than a surface
level reading. However, in the person of Appius, much like Aruns, desire has produced
an inversion of Gower’s ideal of kingship, in which the sovereign serves as the guarantor
of truth by interpreting ambiguity within the law truly and communicating this truth to his
subjects; instead, the people of Rome are compelled to appeal to the law itself, rather than
the sovereign whose interpretation has become perverted, to achieve justice. Once again,
however, Appius responds to popular appeal through the methods of proper kingship, but
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the end result remains unsatisfactory because his will is governed by desire rather than
reason: “For al the clamour that he herde, /The king upon his lust ansuerde, / And gaf
hem only daies tuo / Of respit” (CA 7.5197-200). While Appius’ actions mirror the
rhetorical hermeneutics of kingship advocated by Gower—sensory perception, followed
by interpretation, followed by the dissemination of royal decree—the effect of desire and
the pleasure produced through desire separate the civil application of the law from its
signification, much like the peasants reacting to Wat Tyler’s speech in Book 1 of the Vox
Clamantis.
The infection of desire within the body of the sovereign produces a political
situation in which the validity of political and legal structures breaks down because the
sovereign can no longer guarantee fidelity between the true signification of these
structures and his own guiding interpretation of the signs that comprise civil law. When
Virginius arrives to dispute the false witnesses, Appius realizes that “no sleihte mihte
availe” in his attempt to circumvent the law, and he ceases the pretense of proper
sovereignty and instead follows “his lustes blinde” while “half in wraththe” and
“Deceived of concupiscence” to rule in favor of his brother, despite the true evidence
produced by Virginius (CA 7.5218-23). In doing so, the civil law of Rome becomes
“torneth out of kinde” as the intent of the sovereign becomes completely divorced from
the signification of the law (CA 7.5220). By basing his legal justification on self-pleasure
rather than common profit, Appius “fails to take control of the exemplary authority only a
king can produce and misses the opportunity to produce it not only in his realm, but in the
very regulation of his body.”162 As Gower emphasizes, desire not only inflames the
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passions of the sovereign’s soul but also makes his body unreadable to his public. Just
like Aruns, Gower describes Appius’ desire for lechery as held “al withinne his oghne
entente” (CA 7.5227); however, unlike Aruns, whose intent could not be understood by
his counsellors, Appius’ very public position as judge precludes his intent to violate
Virginia from being entirely unknown. Instead, while the people of Rome fundamentally
understand the lecherous intentions of Appius, they are powerless to challenge his ruling
within the legal apparatus because Appius’ interpretation of the law has so greatly
transgressed its true signification: “Bot agein him was non appel, / And that the fader
wiste wel” (CA 7.5233-4). The problem raised by Appius’ legal ruling extends beyond
the violation of Virginia’s individual rights and Virginius’ patriarchal rights. Appius’
ruling challenges the semiotic foundation of the civil law. Despite widespread recognition
that the witnesses produced by Marcus are false and that Virginius’ testimony is true,
these words carry no truth value because the ultimate guarantor of truth, Appius, has
become blinded by desire. At the same time, Appius’ ruling also transgresses the semiotic
stability of Virginia herself. In contrast to Virginia’s earlier depiction in the exemplum,
Appius’ ruling has placed a signifier, slave, that does not correctly signify Virginia in any
way. While Livy has Appius verbally declare her a slave—"Go, lictor, remove the crowd,
and make way for the owner to seize his slave”—Gower is careful to refer to her, both in
his own narration and the reported speech of Virginius, “maide” or “maiden,” preserving
both her chastity and semiotic stability.163 As we will see, the transgression of semiotic
stability within the kingdom necessitates intervention that restores the fidelity between
sign and signified.
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Virginius as rhetorician
As in “Lucrece,” a male relative of the violated woman leverages the ambiguity of
the visual image of the violated woman’s body to create a space for rhetorical and
political intervention that rejuvenates the political realm. After hearing Appius’ ruling,
Virginius moves to comfort Virginia, pulls out a sword, and kills Virginia. Traditionally,
modern scholarship has imputed two justifications for Virginius’ actions. First, Genius
explains that Appius’ ruling has “Untrewly” obstructed Ilicus’ right to marriage, an
obvious sovereign overreach into the domestic sphere (CA 7.5241). Second, Virginius
himself claims that Appius’ ruling brings shame and “evele named” down upon his own
person as the father of Virginia. As Bullón-Fernandez notes, in Gower’s version of the
tale, Virginius’ justification for the killing of Virginia is reported across two sources, the
voice of the narrator and the direct speech of Virginius, which serves to question the
motivation attributed to Virginius in Livy’s text, in which the justification is reported
entirely through direct speech.164 However, when read alongside “Lucrece,” it is clear
that Virginius’ actions mirror the hermeneutical structure Gower employs throughout the
earlier exempla. At the moment when Appius’ desire brings about false interpretation,
Virginius engages in a symbolic action, the killing of Virginia, designed to compel the
correct interpretation of his daughter’s body. This action, though, calls out for verbal
hermeneutical glossing because of both the ambiguity of Virginius’ motivations and the
brutality of the act itself. While Virginius’ direct speech is obviously self-serving and
motivated by his own patriarchal pride, his hermeneutical explanation for his action also
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points to the necessity for the restoration and preservation of signifiers that properly and
naturally signify:
For me is levere upon this thing
To be the fader of a maide,
Thogh sche be ded, than if men saide
That in hir lif sche were schamed. (CA 7.5248-51)
Virginius’ concern here is not only with the public nature of shame and reputation but
also with ensuring that the ambiguity of his daughter’s body is properly interpreted, in
this case as a signa ambigua propria rather than as a signa ambigua translata. For
Virginius, it is preferable to kill his own daughter, and thereby preserve her as “maide,”
than to allow her to live and become signified by the verbal language of men that does
not accurately represent her. As the exemplum shows, the core problematic of Gower’s
theory of deliberative rhetoric emerges when a sovereign rejects his role as the guarantor
of truth within the kingdom and instead leverages the centrality of his interpretation to
achieve his own desires rather than the common profit.
As Virginius’ actions become overtly political, Gower emphasizes that Virginius
does not succeed as an orator because his oratorical strategies produce belief but rather
because he is able to accurately gloss the ambiguity that is concealed by a visual sign, in
this case, the bloody sword that he used to kill his own daughter. As with Brutus in
“Lucrece,” when Virginius addresses the “pouer” of Rome, a lengthy direct speech in
Livy is condensed to a single line—“and tolde hem al the cas”—followed by a long
narrative explication of the matter with a specific focus on addressing “the grete
unrihtwisnesse” at home (CA 7.5265-6; 7.5270). Again, though Virginius seeks to
persuade through speech, it is not his speech that carries the rhetorical force of the
argument but rather a symbol of the sovereign’s iniquity, “his swerd droppende of blod /
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The which withinne his douhter stod” (CA 7.5263-4). Much like the body of Lucrece, the
bloody sword functions to open a space for rhetorical and political intervention through
the centering of an interpretation that reveals the truth of the matter. Upon seeing the
sword and hearing the case, it is functionally impossible for the crowd to contest the
charges of iniquity that Virginius lays upon Appius. Gower describes the sword as “this
merveile which thei sihe,” and emphasizes that the collective decision to undertake
political action occurs not because of speech understood through the ear but rather
through the marvel “So apparant tofore here yhe” (CA 7.5277-8). The crowd’s sensory
apprehension of the sword structures their understanding of Appius’ overreach into the
domestic sphere, but the crowd is only capable of connecting this visual image to a
universal concept through Virginius’ hermeneutical glossing. If Virginius succeeds as a
rhetorician is it not because of his skill as a speaker. Gower does not even deem it
necessary to record his direct speech in full. Instead, he succeeds because his actions and
interpretations of ambiguous signs counter the semiotic transgression perpetrated by
Appius and his desire.
Once the interpretation of ambiguity has returned to government by reason
through Virginus’ intervention, the legal and political structures perverted through
Appius’ transgression return to their stabilizing roles and allow for the addressing of
sovereign iniquity through popular deposition. After seeing the bloody sword, the
commons of Rome swear an oath to stop tyranny within the kingdom. In a parallel with
Appius’ earlier perversion of Aquinian epistemology, Gower describes their collective
decision-making process through the same Aquinian method. As each member of the
commons shares their stories of sovereign iniquity, the information “Cam openly to

139

mannes ere” (CA 7.5289). However, rather than producing desire and, ultimately, the
transgression of signs as in Appius, this sensory information instead “broghte in the
comun feere” for “him [Appius] that so hem overladde” (CA 7.5290-2). With fear as the
motivating factor, the commons come together and depose Appius “Thurgh comun
conseil of hem alle” and “receiven the penance / That longeth to such governance” (CA
7.5294; 7.5299-300). In this closing scene, Gower reiterates how rhetorical practice
should ideally function within a kingdom. The commons, brought to understanding by
Virginius’ hermeneutical glossing, interpret Appius’ actions in line with their own moral
disposition so that the proper emotion, here fear, is produced within the crowd. The fear
that the commons have concerning Appius’ overreach in turn motivates them to carry out
political action, in this case, the deposition of Appius. When true signification regulates
the legal and political systems of Rome, the law functions as intended, as a vehicle for
communicating, disseminating, and guaranteeing natural and moral truths throughout the
kingdom. Gower’s “Virginia” serves as a rhetorical exemplum that teaches not only the
consequences of sexual desire and the limits of sovereign authority but also the danger
that arises when a sovereign’s interpretation privileges his own desire rather than the
common profit.
Richard II’s Attempted Canonization of Edward II
The hermeneutic and philosophical traditions discussed above were not
constrained to ecclesiastical and political matters but extended quite broadly into most
aspects of medieval life. As Marie-Dominique Chenu has described it, by the twelfth
century, the medieval mind followed “the conviction that all natural or historical reality
possessed a signification which transcended its crude reality,” which produced a cultural
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affinity to simultaneously engage in the practice of hermeneutics and to construct an
“intrinsic set of categories and values” through which to interpret nature and history.165
These hermeneutic categories and the broad tradition of enarratio poetarum—
commentary on classical authors—assumed rhetoric’s traditional aim “to grasp discourse
as action, as totality, and to reunite the signified with the signified” through
hermeneutics’ appropriation of the “prescriptive strategies of rhetoric.”166 In other words,
by the late medieval period, rhetorical practice and hermeneutical interpretation had
become largely conflated with one another. The interpretation of ambiguity, specifically
the amplification, abbreviation, and variation of particular hermeneutical categories,
functioned similar to the canon of inventio in classical rhetoric. The medieval rhetorician
could intervene rhetorically through the practice of hermeneutics by centering his own
interpretation of hidden truth as the standardized interpretation, which is the exact
practice simulated by exempla in Fürstenspiegel. In short, a sovereign’s interpretation of
exempla closely resembled the vernacular author’s rhetorical translation of source texts.
The productive force of rhetoric descended not from the ability to invent something new
but rather in the capacity to remake and reimagine what has already been so as to better
serve one’s own ends. Ideally, in the case of the sovereign, rhetoric helps to construct
ethical frameworks that preserve peace and common profit within the kingdom.
Thus, within the realm of politics, a king’s interpretation of ambiguity became yet
another tool for maintaining and realizing his sovereign authority. When monarchs
practiced hermeneutics, the visual image emerged as a productive site of interpretation
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through what Hugh of St. Victor defined as coaptio, the “transference or elevation from
the visible sphere to the invisible through the mediating agency of an image borrowed
from sense-perceptible reality.”167 Like the phantasia of Aquinas, the visual image served
to mediate between the particular and contingent circumstances of the immediate
situation and the universal categories of virtue necessary to uncover the truth concealed
by ambiguity. Following Aquinas, medieval hermeneutics privileged sight as the sense
most responsible for structuring the perception of reality. Visual images, given their
immediacy and lack of mediation through language, became particularly productive sites
of hermeneutics, specifically the interpretation of higher symbolic meaning.
In line with the larger aims of this dissertation, I want to suggest that the practice
of chaste rhetorical interpretation found in the Confessio shared resonances with
rhetorical practices operant in the broadly conceived political discourse of the late
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in England. The rhetorical practices depicted by
Gower in the Lucrece and Virginia tales—namely, the centering of an authoritative
figure’s interpretation of a violated body to create a space for rhetorical and political
intervention—was not confined to literature but closely resembled Richard II’s attempted
canonization of Edward II, an attempt to implement his own ideology of majesty as the
dominant political theory in late medieval England. In both cases, political leaders
leveraged the ambiguity of a violated body to intervene within their political spheres and
bring about some sort of political change. Despite the copious production of political
propaganda during his reign, his institution of the discursive ideology of majesty, and his
role as the benefactor of Chaucer and Gower, two prolific late medieval English poets
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whose works dominate the vernacular English rhetorical tradition, Richard himself is an
unexamined figure in contemporary medieval rhetorical historiography. As Richard II
declared his majority in 1389, he found his rule in a precarious situation. Like all kings
crowned as children, he faced challenges to his sovereignty by the very individuals who
were supposed to support his reign. In Richard’s case, his sovereignty was tested by the
Lords Appellant, who just a year previously had briefly forced Richard to abdicate his
throne and executed his closest allies during the Merciless Parliament.168
The problem Richard faced was not merely a problem of politics but, specifically,
a problem of rhetoric. Throughout the late medieval period, the English monarchy was
conceived as constructed through a series of discursive texts, such as coronation oaths,
civil laws, commentaries, exegesis, and, as we have seen above, even fictional texts like
Fürstenspiegel, that provided a juristic framework that simultaneously defined and
limited the sovereign’s power. As Gower demonstrated through his exempla, a
sovereign’s efficacy as the juristic head of the kingdom lay in his capacity to successfully
navigate these discursive constraints and disseminate his interpretation of textual
documents throughout the kingdom using literacy skills associated with grammar and
rhetoric. In response to what he perceived as unjust constraints upon his authority during
the Merciless Parliament, Richard initiated his rule by implementing a rhetorical program
centered around the elevation of his own body and royal persona. By understanding
rhetoric not merely as a textual practice but rather as a constellation of practices defined
through action, this section seeks to answer the following question: How did Richard II
employ a similar version of the rhetorical practices depicted by Gower to advance his
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political aims, and what does this suggest about the larger intersection between
sovereignty, deliberative rhetoric, and the ambiguity inherent in signs? While I do not
want to suggest causality between Gower’s exempla and Richard’s rhetorical program in
either direction, by placing these literary and political examples side-by-side, we can
trace the broadly rhetorical culture of late medieval England.
In the earliest years of his majority, Richard II took a keen interest in guiding the
realm’s interpretation of the violated body of his great-grandfather Edward II, within
whom he saw many parallels to his contemporary political situation. Specifically,
Richard sought to have Edward canonized as a saint. Much like a woman’s violated body
in medieval exempla, the medieval interpreter understood the king’s body as something
to be read tropologically or allegorically as revealing a higher moral or spiritual meaning.
As Ernst H. Kantorowicz has detailed, within medieval political theory, the king himself
was understood to have two bodies, a natural and physical body, which was subject to all
the ailments of living, including sensory fallibility, and a sovereign body, an eternal
incorporation of the entire kingdom, including the rule of law.169 Under this theory, the
sovereign power of a kingdom became reified within the natural body of the king, who is
vested with power through the force of civil law and represents the inherent power of the
sovereign through his capacity to uphold that law.170 Beyond this useful political
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distinction, the human body also served broadly as a metaphor for the state because of the
perceived “stability and normative nature of the human organism” with a single ruler,
represented by the governing head.171 The political realities of this metaphor had a major
implication for the interpretation of bodies and, especially, the king’s body as visual
signs. Since the king’s natural body was understood to incorporate the king’s sovereign
body and since the efficacy of the body as a political metaphor depended upon its
perceived stability, any ailments on the king’s natural body were interpreted symbolically
as social ills within the kingdom itself, a concept known as the corporate fiction. When
faced with the visual sign of a sovereign’s violated body, the medieval interpreter had to
determine whether to understand its violation as an ambigua signa propria, as a literal
violation, or as an ambigua signa translata, as a violation rendered upon the body that
represents a further violation of the social order. It is not surprising then that the
canonization of royal and baronial saints took on a political dimension in late medieval
England as the crown struggled with the barony over the implementation of its sovereign
authority.172 For each group, the authentication of a saint by the Church was seen as a
symbolic legitimation of the rightness of their cause, and, once the deceased sovereign or
baron became canonized, they came to function as a political symbol that both
represented and authorized the principles of government espoused by the crown—
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ultimate freedom of the sovereign—and the barony—the maintenance of their privileges,
including the right to counsel the king and even depose him when necessary.
In the person of Edward, Richard found a perfect symbolic representation of his
political challenges, and, in the image of his violated body, he found a productive
ambiguous sign to interpret in line with his political program. While Richard could claim
descent from Saint Edward the Confessor,173 for his own political aims, achieving the
canonization of Edward would be a great symbolic legitimation for his ideology of
majesty through the elevation of his own body.174 Like Richard, Edward’s reign was
characterized by conflict between the crown and barony and the constant threat of
deposition. Just as Richard faced deposition in 1387, Edward himself was deposed under
pressure from Roger Mortimer and Queen Isabella in January of 1327 when he abdicated
his throne in favor of his son Edward III. In September, while imprisoned at Berkeley
Castle, Edward died and was possibly murdered for political reasons. Within the
chronicle tradition, Geoffrey le Baker describes his death as a mutilation in which a hot
poker was inserted into his anus, an obvious piece of propaganda tied to Edward’s
alleged homosexuality.175 Whether Edward was brutally murdered or not, the three
months between his death at Berkeley and his funeral in Gloucester decomposed his body
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to the point that a royal effigy was produced of an “image ad similitudinem regis [to the
likeness of the king]” to cover the violated body of the king, the first use of such an
effigy in English royal funerals.176 As a rhetorician, the challenge that Richard faced
during the canonization of Edward was the very hermeneutic problem discussed by
Augustine and Aquinas: should the violations wrought on Edward’s body be interpreted
as an ambigua signa propria, as representative of a literal shortcoming in Edward himself
that would justify his deposition, or as an ambigua signa translata, as symbolic of the
transgression of natural law by the overstepping barony?
For both Edward and Richard, the inability to practice the proper rhetorical
interpretation at the center of Gower’s theory of deliberative rhetoric served as one of the
baronial justifications for the discursive constraint of the sovereign’s authority and,
ultimately, the deposition of the monarch. In 1311, Edward was forced to submit to a
series of 41 Ordinances by the English peerage.177 While most of these ordinances
concern limiting the crown’s authority to appoint officers and spend freely without
baronial consent, the document repeatedly references Edward’s inability to interpret the
truth of his subjects, the same problem that plagued Aruns and Appius. In the preamble,
the Ordainers justify their actions because of the presence of “bad and deceitful counsel”
that has “debased and ruined” the king’s dignity.178 Similarly, in language carefully
designed to shift blame away from the king, the Ordainers legitimated their right to
appoint members to the king’s household precisely because Edward “has been badly
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advised and guided by evil councillors” who must be removed and replaced.179 The
Ordainers reserved an article specifically for the banishment of Piers Gaveston whom
they argued had exploited the king’s lack of caucio as he “has badly advised our lord the
king and has incited him to do wrong in diverse and deceptive ways.”180 The Ordainers
also note that Edward’s failure to interpret correctly has had impacts beyond his
household as criminals within the kingdom feel emboldened to commit crimes since “the
king, through evil counsel, so lightly grants them [criminals] his peace against the
provisions of the law.”181 Much like Appius’ misinterpretation and misapplication of the
law threw Rome into discord, Edward’s inability or refusal to enforce the justice of the
law as written produced discord within the realm. The rhetoric that the Ordainers use to
justify their discursive constraint of sovereign authority consistently emphasizes that
Edward’s inability to interpret truth has led to his disenfranchisement by his counselors
who co-opt his sovereign authority and govern his body, which has produced widespread
social unrest throughout the realm.
The rhetoric that justified these constraints would have been extremely familiar to
Richard as the Lords Appellant used the exact same political strategy to justify their
actions during the Merciless Parliament. In their appeal to Parliament, the Lords
Appellant explain that they were compelled to bring this matter before Parliament’s law
because Richard’s counselors perceived “the tender age of our lord the king and the
innocence of his royal person…[and] caused him to believe many lies devised and plotted
by them,” which led to Richard rejecting the good counsel of “his loyal lords and lieges,”
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which included the Lords Appellant.182 Further, much more explicitly than the Ordainers,
the Lords Appellant noted that Richard’s inability to interpret truth, descending from his
young age and lack of experience, threatened the stability of his own body and the body
politic. The Lords Appellant claimed that the king’s false counselors compelled Richard
to swear “an oath saying that he would be governed, counselled, and led by them…[and]
manipulated the king to obey their false theories, schemes, and deeds,” which has
produced “troubles, inconveniences, misfortunes, and destructions” throughout the
kingdom.183 The preamble to the Merciless Parliament is especially enlightening, since,
as the introduction to the charges laid against Richard and his closest allies, the items
listed in the preamble structured the justification for baronial intervention as a whole. As
it appears in these two documents, the barony developed a theory of political constraint
that centered the sovereign’s capacity for distinguishing between what is true and what
seems true. When the sovereign fails in this function—when he fails as a rhetorician—the
peerage is required to constrain his authority. For Richard’s political goals, this situation
was untenable, so he sought to subvert these discursive constraints by changing how the
realm interpreted the deposition of Edward.
Although the surviving archival evidence is scarce and one-sided, the textual
record suggests that Richard’s interest in canonizing Edward extended beyond a general
filial affection and his broader interest in elevating English martyrs through the rhetorical
intervention inherent in canonization. As Richard sought to intervene within his
contemporary political discourse, he turned toward linguistic and symbolic means.
Beginning with a letter written for Pope Urban VI sometime between 1385 and 1389,
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Richard embarked upon an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to receive Papal
recognition of the miracles associated with Edward’s tomb at Gloucester. In the letter,
Richard forgoes rhetorical embellishment and centers his argument for Papal support “for
the sake of the repeated and conspicuous miracles (propter crebra miaculorum insignia)”
associated with Edward’s tomb in Gloucester.184 Though not described in detail in this
correspondence, Jennifer Bray has documented that Richard’s argument for Edward’s
canonization continually emphasized the human body, both the potentially exaggerated
account of Edward’s rumored torture and the miraculous cures to physical maladies
granted to those who prayed at his tomb in Gloucester.185 The evidence for canonization,
then, had little to do with the saintly character of Edward’s life but rather with the horrors
wrought upon his body during his death, which, if canonization were achieved, would be
divinely confirmed as an unnatural transgression of the natural law by an overstepping
barony. In October of 1390, the Westminster Chronicle reports that Richard made a very
public appearance at Edward’s tomb to pray for the soul of his great-grandfather “whose
translation he was very anxious to effect” and to debate the validity of the miracles
observed around the tomb with his retinue.186 The chronicler’s reference to the translation
of Edward obviously refers to the traditional definition of moving the body of a saint or
ruler from one location to another,187 but it also suggests Richard’s incipient deliberative
rhetorical program which relied upon the translation of Edward’s body from an aambigua
signa propria to an ambigua signa translata.
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In the common understanding, the maladies of Edward’s body were understood as
literal signs that represented his failures as a sovereign and the larger civil unrest that
accompanied his rule and justified his deposition, which presented Richard with both a
rhetorical problem and opportunity. Since the health of sovereign’s natural body and the
body politic are semiotically intertwined, perversion of the natural body represents
weakness in the realm, which necessitates the cleansing of the natural body through civil
deposition. For Richard, Edward’s canonization would achieve not only a spatial
translation but a hermeneutic translation. Edward’s body would no longer function as an
ambigua signa propria but instead as an ambigua signa translata. The elevation of
Edward’s violated body to sainthood would shift the interpretation of Edward’s
deposition and death from a discursively justified act to a divinely recognized
transgression of the natural law that governed relations between the king and his subjects.
Following his public visit to Gloucester, Richard made two separate payments related to
the canonization of Edward, a payment on 10 July 1392 to William Storteford “for
prosecuting the affair in the Roman Court respecting the canonization of Edward” and a
payment on 26 June 1397 to Richard, Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, for the same
purpose.188 In addition to paying for the prosecution of the canonization case, Richard
also funded the composition of a book, the Book of Miracles of Edward, late King of
England, whose body was buried at the town of Gloucester, as a present to Urban on 24
April 1395.189 Unfortunately, this text has not been recovered, and Richard’s deposition
in 1399 ended any further attempts to achieve canonization.
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While the textual archive on Edward’s canonization ends with Richard’s
deposition, across two chronciles, Thomas Walsingham records Richard’s particular
interest with the interpretation of violated bodies. In 1397, Richard took his revenge upon
the Lords Appellant for the Merciless Parliament of 1388. He rescinded the general
pardon that he was forced to grant in 1388 and charged the Earl of Arundel with plotting
to imprison the king along with the Duke of Gloucester. The outcome of the trial was
predetermined, and Arundel was sentenced to death by beheading. The Annales Ricardi
Secundi et Henrici Quarti describes that, after the execution, Arundel’s body remained
upright long enough to recite the Lord’s prayer before falling to the ground.190 Following
Arundel’s execution, Walsingham reports that Richard’s sleep was disturbed by visions
of the earl’s ghost.191 Richard’s anxiety over the execution was further compounded
“when he heard that the common people were regarding the earl as a martyr and making
pilgrimages to his body” and claiming that Arundel’s head had been reattached to his
body in death.192 Richard ordered the exhumation of Arundel’s body to confirm these
stories as untrue and demanded that the abbey conceal the earl’s burial site. Just as in the
case of Edward II, Richard’s actions here suggest a desire to ensure that his interpretation
of ambiguous signs is the dominant interpretation within the realm, which
uncoincidentally directly countered the barony’s earlier justifications for limiting his
sovereignty during the Merciless Parliament. His exhumation of Arundel reiterates that
Arundel’s body conceals no higher symbolic meaning but should be interpreted literally,
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with his violation representing his treason against the crown’s prerogative to carry out its
justice. Had Arundel’s head been reattached to his body, it would suggest that Richard
was unjust in rescinding his previously pledged truth to the Lords Appellant and even that
the barony is justified in constraining the sovereign authority of the king. To forward his
political program, Richard relied upon controlling the symbolic and literal interpretation
of ambiguous signs.
What, then, should we make of the deliberative rhetorical program enacted by
Richard during the early years of his rule? While we cannot definitively prove that
Richard read texts drawn from the enarratio poetarum and Fürstenspiegel traditions,
surviving manuscript lists indicate that Richard himself owned an unidentified ars
grammatica through which he was taught “‘lettrure,’ basic scholastic accomplishment,”
most likely by Simon Burley who himself owned a copy of De regimine principum.193
The rhetorical strategy that Richard employed during the attempted canonization closely
recreates the strategies of reading embodied within these two genres. Like in the exempla
that comprise the vernacular Fürstenspiegel, when Richard is confronted with an
ambiguous figurative sign, Edward’s body, he attempts to leverage the ambiguity of the
sign through the centering of his own interpretation, in this case, that Edward’s
deposition and death represent an unnatural constraint imposed by an unjust barony.
When viewed from this lens, Richard’s attempt at canonization resembles the interior
reading practices and development of moral virtue expanded to a macro-scale. And, most
suggestively, like Brutus and Virginius, Richard’s attempted canonization of Edward and
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exhumation of Arundel leverage the interpretation of violated bodies to create a space for
rhetorical and political intervention. Richard’s reinterpretation of Edward’s violated body
from an ambigua signa propria to an ambigua signa translata is an act of hermeneutics
put toward deliberative rhetorical ends that depends upon the ambiguity of the visual
sign. If Richard’s suit were successful, he would receive divine sanction for this
interpretation of kingship. The natural body of the king would be elevated to a saintly
body that could not be constrained by the barony. Richard would finally be able to enact
his ideology of majesty and absolutism. Further, divine sanction of Richard’s
interpretation would also subvert the Lords Appellants’ justification for constraining his
authority—that his young age and lack of experience made him incapable of interpreting
truth. In short, Richard’s attempt at canonization is an example of leveraging the
ambiguity surrounding figurative signs to achieve one’s own political goals.
Richard’s attempt at canonization was ultimately unsuccessful precisely because
Richard committed the sin of interpretation that Augustine described. He sought to
understand Edward’s body tropologically and allegorically when, in reality, his violated
body was widely understood to be a literal sign of his shortcomings as a monarch. His
strategies of interpretation could not exceed the personal and become persuasive within
his contemporary political situation. Richard was ultimately unable to bridge the
hermeneutic gap represented by Edward’s body because his interpretation was
fundamentally untrue. Edward did not live a particularly pious life, and his deposition
and death did not make him a martyr for the Christian faith. As scholars have noted,
despite the cult of Edward II arising shortly after Edward’s death, the cult itself and the
push for Edward’s canonization never held widespread popular support outside of the
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area immediately surrounding Gloucester and relied almost exclusively upon royal
patronage.194 The bid for canonization lacked popular and Papal encouragement and
represented Richard’s aspirational political reality rather than the truth of the matter.
However, beyond this, Richard’s failure as a rhetorician was also intimately connected to
his lack of a moral disposition, which as we have seen, is necessary for any ethical
rhetorician operating within a deliberative rhetorical paradigm characterized by the
embodied nature of interpretation. When Richard was deposed in 1399, Richard’s
inability to interpret the truth concealed by ambiguity once again served as part of the
justification for the constraint and ultimately abdication of his sovereign authority. But, in
these articles of deposition, earlier references to Richard’s youth and inexperience have
been replaced by complaints against Richard’s moral character, most notably that he
followed his appetite and will instead of reason and that he violated pledges of “trouthe.”
The articles of deposition recorded in the Record and Process note that Richard was
notoriously “so variable and dissimulating in both word and letter, and so inconstant in
his behaviour” that he lacked the ability to govern and brought shame to England
abroad.195 Further, Richard refused to accept counsel from his vassals and always
centered his own interpretation of uncertain matters to the point that the lords “dared not
speak the truth in giving their advice on such matters.”196 Most interestingly, however,
the sixteenth item of the deposition demonstrates the very problem that plagued Richard’s
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attempts to achieve the canonization of Edward. The articles note that Richard acted only
in accord “to his own arbitrary will” and that the interpretation of laws were found “in his
mouth, or, at other times that they were in his breast” which resulted in Richard being
“led astray by his own opinions.”197 Richard’s failure as a monarch was characterized,
among other things, by his failure to consider rhetorical interpretations beyond his own.
When faced with discursive constraints, Richard turned toward non-textual methods of
persuasion that were more open to rhetorical intervention. Richard’s appeal to natural law
and divine legitimation attempted to subvert the discursive construction of kingship.
However, he simply lacked the virtue of caucio as defined by Giles of Rome and
consequently could not lead the realm to proper moral action. Richard did not necessarily
fail because his rhetorical strategies were untenable; rather, he was simply a poor
rhetorician who failed to compose his definition of kingship as “a name of his own
devising, expressive of kingliness and absolute regal power.”198 Richard’s ideology of
majesty depended upon the absolute supremacy of his interpretation of ambiguous signs;
however, when this interpretation violated the most basic tenets of hermeneutic theory
and when his interpretations did not descend from a moral disposition, it was inevitable
that Richard’s rhetorical attempts at subverting the discursive constraints placed upon his
sovereignty would fail.
Conclusion
At the outset, this chapter aimed to examine how the incorporation of recovered
Aristotelian texts and the move toward composition in vernacular languages shifted
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definitions and depictions of rhetorical practice toward conceptualizing rhetoric as a
reasoned capacity of interpretation that functions as an epistemological category in its
own right to create a space for intervention within broadly conceived political discourse.
Drawing upon the inherited tradition of Aristotelian virtue ethics, Gower developed a
theory of deliberative rhetoric that was specifically adapted for use by a benevolent
monarch. By positioning rhetoric not as an art of creating belief but rather of revealing
truth, Gower adopts a deliberative rhetorical paradigm with a sovereign who possesses a
moral disposition and grammatical-rhetorical training that his subjects lack at its
hermeneutical center. As a fundamentally embodied act, interpretation of this sort was
subject to the dangers of sensory perception, so sovereigns were required to possess a
chaste disposition that allowed their judgment to be tempered by reason rather than
desire. In fact, a sovereign’s authority and efficacy as a sovereign fundamentally
descends from his capacity to gloss ambiguity and disseminate his interpretation
throughout the realm in a manner that always forwards common profit rather than
individual desire. When the sovereign fails in this duty, civic discord emerges, and it
becomes incumbent to replace the sovereign with someone what can productively
interpret ambiguity in line with his own moral disposition.
The three major examples analyzed, Gower’s “Lucrece” and “Virginia” and
Richard’s attempted canonization of Edward, all suggest that the reading practices
operant within the Fürstenspiegel genre were put to use beyond the immediate contexts
of literary reception. In all three cases, authoritative figures attempted to leverage the
ambiguity of the violated body as a visual sign to create a space for rhetorical and
political intervention, but their successes or failures within this space depended not
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necessarily upon their oratorical skills but instead on their habituation toward virtue.
Indeed, the centering of one’s interpretation of ambiguity became a significant and
productive rhetorical strategy in late medieval England. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this act
of interpretation as a rhetorical practice closely imitates the rhetorical translation
practices of vernacular authors. In short, we should understand, then, that the rhetorical
practices that modern scholarship has identified as operant within medieval literature
were also inflected within medieval political praxis.
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CHAPTER IV
A “WERKYNG MERVEILOUS”: LYDGATE’S SOCIAL POETICS
By the mid-fifteenth century, rhetoric’s position within the Aristotelian division
of sciences had more or less followed the classificatory arc begun with the recovery of
Aristotle in the twelfth century and predicted by John Gower in the fourteenth century.
As Rita Copeland has argued, the vernacular authors of the fifteenth century, such as
John Lydgate and Stephen Hawes, drew upon a sub-tradition of earlier vernacular writers,
such as Dante, Brunetto Latini, and Gower, who recognized rhetoric as a branch of
science governing ethics and politics.199 Copeland has shown elsewhere that the history
of medieval rhetoric is in many ways characterized by continual efforts to discipline the
amorphous body of rhetoric into existing epistemological frameworks.200 Across these
two pieces of scholarship, Copeland persuasively traces a vernacular sub-tradition in
which authors legitimize their very acts of composition by repositioning rhetoric’s role
away from concerns of proper Latinity and organization and back toward the inventive
and productive force that rhetoric possessed in Aristotle. Although Copeland has
identified the intellectual and academic tradition that precipitated the positioning of
rhetoric in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, her analysis elides the concomitant cultural
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shifts that simultaneously worked to legitimize rhetoric as a productive social practice–
namely, the increasing institutionalization of rhetoric as an educational curriculum within
the king’s curia. As rhetorical education became an institutionalized component of the
prince’s education, the ideological role of rhetoric within the king’s household and the
politics of the realm likewise shifted to encompass the performative aspect of politics that
was absent in the moral-ethical definitions of rhetoric found, for example, in Gower.
For a writer such as John Lydgate, who obtained patronage from the courts of
Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI, the shift of the institutional status of the rhetoric
within the prince’s curia paralleled the increasing importance of rhetoric within the
educational paradigms of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, in which vernacular
education came to supplement the traditional Latin-based grammatical education of the
primary and secondary school. As a child who attended the monastery school at Bury St
Edmunds and eventually joined the monastery as a novice in 1385 at the age of 15,
Lydgate was intimately familiar with the course of grammatical, rhetorical, and logical
education as it was practiced in fourteenth and fifteenth century England.201 At the same
time, having received patronage from three consecutive English kings,202 Lydgate was
uniquely qualified among his contemporaries to trace how the elevation of the institution

201

Walter F. Schirmer, John Lydgate: A Study of Culture in the XVth Century, trans. Ann E. Keep (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1961), 8-9. Schirmer provides a standard biography of Lydgate, tracing the
historical contours of his life alongside his extensive literary corpus. Scenes from Lydgate’s childhood,
including his education at Edmund St. Bury’s, can be found in Lydgate’s minor poem, the Testament, but
these scenes are of a more general than specific nature. See: John Lydgate, The Minor Poems of John
Lydgate (New York: Andesite Press, 2017). For a concise biography of Lydgate’s life in relation to his
writings, see Derek Pearsall, John Lydgate (1371-1449): A Bio-bibliography (London: English Literary
Studies, 1997).
202
Lydgate was especially close with the court of Henry VI and, as Schirmer has argued, functioned
essentially as a “poet laureate” of England who worked to advance the political cause of Henry VI,
specifically through the composition of poems praising Henry’s coronation in Paris and London and his
pilgrimage to Bury St. Edmonds, 138-46.

160

of rhetoric affected political theory and practice. While the general claim that Lydgate
and, more broadly, fifteenth century England understood rhetoric, poetics, and politics to
be intimately connected is not new,203 these primarily legalistic and juristic readings of
medieval culture have passed over how the development of English civil law regulating
language was accompanied by a cultural shift in pedagogical practice that emphasized
both vernacular and rhetorical practice in education. In the fifteenth century, as rhetoric
emerged from under the shadow of the broader category of logic to achieve its own
institutional status within education, it likewise broke away from its overlapping
association with virtue and ethics and took on an increased attention to style and
performance.204
Lydgate’s Fürstenspiegel, the Fall of Princes, translated from Laurent de
Premierfait in the tradition of Boccaccio’s De casibus vivorum illustrium and composed
from 1431 to 1438, provides an ideal case study for tracing how rhetoric’s shifting
institutional and pedagogical status precipitated epistemological shifts within rhetorical
practice. Written at the behest of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, the Fall of Princes is
Lydgate’s most expansive (36,365 lines) and poetically accomplished work.205 In the De
casibus tradition, Lydgate’s Fall traces the rise and fall in Fortune of great men and
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women derived from Biblical and classical history. Unlike Fürstenspiegel within the
Letter to Alexander tradition, the tales included in the De casibus tradition do not contain
exegesis in the form of commentary, but rather in the form of dialogue between author
and these illustrious figures; however, at Humphrey’s request, one of the major additions
Lydgate made to his translation of Premierfait included the composition of “envoys”
within the text that detail the moral failings that bring about individual changes in fortune
and that reposition the text of the Fall more clearly within the admonitory tone of the
Fürstenspiegel genre. Lydgate’s appropriations of and additions to the De casibus
tradition function rhetorically to establish a poetic rendering in which narrative history
and affective tragedy are mixed, resulting in the creation of an ethical framework in
which sin and causality, not Fortune, are the primary determiners of an individual’s fate.
Lydgate’s reorientation of the theoretical framework underpinning the De casibus
tradition reveals his understanding of the Fürstenspiegel as a didactic genre.
As I will argue in this chapter, Lydgate’s definition of rhetoric and depiction of
rhetorical practice in his translation reveals an ideal orator who assumes not only proper
moral disposition but also a capacious understanding of the performative potential of
rhetorical practice, specifically the canon of “Ellocucioun.” Lydgate’s depiction of
rhetoric in the Fall has been assigned a negative reputation in modern scholarship,
especially when compared to the vernacular discussions of rhetoric that preceded
Lydgate, with Derek Pearsall concluding that Lydgate’s translation of Premierfait
indicates “no independent movement, in his translation, toward Renaissance attitudes” of
language.206 However, when Lydgate’s definition of rhetoric is considered within a
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constellation of “broader cultural processes,” his specific adaptations to rhetorical theory
become more commensurable to the modern audience.207 In this chapter, I examine how
rhetoric as a discipline taught within the secondary schools of medieval England became
more professionalized over time at the same time that that rhetoric became legitimized as
an object of study for the young nobility. Further, in line with the historical-theoretical
framework that informs this chapter, I argue that Lydgate’s definition and depiction of
rhetoric reflects the shifting position of rhetoric as a standardized discipline within the
secondary schools of medieval England and its increasing professionalization within the
king’s household. To make this argument, I will detail Lydgate’s definition of rhetoric in
Book 6 of the Fall of Princes and compare this description of rhetoric with the notion of
authorship outlined in the prologue to Book 1 of the Fall. Finally, to illustrate Lydgate’s
definition of rhetoric in practice, I will analyze Lydgate’s exemplum on Cicero as an
example of eloquence informing political practice.
The Education of the Prince
By the early fifteenth century, the increasing professionalization of the discipline
of rhetoric precipitated a shift within medieval pedagogy that was in turn reflected within
the king’s curia and the course of education for the young prince. During the medieval
period, the education of the prince, like the education of all who attended primary
grammar schools, was characterized by the slow progression in reading, most often in
Latin, from letter, to syllable, to word, to phrase. As the student learned strategies of
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reading, he progressed from writing on wax tabula, to reading and memorizing elements
of the Psalter, to finally reading, paraphrasing, and commenting upon the classical and
patristic auctores.208 While this method of instruction endured for roughly three hundred
years from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, the relative positioning and relationship
between grammar and rhetoric in the medieval primary school transitioned from one of
close conflation to an increasing separation of the two disciplines. In the twelfth century
classroom of England and Northern France, although grammar was ostensibly the
primary discipline of study, Suzanne Reynolds has shown that interlinear glosses of
school texts demonstrate that the study of grammatica was highly inflected by rhetorical
knowledge and methodology, resulting in a “profound erosion of the boundary between
grammar and rhetoric.”209 As a pedagogical tool, interlinear expository glosses served
two specific functions within school texts. First, they provided grammatical treatment of
unfamiliar terms and tropes that helped the student to comprehend literally a given
passage of Latin. Second, they provided interpretive commentary that communicated the
sense of a passage in a manner that students could easily grasp and explained the
metaphorical meaning behind author’s use of particular tropes.210 Based upon her reading
of these interlinear glosses, Reynolds concludes that “textual exposition” serves as the
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“‘master practice,’ [of medieval education] the template for both hermeneutic and
inventional textuality.”211 In other words, the very act of grammatical exposition involved
the use of rhetorical principals of invention that threatened the clear delineation between
the art of grammar as concerned with congruity and exegesis and the art of rhetoric as
concerned with invention and style.
The conflation of the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric within twelfth century
school texts reflected a larger cultural anxiety concerning the proper interpretation of
language. For medieval commentators, the conflation of these practices in school texts
points toward the normalizing roles that these systematic arts played in the production
and interpretation of language. If, as R. Howard Bloch maintains, the role of medieval
grammar from the time of Priscian to the twelfth-century was “the delineation of straight
paths, the creation of linear links between symbols, sounds, and letters as well as between
words and the physical properties of things,” then the literacy practices developed in the
classroom aimed at providing students with the knowledge necessary to properly order
and determine linguistic signifiers, hence the emphasis upon explanatory interlinear
glosses within school texts.212 As Brian Stock has argued, these pedagogical practices
reflect the larger cultural shift that occurred during the medieval period as written textual
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culture subsumed oral culture as the predominant mode of thought, resulting in students
developing an “intellectual apparatus [that] was highly influenced by the structure of
language, providing [them] with beneficial aids to thinking such as grammar and
logic.”213 Under this model, the normativizing role of grammar and rhetoric worked to
provide students with a common language of linguistic interpretation and composition.214
The curricular structure of medieval primary schools and grammatical instruction
“functioned to perpetuate and reproduce the most fundamental conditions for textual
culture, providing the discursive rules and interpretive strategies that constructed certain
texts as repositories of authority and value.”215 The broader category of grammatica, with
its focus on invention, “discursive rules,” and hermeneutics, “interpretive strategies,” was
comprised by the disciplinary aims of both rhetoric and grammar. For example,
commentaries on the tradition of verse fables used to teach Latin grammar and
composition in primary school classrooms across late medieval Europe, but particularly
in England, exposed pupils to methods of allegorical interpretation and rhetorical
invention that provided students with the basic literary skills necessary for commenting
on and composing the more difficult texts that comprised rhetorical education at the level
of the secondary school and the university.216 As students learned to read and interpret
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the classical and patristic auctores, they also developed a basic rhetorical knowledge that
would allow them to harness the productive and inventional power of rhetoric in their
own glossings.
By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the rhetorical principles studied
indirectly in the grammar school curriculum came to be a more standardized part of
medieval education. According to Robert Black, in Italy, while twelfth and thirteenth
century schools saw rhetoric “touched on in a cursory way and superficial fashion when
reading the school authors,” which might provide students with a knowledge of rhetorical
terminology, “by the fourteenth century it seems that introductory rhetoric had come to
represent a normal complement to the secondary grammar syllabus.”217 In contrast to the
grammatical education focused upon the interpretation of literal and allegorical meaning,
the rhetorical curriculum developed during this time period drew heavily upon the
dictaminal tradition, with students translating vernacular letters into Latin so as to learn
“how to give their Latin prose composition the elegance which was lacking in their
earlier strictly grammatical efforts.”218 In fourteenth century England, Christopher
Cannon has summarized this curricular development as the elevation of “grammar into
something like a literary technique” with “grammatical concepts and
terminology…shaping the material of allegory, metaphor, and image.”219 In the monastic
grammar schools of England that Lydgate would have attended, rhetorical translation was
not confined to prose letters but also included the translation of vernacular English poetry
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that students would render into polished Latin prose or poetry.220 Over time, the literacy
practices developed in medieval primary and secondary schools transitioned from
providing students with a general methodology for interpreting texts toward equipping
students with an orientation toward language that allowed them to stake their own claims
to authority through the act of rhetorical invention. What resulted was a set of
pedagogical exercises in which students aimed not necessarily to transpose the literal
meaning of a Latin composition bur rather to compose translations that were “unbounded
by the formalities of logic and grammar” and that utilized rhetorical tropes, particularly
amplification, to achieve their own aims.221 The rhetorical education provided by these
primary and secondary schools in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries gave students the
opportunity and skillset to leverage rhetorical style as a practice that could allow for
intervention through rhetorical stylistics.
The shift in medieval educational practices was not confined to the medieval
classroom but was also reflected in the household of the king, the curia. Rather than
sending their children to the public grammar schools, the English nobility preferred to
educate their children within the household, with the educational curriculum being led by
two professional members of the king’s curia, the “master” who socialized children into
the nobility, and the grammar and rhetoric teacher, most often during the twelfth to
fourteenth centuries a literate chapel clerk who held no formal position within the
household who was charged with teaching sons, and occasionally daughters, Latin
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grammar and reading.222 However, as R. F. Green has demonstrated, by the late
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the position of the grammar and rhetoric teacher
became professionalized within the English court through the granting “of an officially
recognized title.”223 Additionally, a cursory review of the books owned by the English
aristocracy reveals a preponderance of grammatical and rhetorical texts, including both
Latin grammars and Latin artes poetriae, as well as historical texts and mirrors for
princes, the most common of these being Giles of Rome’s De regimine.224 Beyond the
royal court’s authorization and professionalization of the prince’s grammatical and
rhetorical education, in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the establishment
of “humanism” as an ideology and the circulation of Italian humanists, with their focus
on Latin eloquence, across European courts further improved the reputation of rhetoric as
a professionalized discipline within the king’s household.225 As David Rundle has shown,
for English audiences specifically, Italian humanism was closely associated with two
interrelated concepts, “providing political philosophy for princedoms” and “promoting
particular forms of classicizing eloquence for their virtue in persuading their audience to
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certain moral lessons.”226 These two concepts, of course, are shared with the
Fürstenspiegel tradition.
When considered in conjunction with the larger cultural shift in medieval
education, the professionalization of the discipline of rhetoric within the king’s household
suggests two major considerations when analyzing Lydgate’s definitions and depictions
of rhetorical practice in his Fürstenspiegel. First, the increasing exposure of rhetoric as a
discipline that students outside of the university would study precipitates a shift in the
manner in which rhetoric authorizes itself. In contrast to writers like John of Salisbury
and John Gower, Lydgate does not feel compelled to closely marry rhetoric to a more
established discipline such as philosophy or ethics; instead, his additions to Premierfait
focus upon acts of amplification and rhetorical performance. For Lydgate, the idea of
rhetorical performance refers to the concept that effective oration and composition must
be accompanied by eloquence, which he defines as rhetorical stylistics put to the end of
persuasion. Second, the elevation of rhetoric to a defined discipline within the king’s
household suggests that, by the time of Henry VI’s childhood, rhetorical performance
was something understood as necessary for effective governance. In other words, these
cultural shifts indicate that, by the time of Lydgate’s composition of the Fall of Princes,
rhetoric had begun its transition from a capacity used to govern internal deliberation to a
capacity focused more clearly upon expression. When interpreted through the lens of
rhetoric’s status in pedagogy and the royal court, Lydgate’s poetry provides evidence for
the increasing recognition of rhetoric as a systematic discipline that does necessarily rely
on accepted fields of study, such as philosophy and ethics, for disciplinary legitimation.
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Lydgate’s Appropriation of the De casibus Tradition
Unlike the Fürstenspiegel analyzed earlier, John Lydgate’s Fall of Princes
follows the De casibus tradition rather than the Letter to Alexander tradition of the
broader Fürstenspiegel genre. While written ostensibly for princes, the De casibus
tradition, like the Fürstenspiegel genre, appealed to a broad range of readers interested in
classical and Biblical history and provided these readers with advice drawn from the
accreted exempla.227 However, following Boccaccio,228 texts within the De casibus
tradition do not create an ethical framework based upon virtue and vice but rather seek to
educate readers by a presenting a comprehensive history of the classical and Christian
worlds. This historical framework is, in turn, comprised of the biographies of notable
men and women who have risen and fallen according to the turn of Fortune’s wheel. As
Green has shown, the education of the aristocracy within the household often relied upon
the employment of “useful ‘ensamples’ from the past,” which, by their claims to veracity,
were inherently more didactically persuasive than fictive literary examples.229 The history
writing of the De casibus tradition, however, did not employ straightforward narrative
writing in the manner described by twelfth-century theorists such as Hugh of St. Victor.
Throughout the De casibus, Boccaccio varied his material by including digressions and
disputations with the characters whose lives he narrates.230 As the De casibus was
translated into the vernacular, first by Premierfait and later by Lydgate, each author made
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additions and amplifications to the text to suit the political and cultural contexts in which
they wrote and to bring the historical record into the present.231 Through these
adaptations, vernacular authors such as Lydgate were able to project “an image of
authority that was public and textual, yet also exclusive” insofar as their adapted
compositions appropriated classical learning within a Christian understanding of history
to produce a teleological rendering of governance in which princes must stoically bear
the whims of Fortune.232 For Lydgate, the historical narrative of the De casibus tradition
came to function as a contested site in which aesthetics, politics, and Christian ethics
interacted and grappled with classical and Christian views on the course of history.
Lydgate’s addition of “envoys” that explain the moral revealed by the historical
biography complicates the historical worldview posited by the De casibus tradition. At
the same time, however, the moralizing language of the “envoys” is necessary for
creating an ethical framework in which the sovereign can be both held accountable for his
actions and engage in the didactic project of the Fürstenspiegel genre. In the prologue to
the second book of the Fall, Lydgate departs from the De casibus tradition’s positioning
of Fortune as the preeminent cause for the fall of prominent figures; instead, in line with
the Fürstenspiegel genre, the ethical or unethical behavior of princes precipitates their
political position within the world:
For ther weelfare and ther abidyng longe.
Who aduertisith, dependith nat on chaunce.
Good liff and vertu maketh hem to be stronge,
And hem assureth in long perseuerauwce;
Vertu on Fortune maketh a diffiaunce.
That Fortune hath no domynacioun
231
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Wher noble pryncis be gouerned be resoun. (FP 2.50-6)233
So long that a prince is “gouerned by resoun,” he is not subject to the whims of fate.
Instead, he can rely on “Vertu” to determine his own fate. As Paul Budra has shown, by
blunting Fortune’s role in history, Lydgate repositions the historical exempla within the
framework of tragedy that Chaucer developed in his own treatment of the De casibus
tradition, The Monk’s Tale.234 In the Fall, Lydgate relies upon this poetic and ethical
framework both to justify his amplifications of Boccaccio’s and Permierfait’s original
texts and to reposition his own work into the didactic genre of the Fürstenspiegel.
Although the prologue to the second book of the Fall inverts the traditional
historical worldview of the De casibus tradition, Lydgate’s actual rendering of the tales
that comprise the Fall challenges the framework of sin and causality that he proclaims as
informing the whole of his text. Despite Lydgate’s claim that Fortune does not dominate
the lives of princes, he draws upon many exempla from Boccaccio in which virtuous
characters suffer a reversal in fortune through no explicit fault of their own. According to
Maura Nolan, the whole of the Lydgatean poetic project revolves around the creation of
an artistic aesthetic that attempts to provide “the illusion of a certain transhistoricity”
through the juxtaposition of sources that create both logical and temporal inconsistencies,
which prmopt the reader to move affectively from pity to joy and back again as they
grapple with understanding a world in which both chance and virtue contribute to a
ruler’s success.235 Lydgate’s appropriation of the De casibus tradition and his creation of
233
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an ethical framework through which to view history compel him to attempt to reconcile
two “contradictory visions of history: that history is providentially ordered, and that it is
radically contingent and unrelated to human merit.”236 As Andrew Galloway has argued,
Lydgate’s attempt at reconciling these contradictory views draws upon classical rather
than medieval learning in an attempt to guide “political culture toward worldly prosperity
yet Stoic ethics,” which positions him as the father of vernacular humanism in the
English tradition.237 Although scholarship has examined the historical, literary, and
ethical foundations that inform Lydgate’s treatment of history as aesthetic and moral
tools, there has been less discussion of how Lydgate’s definition and depiction of rhetoric
in the Fall resonates with his larger poetic and political project. As my reading below will
argue, Lydgate’s understanding of rhetoric as a performative art reliant on rhetorical
tropes posits a sovereign who leverages rhetoric to achieve his own social aims through
the performance of eloquence and, in this manner, to guard against the vagaries of
Fortune.
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Lydgate’s Definition of Rhetoric
Although rhetoric as a systematic disposition for approaching composition
informs the whole of Lydgate’s Fall of Princes, Lydgate follows Boccaccio and
Premierfait in providing his fullest treatment of rhetorical theory and practice in the sixth
book following the historical exemplum of Cicero, as a digression against those
“[Iangelers and] diffamers of Rhetorique” (FP 6.3277 ff). As is typical of discussions of
rhetoric in the Fürstenspiegel tradition, Lydgate defines rhetoric, situates it within an
existing classificatory system—drawn from Boccaccio—explains its constituent parts—
taken from Premierfait—and details its efficacy within civil society. Although Copeland
has argued that Lydgate grapples with two conceptions of rhetoric—one inherited from
Boccaccio and Premierfait in which rhetoric is defined through its civic embodiment in
the orator and one inherited from Chaucer in which the poet as rhetorician pleases the
royal court through figurative language—I want to suggest that Lydgate draws upon his
conception of authorship as an extension of the rhetorical figure of amplification to
reconcile poetic performance and political efficacy.238 That is, rather than rhetoric and
poetics “subsum[ing] the political,” as Copeland suggest, for Lydgate, rhetoric is the
systematic art the supplements the political through the amplification provided by
rhetorical stylistics and thereby engenders the sovereign with the capacity to intervene in
the political sphere.239
Lydgate’s treatment of rhetoric in the Fall is fairly conventional and follows his
immediate sources, but his additions and amplifications to Boccaccio’s and Premierfait’s
prose demonstrate an understanding of rhetoric that is skeptical of attempts to tie
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rhetorical practice to academic philosophy and rather imagines rhetorical efficacy as
intimately tied toward eloquent performance rather than the expression of truth. As Kellie
Robertson has argued, in his Reson & Sensuallyte, Lydgate consciously breaks away
from academic conventions that conflate reason with natural philosophy, which results in
a theory of sensuality in which poetic eloquence, rather than philosophical logic, “reveals
that which is inaccessible to mere sensual analysis.”240 Following Boccaccio, Lydgate
places rhetoric within the “rac[i]ounal” division of philosophy, which determines “What
men shal uiode & what thing vndirfonge” (FP 6.3295-6). From this initial classification,
rhetoric assumes neither the close association with logic found in Scholastic treatments of
rhetoric nor the overarching subsummation to morality and ethics found in fourteenth
century commentators such as Gower. Instead, in this instance, rhetorical knowledge for
Lydgate functions as a capacity that guides individuals to correct practical action, much
in the same way the poet compiles historical exempla to demonstrate the consequences
that emerge from improper action. As one third of philosophy, rhetoric is not something
naturally possessed but rather a systematic art that requires four components on the part
of a successful rhetorician: a natural wit; systematic study; a virtuous disposition; and an
agreeable nature (FP 6.3295-7). Following Premierfait, after defining rhetoric, Lydgate
proceeds to explain its constituent parts, reiterating the five canons of rhetoric, which he
renders as “Inuencion,” the possession of “A sikir grounde foundid on resoun,”
“Disposioun,” which helps the orator to avoid digression, “Ellocucioun,” the capacity to
conveniently convey expressions to one’s audience, “Pronunciacion,” the property of
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joining rhetorical “craft onto nature,” and “Remembraunce,” which involves
communicating each part of an oration as intended (FP 6.3321-60). Despite his initial
treatment of all five canons of rhetoric, as Lydgate proceeds on this digression of
rhetoric, he focuses primarily upon the relationship between rhetorical style, as
represented by the canon of “Ellocucioun,” and eloquence’s didactic and civic functions.
In perhaps the largest of Lydgate’s additions to Premierfait, he adds a metaphor to
the canon of “Ellocucioun” that encapsulates how style operates within the larger
discipline of rhetoric. Drawing on rhetoric’s traditional association with the technical and
mechanical arts, Lydgate analogizes the canon of “Ellocucioun” as “Like a keruer that
first doth tymbir hewe, / Squier & compass cast features & visage, / With keruyng tool
makth [up] a fair image (FP 6.3337-9). Though the canons of invention and arrangement
provide the raw material for composition, in this case the “tymbir,” it is the canon of
“Ellocucioun” that acts as the “keruyng tool” that allows the technician to translate this
raw material into a commensurable form, here, the “fair image,” but, in rhetorical
practice, the oration adapted to one’s audience. In other words, the canon of style is that
which vivifies language and turns it into something that can actively intervene within the
social and political spheres. The metaphor that Lydgate adds to Premierfait’s definition
style shares striking resonances with Lydgate’s discussion of vernacular authorship that
opens the whole of the Fall in the prologue to Book 1. The prologue opens with Lydgate
commenting upon Premierfait’s act of translating Boccaccio, and he expounds upon how
the act of vernacular translation shares similarities with the technical art of pottery:
In his [Premierfait’s] prologe affermyng off resoun
Artificers hauyng exercise
May chaunge and turne bi good discrecioun
Shappis, formys, and newly hem deuyse,
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Make and vnmake in many sondry wyse,
As potteres, which to that craft entende,
Breke and renew ther vesselis to a-mende (FP 1.8-14)
For Lydgate, authorial proficiency descends from the ability to reshape existing material
by applying one’s “discrecioun” to “deuyse” new forms, whether those be new methods
of argumentation or new strategies of expression. Lydgate’s rendering here of rhetorical
style as a mechanical art draws upon a long tradition within rhetorical theory that
described the poet and rhetorician as a type of builder.241 The recognition that the poet
conceives of a form or image, the verba, within the memory before then crafting that
image into the actual composition, the res, reflects a Neo-Platonic understanding of
poetic composition.
The end of authorial translation lies in adapting accepted learning into contingent
cultural situations and thereby making old writing understandable to contemporary
audiences. Through the presentation of an individual’s moral standing in relation to their
historical actions, Lydgate introduces the affective mode of pity into his depiction of
history, which, in turn, imbues the poet with the authority to interpret history within an
existing ethical framework, in this case, one designed to bring about good governance.
According to Mary Flannery, Lydgate’s treatment of characters in the Fall, specifically
his rendering of their fama, engenders a poetic voice that is charged “with weighing the
repute and accounts of texts, authors, and characters” and then compiling, organizing, and
adapting these sources to present specific instantiations of history and reputation.242 In
the same manner that the potter may use his wheel to constantly shape, reshape, and
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unmake the unformed clay, the author may use language, especially the rhetorical figure
of amplification, to reinterpret history and put it to new uses.243 These adaptations to the
historical record consist of both the organizational framework around which one
interprets history and the actual rendering of the historical narrative through the author’s
amplification using rhetorical stylistics. In line with the Fürstenspiegel tradition, for
Lydgate, history becomes the raw material that must be adapted to educate the prince
under ethical frameworks.
As the prologue to Book 1 continues, Lydgate supplements a conventional
medieval discussion of the recovery of classical learning by identifying the poet as
having a specific and heightened sensory perception that allows him to improve upon
pre-existing compositions through the influence of eloquence. The logical end of
Lydgate’s analogy between the poet and the potter culminates in the poet possessing a
vision within the intellect that allows him to alter and amplify constructed text so as to
render an image that already exists within his mind. As Lydgate describes it, this “inward
siht” allows the poet to “Deuises newe” through the act of “Fantasien,” that is, the
operation of the imagination (FP 1.17-8). In line with Chaucer’s treatment of old texts in
the Parlement of Foules,244 Lydgate employs the metaphor of separating the wheat from
the chaff to describe the poet-translator’s relationship to classical learning; however,
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unlike Chaucer, Lydgate describes the poet-translator’s intervention in starkly rhetorical
and sensory terms:
Thei may off newe fynde and fantasie,
Out of old chaff trie out ful cleene corn,
Make it more fresh and lusti to the eie,
Ther subtil witt and ther labour applie,
With ther colours agreable off hewe,
Make olde thynges for to seeme newe (FP 1.23-8).
In contrast to earlier treatments of rhetoric, Lydgate does not consign the poet-translator
as rhetorician to the explicit rendering of truth, though that, of course, is implied by the
rhetorician’s virtuous disposition and agreeable nature. As Robert R. Edwards has
argued, the figure of the author posited by Lydgate is one who remains loyal to the
original meaning of a text but who, at the same time, enlivens this text with “received
materials by compilation, rhetorical amplification, and moralization.”245 The poettranslator’s gift lies in his capacity to use language, the “coloures agreable,” to
reinvigorate classical learning by increasing its sensory appeal, insofar as it makes older
texts “more fresh and lusti to the eie.” In this manner, rhetoric and language take on a
didactic role, but, here, the process of education is as much to delight as it is to teach
explicitly.
Further, Lydgate’s description of the author’s role in composition strongly
resonates with the more advanced school-based practices of the medieval English
secondary school, in which students translated vernacular and Latin prose and poetry into
refined Latin compositions of their own. Compared to the earlier grammatical school
practices in which translation found its end in transcribing literal meaning, these later acts
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of rhetorical translation focused upon the development of eloquence through the art of
amplification. As Christopher Cannon has argued, for Lydgate, these schoolroom
practices “provided rich resources for meaning-making and ornamentation in poetry” and
engendered a grammatical disposition that understood literary forms as created through
“aggregation, by the patching together of otherwise distinct and separable parts.”246
Drawing from Premierfait’s comments on his own translation of Boccaccio, Lydgate
records the author’s task of amplification as “to a-menden, correcten and declare; / Nat to
condempne off no presumpcioun” (FP 1.86-7). In particular, the poet-translator is
charged with amplifying the rhetorical effects of classical and historical stories that are
“bare” due to their composition “Vndir a stile breeff and compendious” (FP 1.89-90).
Since these historical exempla contain a didactic element, they must be “prolonge[d]
whan thei be vertuous” (FP 1.91). Here, the amplification concerns adding not only
additional references to classical texts of learning, which both Premierfait and Lydgate
bring to Boccaccio’s text, doubling its original size, but also rhetorical flourishes that
“supporte” the original exempla by making them more engaging to the reader (FP 1.88).
Despite Lydgate claiming that his own writing his without “rhetorik,” (FP 1.230), his
aureate poetics obviously reveal this claim to fall within the topos of modesty.
The rhetorical notion of authorship communicated at the opening of the Fall
further resonates with the originary myth of rhetoric found in the digression of Book 6.
As an adaptation of the Ciceronian myth passed down through Brunetto Latini, rhetoric
here certainly possesses a civilizing force, but the weight of that force is found not in its
capacity to precipitate cooperation through communication but instead in the ability of
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eloquence to make expression conveniently commensurable. Man’s use of language
distinguishes him from animals since man can “vttre his conceit onli be langage,” but
rather than birthing civilization, language is rendered as that which ameliorates the
appetitive desires of man (FP 6.3378). It is through language that “The soule be grace
repressith al outrage, / Namli whan resoun hath the souereynte / To bridle passiouns of
sensualite” (FP 6.3379-81). As the discussion on rhetoric continues, eloquence is
depicted as the counterpart of prudence, which Lydgate emphasizes by paring
“eloquence” and “prudence” as rhyming words. According to Lydgate’s translation of
Premierfait, eloquence is “youen” to man as “A thyng couenable in especiall / Whan that
it is conveied by prudence” (FP 6.3382-4). Prudence informs the enactment of eloquence,
but eloquence, on its own, gives expression to the marvels of natural creation and the
intention of the soul that could not be communicated without eloquent language. For
Lydgate, language as a communicative capacity must be accompanied by rhetorical
ornamentation to reach its highest potential. In this conception, eloquence does not run
the risk of producing pleasing language that leads the audience away from truth by
appealing to sensory desires. By positioning eloquence as governed by prudence,
Premierfait and Lydgate expand the possibilities afforded to rhetorical ornamentation and
expression.
Beyond its ability for rendering truth, Lydgate praises rhetoric and eloquence for
their pedagogical potentials. As foreshadowed by the role of language in pacifying
sensuality, rhetoric is also ascribed with the pedagogical role of teaching virtue so that
the individual may discipline themselves under ethical frameworks and, crucially, keep
their body in measure: “That bi langage and bi eloquence / A man is tauht in vertu to be
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stable / Of soule eternal, of bodi corumpable” (FP 6.3405-7). This didactic aspect of
rhetorical practice extends beyond explicit teaching and also includes the elements of
inductive reasoning that contribute to persuasion. Citing the examples of ancient
rhetoricians, Lydgate explains that political persuasion is achieved through “wise
exaumplis & prouerbis pertinent” as well as “sugrid langage & vertuous dailiaunce,"
which are described as “Woordes pesible embellished with pleasuance” (FP 6.3457;
6.3467; 6.3468). Across each of these examples, Lydgate emphasizes that the logical
aspects of rhetorical invention must always be accompanied by rhetorical flourish, what
he deems “prudent eloquence” (FP 6.3472). It is only when eloquent language supports
historical example that inductive persuasion can occur. When eloquence does not vivify
language, the result is catastrophic for the political state. Lydgate concludes the
digression on rhetoric by citing the example of those “braynles people” who attempt
political oratory but lack the systematic study of rhetoric as an art and are therefore
“bareyn of eloquence” (FP 6.3476-7). As this last example demonstrates, when language
is uttered without eloquence, it loses the civilizing effect described earlier in the
digression. According to Lydgate, the lack of eloquence causes individuals to revert to
the state of animals as they utter “ther speche as nakid folk & bare” (FP 6.3478). In a
final bit of playful poetic license, Lydgate strips these citizens’ language of its rhetorical
flourishes and their bodies of civilizing garments.247
The whole of Lydgate’s discussions of rhetoric and authorship suggest that he
conceives of rhetoric as more firmly concerned with stylistic issues; however, it would be
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reductive to suggest that Lydgate’s rhetoric privileges “Ellocucioun” at the expense of the
other four canons of rhetoric. Rather, for Lydgate, rhetorical style, amplification, and
ornamentation are necessary accompaniments to all orations and compositions insofar as
these rhetorical features are the carving tools that translate the raw material of language
into a civilizing and productive force. As I will demonstrate over the analysis of the
exemplum of Cicero that closes this chapter, when this framework is translated into the
political sphere, rhetorical amplification and embellishment serve as tools that allow for
political performance to achieve its social aims.
Prudent Eloquence: The Case of Cicero in Governance
As the historical exemplum that introduces the digression and defense of rhetoric
in Book 6, Lydgate’s treatment of Cicero reveals how eloquence, understood here as
effective “Ellocucioun,” is necessary for political praxis. While Cicero’s life is treated
fully in Book 6, Lydgate specifically references Cicero in the prologue to Book 1 and
thereby engenders a didactic framework that informs the whole of his Fürstenspiegel
project. The prologue closes with Lydgate praising the learning of the young Henry VI
and his uncle, Humphrey, who commissioned Lydgate to translate the Premierfait’s text
into English for the edification of the children of the English nobility. Before introducing
and flattering his patrons, Lydgate references the historical examples of Cicero, an
eloquent rhetorician, who provided an education to Caesar, whom Lydgate reveres as the
politician who restored Alexander’s empire and began the Age of Steel:
For in the tyme off Cesar Iulius,
Whan the tryumphe he wan in Rome toun,
He entre wolde the scoole off Tullius
And here his lecture off gret affeccioun;
And natwithstandyng his conquest & renoun,
Vnto bookis he gaff gret attendaunce
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And hadde in stories ioie and gret pleasance (FP 1.365-71).
This reference to the relationship between Cicero and Caesar serves a dual purpose in the
prologue. First, it establishes a didactic framework in which successful politicians devote
themselves to learning and allow themselves to be instructed by those who possess
prudent eloquence—this being, of course, the ground upon which the Fürstenspiegel
genre is planted. Second, it calls particular attention to the lives of Caesar and Cicero, a
historical episode that was of great interest to Lydgate in particular.248 Interestingly, in
the historical exempla on Caesar and Cicero found in Book 6, any sense of rivalry
between the two is elided, despite Lydgate acknowledging that Cicero warred with
Antony and Octavian following the death of Caesar; instead, Caesar and Cicero are
depicted each as paragons of governance and eloquence, and Rome approaches its zenith
as a civilization when the two work together. By foreshadowing this important moment in
both the history of the world and the composition of the Fall as a whole, Lydgate
emphasizes the necessity that political speech be accompanied by stylistic competency.
Indeed, in the portrait of Humphrey that follows the quick digression on Cicero and
Caesar, Humphrey is explicitly praised as an aristocratic leader whose accomplishment in
letters has refined his political sensibilities.
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When Lydgate turns to his discussion of Cicero as a political and rhetorical figure,
he again reiterates the close connection between his notions of authorship and the
rhetorical act of amplification—the same rhetorical act that Cicero puts to effective use
during his life in politics. At the opening of the exemplum, Lydgate translates a long
digression from Boccaccio (49 lines), in which Boccaccio laments his inability to match
Cicero’s eloquence as he details his life. Toward the end of this digression, Lydgate
renders a direct quotation from Boccaccio that serves as a rationalization for the type of
amplification that Lydgate employs throughout the Fall:
But for to yiue occasioun
Which in rhetorik haue mor experience
Than haue I, & mor inspeccioun
In the colours and craff[t] of eloquence—
Them texcite to do their dilligence,
Onto my writing whan they may attende
Of compassioun my rudnesse to amende (FP 6.2989-96).
In this quotation, Boccaccio’s rationalization of future authors’ amplification of his own
work rests not upon their capacity to elevate the truth-value of his writing. Instead,
Boccaccio desires that his inheritors elevate the “rudnesse” of his language through their
use of “the colours and craff[t] of eloquence.” Much like the notion of authorship that
Lydgate establishes in the prologue of Book 1, authorial presence is not denoted by the
act of invention or arrangement but rather by the amplification of style. As Maura Nolan
has argued, in this moment, for Lydgate, style transcends its earlier associations with rote
exercises and enters the conceptual level, “a mode that can be entered and exited” by the
authorial voice at will.249 For a project of narrative history writing, in which truth has
been determined and accepted a priori by the reality of the historical record, the act of
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authorship is confined to the elevation of particular ethical frameworks through the
amplification of language. As Lydgate renders Premierfait’s French prose into English
verse, his amplifications serve to establish a theory of political practice in which political
efficacy is intimately connected with eloquence and style.
In the historical exemplum on Cicero, Cicero’s rise as a politician is precipitated
by the eloquence of his oratory during the Catiline conspiracy, which provides a fitting
example of the relationship between style and political performance. After detailing the
general plot of the conspiracy, Lydgate explains that Cicero successfully prosecutes the
conspirators with “prudence & werkyng merveilous” (FP 6.3050). Just like in the broader
discussion on rhetoric, prudence and eloquence are presented as counterparts of one
another, with prudence determining the content of an oration, its ethical framework, and
eloquence providing the necessary sensory stimulation that guides the audience toward
accepting the truth. In contrast to Gower’s treatment of the Catiline conspiracy, Caesar is
conspicuously absent, and Cicero’s successful prosecution depends not upon his plain
rendering of truth but rather the “merveilous” speech that he provides. In particular,
Lydgate’s use of the term “merveilous” is important to understanding the role of
eloquence in the practice of politics. Although “merveilous” carries the meaning of
wonderful or miraculous, in late medieval English literature, the term also connoted the
overwhelming of the sensory perception. Cicero is certainly prudent in his speech
prosecuting the conspiracy, but the rhetorical weight of his performance is found in the
eloquence of its construction. The example of Cicero presented here supports and
expands J. Allan Mitchell’s claim that Lydgate’s uptake of the rhetorical tradition
presented by Gower reflects “a broader transition away from rhetorical science toward
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stylistics in late medieval culture.”250 After successfully prosecuting the conspiracy,
Cicero is elevated to the position of patron of Rome and becomes the “champioun” of the
city (FP 6.3078). In his capacity as governor, he enacts a government based upon
“knihthod & polycie” that maintains Rome through the operation of prudence (FP
6.3080). During this time, Rome approaches its cultural zenith, with Cicero ascending to
the symbolic level, as the “sunne” that illuminates Rome and the rest of the world (FP
6.3081-4). Despite the earlier description of Cicero’s focus upon “knihthod & polycie,” it
is not the governmental or political machinations of Rome that illuminate the world but
rather the “bemys… / Of his rhetoric & his eloquence” (FP 6.3083-4). The relationship
between politics and rhetoric that is metonymized in the person of Cicero is one in which
political action is subsumed under the broader category of rhetoric.
When Cicero does engage in political action, Lydgate is careful to detail that the
political fruit borne by his orations are as reliant upon rhetorical performance as they are
upon logic and reason. In detailing Cicero’s defense of two criminals, Lydgate inverts the
typical hierarchical relationship between logic and style by emphasizing that it is “With
so excellent flouryng fair langage / With such resouns concluded at the fyn” that Cicero’s
speech acquits the criminals. Although this ordering does preserve the rhyme royal
scheme of the Fall, in this particular model of oration, the question of stylistics
supersedes the question of logic and reiterates Lydgate’s definition of rhetoric in which
style and ornamentation are necessary supplements to the factual elements of a
composition. As Cicero puts his oratorical skill to more direct political questions,
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Lydgate again emphasizes that it is the style of Cicero’s speech that heals the division of
the Roman state following the civil war between Caesar and Pompey:
Thoruh his langage this saide Tullius
Reconsilede bi his soote orisouns
To the lordship & grace of Iulius,
Princes, kynges of dyuers regiouns (FP 6.3130-3).
Once again, no reference is made to the overriding logic or political concerns that may
have motivated Cicero’s speech on unification. Instead, the sweetness of his orations
motivates the populace to accept Caesar as their new ruler. Cicero’s orations here
produce the same civilizing effect that the broader category of eloquence has on the
human condition, as defined in the defense of rhetoric that follows the Cicero exemplum.
This political moment encapsulates the broader argument that Lydgate forwards through
his translation of Premierfait. Rhetorical practice and political practices are coconstitutive, but eloquence, the act of amplification, is the vivifying force that makes
political action possible through the creation of assent. As the historical life of Cicero
closes, Lydgate exemplifies Cicero’s eloquence and the political goodwill that it provided
him throughout his life: “His langage made hym stonde in grace / And be preferrid during
al his lyff” (FP 6.3153-4). The effective rhetorician imagined by Lydgate is neither the
grammatical interpreter of Salisbury nor the ethical moralizer of Gower. Lydgate’s
rhetorician is one who understands the affordances of style and leverages those
affordances to achieve political persuasion.
Conclusion
Compared to the earlier treatments of rhetoric in the Fürstenspiegel of Salisbury
and Gower, the definition and depiction of vernacular rhetoric found in the Fall of
Princes decisively separates rhetorical practice from its close association with
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philosophy, logic, and ethics. This is not to suggest that Lydgate as an author and theorist
understood rhetoric as unconcerned with these issues. He fully defines rhetoric as
fundamentally governed by prudence, but, as a vernacular translator, he pays attention
generally to the cannon of “Ellocucioun” and specifically to the role of amplification in
rhetorical ornamentation in the establishment of authority. As I have suggested,
Lydgate’s conservative reorientation of rhetoric under the epistemological category of
rational science reflects the extent to which rhetoric had become professionalized both
within the secondary schools of late medieval England and the king’s curia. Lydgate’s
specific interest in the rhetorical figure of amplification likely descended from the school
exercises that he completed as a student at Edmund St. Bury’s in which he would have
been charged with creating his own refined Latin prose and verse compositions from
vernacular exemplars. Indeed, the primary concern of Lydgatean poetics involved the
elevation of vernacular English through aureate stylistics.
The example of Lydgate, then, I hope, demonstrates that the relationship between
the definitions of rhetoric found in medieval Fürstenspiegel and the broader culture of
medieval rhetorical practice did not follow a singular path of influence. Unlike the
academic and scholastic influence present in Salisbury and Gower, Lydgate’s definition
of rhetoric is indebted much more to the basic literacy practices found in secondary
schools and to the rise of vernacular authorship, as represented by figures such as
Chaucer. As a result, the rhetorical-political actor depicted by Lydgate is more concerned
with matters of rhetorical performance than with firmly grounding rhetorical practice
within existing philosophical and ethical frameworks. As rhetoric became increasingly
professionalized as a discipline and legitimized as a suitable course of study for the
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young nobility, rhetoric itself no longer needed to cling so tightly to culturally accepted
formsk of knowledge, such as philosophy and ethics, for purposes of legitimation. By the
mid-fifteenth century, in the figure of Lydgate as poet-translator, we see the logical
conclusion of rhetoric as defined in the Fürstenspiegel. Unshackled from its torturous
treatment in the inherited Aristotelian tradition, rhetoric is free to focus upon the stylistics
of performance that return rhetoric to its civic function of persuading the political state.
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CHAPTER V
THE FÜRSTENSPIEGEL AND MEDIEVAL RHETORICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
At the outset of this dissertation, I argued that the field of medieval rhetorical
historiography has long overlooked the rhetorical contributions of the Fürstenspiegel
genre because its discussion of rhetoric often draws upon literary exempla in favor of
meta-rhetorical treatises that explicitly treat rhetorical theory and figures. Further, I
suggested that the field’s preference for analyzing these types of texts within a tradition
of inheritance, adaptation, and innovation often divorced rhetorical theory from rhetorical
practice. When reading through rhetorical historiography, one may get the impression
that rhetoric during the medieval period was practiced exclusively in schools and
universities rather than royal and legal courts.251 However, the case studies presented here
demonstrate that the rhetorical practices and depictions of rhetoric found in medieval
English Fürstenspiegel reflected the broader medieval culture of rhetorical practice that
extended beyond academic spheres of influence. The rhetorical practices of the
Fürstenspiegel genre exemplify the rhetorical culture that Richard McKeon described:
In application, the art of rhetoric contributed during the period from the fourth to
the fourteenth century not only to the methods of speaking and writing well, of
composing letters and petitions, sermons and prayers, legal documents and briefs,
poetry and prose, but to the canons of interpreting laws and scripture, to the
dialectical devices of discovery and proof, to the establishment of the scholastic
method which was to come into universal use in philosophy and theology, and
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finally to the formulation of scientific inquiry which was to separate philosophy
from theology.252
The intent of this dissertation is not to relitigate what McKeon correctly claimed 80 years
ago but rather to argue that the Fürstenspiegel serves as a tradition in which medieval
rhetorical, hermeneutical, ethical, and political questions intersect. For the field of
medieval rhetorical historiography, the Fürstenspiegel can provide a gateway for
analyzing the constellation of relations that constitute medieval rhetorical culture.
Although the rhetorical case studies here certainly conceive of rhetoric in
significantly different ways, the commonalities found in their treatments of rhetoric have
implications for the field of medieval rhetorical historiography and its understanding of
deliberative rhetoric as a productive and intervening force in medieval society. To
summarize, this dissertation makes four interventions in medieval rhetorical
historiography that productively supplement ongoing conversations in the field. For the
remainder of this conclusion, I will detail these interventions and suggest potential areas
for future research that extend the project of this dissertation.
I: The Fürstenspiegel tradition traces the recovery of Aristotle
As texts that grapple directly with Aristotelian theory, both in their fictional
historical framework and in their discussions of natural science and ethics, Fürstenspiegel
provide a productive object of analysis for considering the relationship between the
recovery of Aristotle and the development of rhetorical theory. In the same manner that
Rita Copeland has argued that Aristotle’s Rhetoric was primarily taken up in medieval
England for its interpretation of the emotions and depiction of social psychology,253 the
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case studies presented in this dissertation suggest that, within political and pedagogical
contexts, Aristotelian theory did not influence the writers of Fürstenspiegel through its
specific treatment of rhetorical theory but rather provided a scientific and ethical
framework upon which authors could translate their rhetorical theory into actual practice.
The Aristotelian theory found in Fürstenspiegel provides an excellent political and
literary complement to Charles Brigg’s discussion of the commentary tradition on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the medieval university from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.
As Briggs has demonstrated, in these commentaries, exegesis focused less upon the
“formal elements” of rhetoric articulated by Aristotle and more upon “its fundamental
role in moral psychology, practical theology, and political science.”254 Indeed, of the
three rhetoricians presented in this study, only John of Salisbury drew directly upon
Aristotelian rhetorical theory—the discussion of induction found in Book 8 of the
Topics—in his own depiction of rhetorical practice. While John of Salisbury certainly
engages with Aristotelian theories of language throughout the Metalogicon, his lack of
access to Aristotle’s Rhetoric leads him to reconcile Ciceronian definitions of rhetoric
with Aristotelian dialectical-rhetorical methodology. As a consequence, John of Salisbury
subordinated rhetoric along with dialectic under the larger category of logic, producing a
theory of rhetoric that possesses no substantive discipline of its own but rather provides a
scientific methodology for engaging in other disciplines.
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When later authors such as John Gower and John Lydgate engaged with
Aristotelian thought, they incorporated Aristotle primarily as an ethical and political
theorist. In part, this reflects the emerging sub-tradition of vernacular rhetoric that
emerged through the influence of Dante and Brunetto Latini, which Gower drew upon
and which, through Gower’s influence, Lydgate would later draw upon. At the same
time, however, Gower’s and Lydgate’s uptake of Aristotle as it relates to rhetorical
theory is primarily associated with the manner in which rhetorical speech and
composition affects the sensitive part of the soul. For Gower, the danger of rhetorical
practice is found in its potential for exciting individuals to pursue their own desires rather
than common profit. In the case of Gower, his repositioning of Aristotelian theory as an
ethical framework upon which rhetorical efficacy must be measured reveals his deep
ambivalence about rhetoric as a political practice. In his discussion of rhetoric, Gower
emphasizes that the orator’s expression of plain truth proceeds from his virtuous
disposition, based upon the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and
temperance. For Lydgate, eloquence provides a fundamentally civilizing force that
accesses the sensitive part of the soul to soothe animalistic nature. Contrary to Gower,
Lydgate understands eloquence as necessary for the development of both reason and
persuasion. Although he still conceives of a close relationship between rhetoric and
ethics, as evidenced by his emphasis on prudent eloquence, in Lydgate, Gower’s
overarching Aristotelian framework and epistemological elevation of rhetoric has receded
in importance in favor of an emphasis on stylistics and performance.
As these examples demonstrate, the medieval inheritance of Aristotle did not
necessarily proceed in a straightforward and chronological matter. Even as later authors
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had access to the full Aristotelian Organon, they did not necessarily take up the
Aristotelian texts that are most commonly associated with rhetorical theory. Within the
Fürstenspiegel tradition, John of Salisbury’s treatment of the first four books of the
Organon was not widely taken up by the authors who followed him in defining and
depicting deliberative rhetoric, even though there is ample evidence that Gower, in
particular, was familiar with John’s Policraticus.255 Instead, once the Nicomachean
Ethics was recovered, it became the primary Aristotelian text associated with the
Fürstenspiegel genre, primarily through the influence of the widely circulating De
regimine principum.256 Alongside the study of Aristotle within the schools and
universities of the Latin West, analyzing the uptake of Aristotle within the Fürstenspiegel
tradition offers a glimpse of Aristotelian theory as it was put into practice. Future work in
this direction should aim to explore how and why particular Aristotelian texts fell in and
out of favor within this political genre. Doing so will open an avenue toward
understanding more completely how the recovery of Aristotle inflected political questions
of the later medieval period, most prominently the dispute between hierocratic and
democratic theories of the establishment of government.
II: Fürstenspiegel reveal rhetorical practice to be intimately connected to the virtue
of prudence
In line with the Ciceronian conception of rhetoric that persisted into the medieval
period, the Fürstensipiegel authors considered here viewed prudence as both a rhetorical
norm and the virtue that governs rhetorical practice. As Jordan Loveridge has argued
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through his reading of Thomas Aquinas, “rhetoric and deliberation function as parts of
prudence in that each seeks to close a divide between singular and universal reasoning,
thereby enabling individuals to make particular choices.”257 When Ciceronian and
Aristotelian definitions of rhetoric became translated into the lens of practical action that
informed the composition of Fürstenspiegel, rhetorical practice became even more
closely associated with virtue ethics since prudence was the virtue that allowed the
sovereign “to rule over those of lesser understanding.”258 Despite prudence clearly
informing medieval conceptions of rhetoric, the relationship between rhetoric and
prudence has been relatively understudied in medieval rhetorical historiography. The
definitions of rhetoric in medieval Fürstenspiegel provide ample evidence not only that
prudence governed rhetorical practice but also that the relationship between prudence and
rhetoric was taken up in different ways across the medieval period.
Across the Fürstenspiegel analyzed in this dissertation, prudence functions as a
capacity that makes rhetorical intervention possible by confirming the individual’s
movement toward virtuous action, in this case promoting the common profit of the
community above individual desire. John of Salisbury associated rhetoric with prudence
even beyond the perceptual framework established by Aristotle and Cicero. For John,
prudence governs rhetorical practice, but prudence itself is developed as the individual
applies the Aristotelian rhetorical-dialectical methodology to contingent situations. By
applying a systematic method for determining the truth, the rhetorician trains the capacity
of discernment that aids prudence in confirming the impulse toward virtue. According to
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Gower, prudence is connected with rhetorical practice by governing the process of
internal deliberation. For Gower, the possession of prudence and its concomitant virtue of
chastity functions to prevent the rhetorician from employing ornamented speech that
produces excessive sensory pleasure within the audience. At the same time, Gower also
recognizes the potential for rhetorical practice to develop prudence in the individual. To
account for the prince’s lack of experience, Gower employs exempla that provide the
prince with the opportunity to practice connecting contingent situations to universal
principles, which he places under the epistemological category of rhetoric. In Lydgate’s
rhetorical system of “prudent eloquence,” Lydgate presupposes that a prudent nature
accompanies rhetorical practice. Consequently, Lydgate’s discussion of rhetoric reorients
prudence from the theoretical foundation that informs rhetoric to the capacity that allows
for the reemergence of stylistics as a major component of rhetorical practice. These
conceptions of the relationship between rhetoric and prudence suggest that virtues such as
prudence were not completely static categories during the medieval period but rather
were leveraged to fit within the rhetorical and political paradigms forwarded by
individual authors.
Viewing prudence less as an all-encompassing category and more as a component
of rhetorical practice provides new avenues for analyzing medieval conceptions of
rhetoric. In particular, Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee, in which Dame Prudence counsels her
husband Melibee, has not been fully considered as a rhetorical text despite containing
many of the hallmarks of the Fürstenspiegel genre. Although David Wallace has argued
that Chaucer incorporates knowledge of the artes dicendi and tacendi in his depiction of
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rhetoric in the Tale of Melibee and the Manciple’s Tale,259 his discussion of rhetoric
within these tales elides the extent to which the virtue of prudence determines the course
of rhetorical practice both inside and outside the domestic sphere. As it pivots toward
considering the Fürstenspiegel as an explicitly rhetorical genre, the field of medieval
rhetorical historiography must also trace how the Aristotelian ethical categories that
informed medieval definitions of rhetoric were treated differently according to the needs
of individual authors. The medieval uptake of prudence suggests the presence of a
rhetorical tradition that did not merely reflect classical learning but actively engaged with
it.
III: Fürstenspiegel consistently use historical exempla to depict rhetorical practice
and enact rhetorical theory
As these three case studies show, when Fürstenspiegel pivoted from discussing
rhetorical theory to demonstrating actual rhetorical practice, they did not do so through
the compilation of rhetorical figures and exempla but rather demonstrated rhetorical
efficacy through literary narrative. The examples provided by these Fürstenspiegel
strongly point to evidence of a medieval rhetorical tradition that extends beyond the three
meta-rhetorical handbooks identified by James Murphy. Although Murphy has identified
literary exempla as a constituent element of the ars preadicandi tradition,260 the rhetorical
importance of exempla as the containers for rhetorical advice has been relatively
understudied in medieval rhetorical historiography. As one of the premier generic
conventions of medieval literature, the exemplum has been analyzed in modern
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scholarship as a means for establishing doctrinal and cultural authority,261 as the means
by which the ethical frameworks governing sovereignty were constructed,262 and as a tool
for maintaining and challenging the unity both between author, text, and reader and the
general unity of the political state through the use of fiction.263 In addition to the cultural,
ethical, and didactic frameworks constituted by exempla, the historical exempla used by
authors such as John of Salisbury, John Gower, and John Lydgate construct rhetorical
frameworks—both in that they depict effective rhetorical practice and in that they
themselves are rhetorical constructions adapted by their authors to articulate particular
theoretical precepts.
The consistent use of historical, rather than literary or mythological, exempla by
these three Fürstenspiegel authors to define and depict rhetorical practice points toward a
culture of rhetorical counsel in which rhetorical and historical education are coconstitutive. Although Richard Firth Green has already detailed that the contents of the
libraries of the English aristocracy were filled primarily by grammatical and historical
texts,264 the field of medieval rhetorical historiography has traditionally interpreted the
relationship between medieval conceptions of rhetoric and history through the lens of
recovery, transmission, and influence instead of through an explicitly didactic
framework. The turn within the Fürstenspiegel toward teaching rhetoric through
historical example corresponds to the medieval practice of teaching rhetoric through
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exercitatio, the imitation of authors. In the same manner that medieval students learned
rhetorical composition by imitating the literary examples found in their school texts,
medieval princes developed their prudence by imitating the virtuous actions of their
historical forebearers. For Salisbury, Gower, and Lydgate, the truth provided by the
historical narrative bolstered their authority both as literary authors capable of adapting
the historical record to reflect their own political systems and as teachers disciplining the
sovereignty of the prince under ethical frameworks. This interplay between history and
rhetoric in the Fürstenspiegel is fittingly represented by the marginal Latin glosses found
in Book 7 of the Confessio Amantis. According to Janet Coleman, although Gower’s
marginal glosses that purport to provide moral exegesis often complicate the moral
communicated by the exempla found in the Confessio, when Gower glosses his historical
sources, such as Livy, his exegesis always renders the literal truth of the historical
record.265 The historical exemplum functions as a tool for teaching rhetoric precisely
because the truth of its narrative is accepted a priori. The stability of the literal
interpretation of the historical exemplum affords its author the opportunity to heighten
the example’s allegorical and tropological senses, which, in this case, provides a
rhetorical education.
The extent to which Fürstenspiegel authors used exempla to articulate rhetorical
theory further erodes contemporary distinctions between literature and rhetoric as
disciplines. According to Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, by the twelfth century in the
Latin West, foundational concepts on composition held by rhetorical theory came to
inform medieval definitions of literary genres insofar as “the articulation of form is
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treated as a dimension of representation, not as a separate process.”266 As these case
studies reveal, during the medieval period, stark delineations between grammar and
rhetoric had become blurred. Though much recent scholarship in rhetorical
historiography has challenged the notion that literary and the rhetorical were distinct
disciplines,267 the case of the Fürstenspiegel decisively demonstrates that texts that are
considered “literary” today clearly articulated rhetorical theory and depicted rhetorical
practices. Expanding the historical archive studied by medieval rhetorical historiography
to include nominally literary texts can supplement the field’s excellent work in
recovering the textual traditions that constituted medieval rhetoric. For an archive in
which records of rhetorical practice are limited or, in the case of chronicle histories,
presented from a particularly biased perspective, the historical exemplum provides an
object of analysis that scholars can draw upon to understand how medieval authors
imagined classical rhetoric in practice. At the same time, through the careful review of
the sources that informed medieval history writing, the field can also trace how medieval
authors adapted these depictions of rhetorical practice to account both for the cultural and
political systems dominant during the medieval period and its burgeoning rhetorical
theory. In so doing, additional texts that have not necessarily been considered rhetorical,
such as Salisbury’s Historia Pontificalis and Lydgate’s Serpent of Division, become open
to consideration as rhetorical texts.
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IV: Fürstenspiegel provide politically and culturally specific instantiations of
deliberative rhetorical theory
As the various parts of Aristotle’s corpus were being recovered, particular authors
took up different aspects of Aristotelian theory according to the needs of the political
theory their Fürstenspiegel expressed. The collected case studies trace instantiations of
deliberative rhetorical theory that are specifically designed for the political systems
forwarded by each Fürstenspiegel author. By situating rhetorical theory within the larger
political aims of the Fürstenspiegel, Salisbury, Gower, and Lydgate collectively
demonstrate what has often been overlooked in scholarship on medieval politics—
namely, that, despite traditional beliefs that the rise of monarchism during the medieval
period foreclosed the possibility for deliberative rhetorical practice, rhetoric itself was
foundational to the development of political theory for these authors. Although medieval
rhetorical historiography has recovered deliberative rhetoric as a practice during the
medieval period, primarily through the act of counsel268 and the development of the
communal voice,269 these treatments of deliberative rhetoric reflect a tendency within
historiography to adopt a totalizing perspective when discussing the development of
rhetorical theory.270 However, as this dissertation’s methodology indicates, when
medieval rhetoricians are treated individually rather than as representatives of larger
trends, it becomes possible to isolate the specific interventions made by each author to
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deliberative rhetorical theory and to analyze how these adaptations were inflected within
the political theory espoused by a given Fürstenspiegel. Further, by tracing these
interventions within the broader medieval culture of rhetorical practice, it becomes
evident that the definitions of rhetoric developed by Fürstenspiegel authors had purchase
outside the pages of the text.
In short, although the theories of deliberative rhetoric found in medieval
Fürstenspiegel share superficial similarities, their specific instantiations reflect their
authors’ preferred modes of governance. For John of Salisbury, Aristotle provided a
systematic methodology that served as an alternative to the theory of natural talent
espoused by Cornificius and his followers. In the hands of a sovereign, Aristotle’s
rhetorical-dialectical methodology allowed for the distinction between effective didactic
criticism and flattery that worked to separate the sovereign from true self-knowledge. By
employing this rhetorical-dialectical methodology, the sovereign learns to interpret the
civic law in line with natural law and thereby subsumes a portion of his sovereignty
under the Church. Given Gower’s absolutist tendencies, his marriage of plain rhetorical
speech with Aristotelian virtue ethics allowed for a deliberative rhetorical system that
centered the sovereign’s interpretation of contingent situations that may be difficult to
comprehend for a populace who lacks the deliberative capacities of the sovereign.
Gower’s skepticism of the sensual nature of language can be traced back to Gower’s
negative experience with eloquence during the Peasant’s Revolt of 1381. At the same
time, by requiring that rhetoricians possess a perfect orientation to virtue, Gower crafts a
political system that limits the potential for a prince to turn to tyrannical and appetitive
rule. Under the Gowerian model, the pairing of rhetoric with virtue reorients aim of
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deliberative rhetoric toward the act of internal deliberation. Finally, by the fifteenth
century, Lydgate leverages the increasing legitimacy of rhetoric as a discipline to
construct a theory of deliberative rhetoric in which stylistics and ornamentation are
necessary for effective political oration. In so doing, he reimagines the orator in the
image of the poet, as a mechanical craftsman who amplifies the raw material of language
according to the design of the ideal form held within his intellect. Through the example
of Cicero and Caesar, Lydgate calls upon the English nobility to employ rhetoric to refine
their political sensibilities. These three examples capture the expansive way in which
rhetoric was conceived within the Fürstenspiegel tradition.
Although this dissertation is limited in its implications insofar as it only examines
three Fürstenspiegel in the context of English politics and education within a relatively
short period of time, the widespread circulation of the Fürstenspiegel genre in the Latin
West provides an opportunity for considering local examples of the relationship between
rhetoric and politics. The persistence of the Fürstenspiegel across temporal and political
borders during the medieval period makes it an ideal genre for investigating specific
uptakes of and adaptations to deliberative rhetorical theory. Even within the English
tradition, this dissertation has not examined the definitions of rhetoric found in prominent
Fürstenspiegel, especially the Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, Thomas Hoccleve’s
The Regiment of Princes, or John Trevisa’s middle English translation of Giles of Rome’s
De regimine principum. By reading these texts against and across the political and
cultural milieu in which they circulated, medieval rhetorical historiography can analyze
how definitions and depictions of rhetorical practice shifted in response to moments of
political crisis. For example, reading the composition of Hoccleve’s Regiment concurrent
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with the Lancastrian attempt to legitimate their claim to the throne of England through
textual means is an obvious avenue for future research on the relationship between
rhetoric and politics. Through the careful comparison of the rhetorical theory found in
Fürstenspiegel and the immediate cultural and political situations surrounding their
composition, we can move toward a conception of medieval rhetoric that extends beyond
the theoretical discussions of rhetoric found in meta-rhetorical treatises and handbooks.
Concluding Remarks
The intent of this dissertation has never been to suggest that the medieval English
Fürstenspiegel under consideration here form a coherent or chronological development of
deliberative rhetorical theory. Rather, I believe, the strength of this dissertation lies in
accepting medieval theorists’ definitions and depictions of rhetoric in their own terms and
in displaying the multiplicity of traditions that comprise the larger category of medieval
deliberative rhetoric. While the Fürstenspiegel genre, as a whole, attempts to create a
normativizing historical and ethical framework, the rhetorical theories that populate the
genre imbue its audience with multiple strategies for engaging in rhetorical invention and
intervention. The continued and careful study of rhetoric in the Fürstenspiegel can only
enliven the scholarly conversation on medieval rhetoric by offering visions of rhetoric
that are as individual as their authors.
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